On Dispensing with Q?: Goodacre on the Relation of Luke to Matthew

JOHN S. KLOPPENBORG
Department for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto, Toronto M5S 2E8, Canada

The case against Q depends logically on the plausibility of Luke’s direct use of Matthew. Goodacre’s carefully argued book contends (a) that none of the objections to the Mark-without-Q hypothesis is valid; (b) that given certain assumptions about Luke’s aesthetic preferences, it is plausible that he systematically reordered the ‘Q’ material from Matthew; (c) that Luke’s rearrangement of Matthew shows as much intelligence and purposefulness as Matthew’s; and (d) that certain features of the ‘Q’ in Luke 3–7 betray the influence of Matthean redaction. Careful scrutiny of these arguments shows that (a) is only partially true; that Goodacre’s assumptions about Lukan aesthetics (b) are open to serious objection; and that while (c) is true, Goodacre’s argument in (d) ultimately cuts against his case against Q.

The publication of Mark Goodacre’s The Case Against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem1 marks an important advance in the articulation and defence of the view that Luke composed his gospel using Mark and Matthew as immediate sources. This theory, first proposed by James H. Ropes2 and Morton Enslin3 in the United States, and espoused by Austin Farrer,4 John Drury,5 and

2 J. H. Ropes, The Synoptic Gospels (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University; London: OUP, 1934) 66–73. Ropes did not mount a full defence of this suggestion, though he did suggest that Luke ‘takes pains that no group of sayings shall exceed a certain moderate length’ and ‘deliberately avoids inclusive topics and large masses’, preferring ‘rapid contrasts and subtle suggestion to give variety and a certain quietly dramatic effectiveness to his portrayal’ (71).
Michael Goulder in the United Kingdom, hypothesizes Markan priority, Matthew’s use of Mark, and Luke’s direct knowledge and use of both. Goodacre’s ‘case against Q’ is not based on claims that the notion of a sayings source is inherently implausible, or that analogies to ‘Q’ are lacking, or that a sayings collection that did not advert to the death and resurrection of Jesus is unthinkable, as some of Goodacre’s predecessors had urged. Instead, Goodacre argues that given Luke’s direct knowledge of Matthew the supposition of a sayings source is simply unnecessary. This is indeed the right way to frame an argument against Q, which is not a hypothesis on its own, despite those who tirelessly refer to ‘the Q hypothesis’. Rather, Q is a corollary of the hypotheses of Markan priority and the independence of Matthew and Luke, since it is then necessary to account for the material that Matthew and Luke have in common but which they did not take from Mark. The case for Q rests on the implausibility of Luke’s direct use of


7 See, for example, Farrer, ‘Dispensing with Q’, 325: ‘We have no reason to suppose documents of the Q type to have been plentiful. . . . No, in postulating Q we are postulating the unique, and that is to commit a prima facie offence against the principle of economy in explanation.’ It is not clear what Farrer meant by ‘documents of the Q type’. In 1955 Farrer was still likely unaware of the Coptic *Gospel of Thomas*; but the Oxyrhynchus fragments had been known for more than half a century. Whether Farrer thought that *P.Oxy*. 1, 654, and 655 were dependent upon the Synoptics should have been irrelevant to his point, since his observations had to do with the genre of Q. Moreover, numerous sayings collections were extant in Near Eastern languages, Greek, and Latin. See the survey of these in M. Küchler, *Frühjüdische Weisheitstraditionen: Zum Fortgang weisheitlichen Denkens im Bereich des frühjüdischen Jahweglaubens* (OBO 26; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979); J. S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Studies in Antiquity and Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 263–316; H. Brunner, ‘Die Lehren’, *Handbuch der Orientalistik. Erste Abteilung, Erster Band: Ägyptologie. Zweiter Abschnitt: Literatur* (2. Aufl.; ed. H. Kees; Leiden and Köln: E. J. Brill, 1970) 113–39; K. A. Kitchen, ‘The Basic Literary Forms and Formulations of Ancient Instructional Writings in Egypt and Western Asia’, *Studien zu altägyptischen Lebenslehren* (OBO 28; ed. E. Hornung and O. Keel; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979) 235–82.

Goulder (*Luke*, 51) notes the analogy of the *Gospel of Thomas* but dismisses it immediately as a ‘gnostical revelation of the risen Lord [which] is very different from our hypothetical compound Q’. That the *Gospel of Thomas* should be classified as either a ‘revelation’ or ‘gnostic’ is highly doubtful. It appears that Goulder thinks that *Thomas* and Q are sufficiently different in terms of conceptual content to make comparison problematic. But this confuses form with content. The several sub-genres of sayings collections available in Near Eastern and in Greek and Latin literature were flexible enough to embrace a wide range of conceptual content, from domestic instructions to specialized instruction for scribes and retainers of Near Eastern monarchies, to sectarian wisdom, to Pythagorean and gnostic esoteric instructions.
Matthew or Matthew’s direct use of Luke. Goodacre’s reply, then, is to argue that Luke’s use of Matthew is indeed plausible, and hence Q is unnecessary.

One of the virtues of Goodacre’s book is its sense of proportion and balance. Where Ropes’s proposal was little more than an aside, Farrer’s case logically flimsy, and Goulder’s exposition so full, subtle, and complex that it is accessible only to specialists, Goodacre’s argument is clearly structured, careful in its logic, and helpfully illustrated with a few choice Synoptic texts. As will become clear, I do not believe that Goodacre has made the case for Luke’s use of Matthew. Nevertheless, his book is perhaps the best presentation to date of the ‘Mark-without-Q hypothesis’ – a hypothesis which, while underappreciated in Germany and North America, deserves careful consideration by all who take Synoptic studies seriously.

Naming the hypothesis

Before I comment on Goodacre’s arguments, a note about nomenclature. Ropes and Enslin were first to articulate the hypothesis of Markan priority and Luke’s direct use of Matthew, but its most prominent advocates have been Farrer, Goulder, and Drury in Britain. For this reason, some have referred to the hypothesis as the Farrer–Goulder hypothesis or, less commonly, the Goulder–Drury hypothesis. Critics have in fact focused most of their attention on Goulder’s views, probably because Farrer’s 1955 article, while rich in grand pronouncements, was weak in its logic and use of evidence and too encumbered by irrelevant theological assumptions to warrant serious engagement. From that point of view at least, the hypothesis would be better called the Goulder hypothesis, since it was Goulder who placed the hypothesis on a serious footing.

Although Goodacre recognizes that Goulder is a far more able defender of the hypothesis than Farrer, he wishes to distance himself from some of the complexities of Goulder’s views, including his theory that each of the Synoptics was composed with a cycle of lectionary readings in mind, and Goulder’s speculation that in the latter part of his gospel Luke was working backwards through Matthew’s gospel. Goodacre prefers to call it the Farrer theory, notwithstanding the fact that

8 Thus Enslin, Christian Beginnings, 432: ‘The very existence of this hypothetical source depends solely on the assumption of the independence of Matthew and Luke. If either used the other, there is no need to postulate a Q to explain the so-called “double tradition”.’

the details of Farrer’s argument receive hardly any scrutiny in the book. As an alternative designation one might propose the Ropes–Enslin hypothesis, to put things in historical perspective, or the Goulder–Drury–Goodacre hypothesis. But such names perhaps attach the hypothesis too closely to individual scholars. The One Gospel hypothesis might also be an appropriate name insofar as Mark is posited as the ultimate documentary source for the other two. But the Griesbach hypothesis, nowadays styled the Two Gospel hypothesis, could equally claim this name since it posits Matthew as the ultimate source for Mark and Luke, and Mark as a conflation of his two predecessor gospels. Perhaps a more apt name is the Mark-without-Q hypothesis (hereafter, MwQH) – which is, indeed, the original name of Goodacre’s web site.10

Preliminary arguments

Goodacre’s first three chapters lay the groundwork for the main thesis and clarify his position vis-à-vis the two other dominant Synoptic hypotheses. In agreement with the Two Document hypothesis (2DH), the MwQH affirms Markan priority; but where the 2DH insists on the independence of Luke from Matthew, the MwQH asserts Luke’s knowledge of Matthew. In this latter respect, the MwQH concurs with the Two Gospel hypothesis (2GH). But the 2GH views Mark as a tertiary gospel, the product of a conflation of Matthew and Luke. Thus:

2DH

Mark

Matt

Q

Luke

Matt

MwQH

Mark

Luke

Matt

2GH

Mark

Luke

Matt

Mark

There is much with which to agree in these first chapters. Goodacre observes that the 2DH, because it has been embraced by so many for so long, has achieved a false aura of received truth. This partly explains the fact that traditional objections to the MwQH are framed in ways that tacitly presuppose the 2DH. Since Goodacre appreciates the challenge from the 2GH as some of his predecessors did not, he also recognizes that Markan priority can no longer be taken for granted and thus mounts a defence of that thesis (Chapter 2). I have no quarrel with Goodacre’s case for Markan priority and so will pass over this portion of his argument. His first and third chapters on the status quo and on traditional objections to the MwQH, however, deserve comment.

10 The web address is http://www.ntgateway.com/Q/. The site is now called The Case Against Q web site.
Challenging the status quo

The need for a thorough defence of the MwQH should be obvious to all involved in the study of the Synoptic gospels, but it is pressing for Goodacre for two reasons. First, the 2DH has, at least in the minds of some, achieved near hegemony, a situation that threatens both wrongly to elevate Markan priority and Q to the status of received truths and perforce to exclude all other alternatives. Second, the MwQH has in Goodacre’s view received inadequate consideration, especially outside the UK.

1. It is true that some have incautiously presented Q as though it were an assured result of research rather than the corollary of the hypothesis of Markan priority and the independence of Matthew and Luke. Willi Marxsen once ventured:

[t]his Two-Sources theory [sic] has been so widely accepted by scholars that one feels inclined to abandon the term ‘theory’ (in the sense of ‘hypothesis’). We can in fact regard it as an assured finding – but we must bear in mind that there are inevitable uncertainties as far as the extent and form of Q and the special material are concerned.

Happily it is now difficult to find similar expressions of rhetorical bravado in favour of the 2DH. Yet it must be pointed out that these sorts of overstatements and the conversion of hypotheses into ‘facts’ by sheer dint of repetition or by logical sleight of hand are not solely the province of advocates of the 2DH; Farrer and Goulder have in fact done the same. It is just as misleading, however, to insist on

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11 The sense that the 2DH was ‘obviously true’ was in part a function of the near ubiquity of its reception in the early twentieth century, following the collapse of the main competitor, the Griesbach hypothesis, after the death of F. C. Baur in 1860. Adolf von Harnack in Berlin (1907), Julius Wellhausen in Göttingen (1905), F. C. Burkitt at Cambridge (1906), Heinrich Julius Holtzmann at Strasbourg (1907), B. W. Bacon at Yale (1908), and Kirsopp Lake in Leiden (1909) all pronounced in favour of the 2DH. Holtzmann’s statement is typical: ‘On this point virtually all agree, Germans as well as others, Europeans and Americans, and for the vast majority the Markan hypothesis is no longer just a hypothesis’ (‘Die Marcus-Kontroverse in ihrer heutigen Gestalt’, ARW 10 [1907] 19–20). Holtzmann named as dissenters only Klostermann, Zahn, Hilgenfeld, and Merx, as well as Holsten and Keim, who continued to advocate the views of Baur and Strauss.


13 Farrer, ‘Dispensing with Q’, 333: ‘The Q hypothesis is a hypothesis, that is its weakness. To be rid of it we have no need of a contrary hypothesis, we merely have to make St. Luke’s use of St. Matthew intelligible; and to understand what St. Luke made of St. Matthew we need no more than to consider what St. Luke made of his own book. Now St. Luke’s book is not a
describing Q as ‘hypothetical’ as if it were the only hypothetical construct in scholarship on Christian origins. John P. Meier advises: ‘I cannot help thinking that biblical scholarship would be greatly advanced if every morning all exegetes would repeat as a mantra: “Q is a hypothetical document.”’ Meier’s exhortation is well taken but also bespeaks confusion. Q is indeed a hypothetical document. Equally hypothetical, however, are Matthew and Luke’s dependence upon Mark, something that Meier (along with Farrer and Goulder) apparently did not think it worthwhile calling ‘hypothetical’. These too might be added to Meier’s mantra. For that matter, the text that we call ‘Mark’ is a hypothetical document. It is reconstructed on the basis of dozens of manuscripts, none earlier than the beginning of the third century CE. The substance lent to the text of Mark by the printing presses of the Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft should not be allowed to disguise the fact that ‘Mark’ is not an extant document, but a text that is reconstructed from much later manuscripts with the help of hypotheses developed to account for the numerous disagreements between those manuscripts and the text-critical criteria that flow from those hypotheses. What we reconstruct as ‘the’ text of Mark is, furthermore, only one in an imaginable series of texts extending from the initial draft(s) of Mark, to some putative ‘final form’ of the gospel, to the texts of Mark used by Matthew and Luke. With the help of an anachronistic analogy of modern publishing, we designate one of that series as the ‘final’ text of Mark and focus our reconstructive efforts on that hypothetical text.

Thus, the first point I should like to make is relatively simple: it is as mistaken to treat the 2DH (and the existence of Q) as an assured result of research as it is to insist on the hypothetical nature of Q and not simultaneously acknowledge the hypothetical character of all of the dependency relationships that we posit. Luke’s supposed dependence on Mark is not any less hypothetical than Luke’s dependence on Q, merely because we have third-century manuscripts of Mark. Still less

hypothesised entity. Here is a copy of it on my desk.’ In this curious bit of reasoning Farrer confuses data (the text of Luke) with hypotheses and does not seem to realize that Luke’s relationship to Matthew is a hypothesis.

Goulder declared, ‘Luke’s use of Mark is a fact (or generally accepted as one), while Q is a mere postulate’ (‘Is Q a Juggernaut?’, JBL 115 [1996] 670). It is true that Q is a postulate, or, better, corollary. But it is absurd to claim that widespread acceptance of the hypothesis of Markan priority converts it into a ‘fact’. Goulder’s observation that ‘Q is now hardly defended in the University of Oxford’ (ibid., 668) is – to adapt his own phrase – both false (since the arrival at Oxford of C. M. Tuckett) and logically irrelevant. On this, see John S. Kloppenborg, ‘Is There a New Paradigm?’, Christology, Controversy, and Community: Essays in Honour of David Catchpole (NovTSup 99; ed. D. G. Horrell and C. M. Tuckett; Leiden, Boston, and Köln: E. J. Brill, 2000) 23–47.

is Luke’s use of Mark a ‘fact’ because many scholars find it an effective hypothesis in accounting for the shape of Luke.

Goodacre claims that ‘it is rare in the recent literature to find a careful account of the origin of the Q hypothesis, at the very least locating the postulation of Q as an element in the discussion of the Synoptic Problem’ (p. 4). He refers to J. D. G. Dunn’s *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament*\(^{15}\) and to John Dominic Crossan’s *The Historical Jesus*\(^{16}\) as cases in point. Dunn’s synthetic treatment of the thought of the early Jesus movement, however, hardly features Q in a substantial way, and it seems perverse to demand of such a book that it document each of the many hypotheses concerning early Christian literature upon which it depends. The need to acknowledge the hypothetical character of Q and alternate possibilities is arguably greater in the case of Crossan’s book, given the fact that the structure of his argument rests in part on a stratigraphy of the Jesus tradition in which Q figures prominently.\(^{17}\) The real test of Goodacre’s assertion, however, is not literature on the historical Jesus or the theology of the NT but rather literature on Q itself. It is true that some of the studies on Q published in the 1970s and 1980s took the existence of Q for granted and did not bother to discuss other Synoptic hypotheses.\(^{18}\) But thanks no doubt to the proddings of William R. Farmer, Michael Goulder, and Goodacre himself, this is no longer generally the case.\(^{19}\)

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17 Goodacre admits that Crossan does discuss the hypothetical character of Q in his *The Birth of Christianity: Discovering What Happened in the Years Immediately After the Execution of Jesus* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998) 110.


19 The hypothetical character of Q is acknowledged and alternative explanations mentioned in R. A. Piper, *Wisdom in the Q-Tradition: The Aphoristic Teaching of Jesus* (SNTSMS 61;
Goodacre of course knows and cites all of this literature, but it is conspicuously missing or buried in the footnotes when he laments the inattention of scholars to Q’s hypothetical character. It is true that some who avail themselves of research on Q do not include all of the qualifications that might in some contexts be appropriate; but recent scholars who write directly on Q have fairly consistently acknowledged its hypothetical nature and the existence of alternate hypotheses.

2. The obverse of the widespread acceptance enjoyed by the 2DH is the general neglect of other hypotheses. Goodacre is right that the MwQH has been undeservedly ignored in Germany and underappreciated in North America. Goulder once complained that in German literature the only alternative to the 2DH to be imagined, if indeed one is imagined at all, is the neo-Griesbach (Two Gospel) hypothesis. But the situation in Europe is not entirely bleak. Frans Neirynck in Belgium has discussed Goulder’s views extensively.20 And despite a few


A few recent authors pass over the issue of the Synoptic problem quickly or do not discuss it at all: L. E. Vaage, Galilean Upstarts: Jesus’ First Followers According to Q (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994) 141 n. 30, cites, but does not engage, Bellinzone’s collection of articles on the Synoptic problem (The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal [Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1985]) and the bibliography by T. R. W. Longstaff and P. Thomas (The Synoptic Problem: A Bibliography, 1716–1988 [New Gospel Studies 4; Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1988]). He adds, ‘I obviously assume, therefore, that Q once existed and that, furthermore, the text of Q as used by Matthew and Luke in the composition of their gospels can still be recovered’ (7). The comment appears to be directed not at dissenters from the 2DH, but at those who ostensibly adhere to the 2DH but who refuse to accept its logical entailments. Alan Kirk (The Composition of the Sayings Source: Genre, Synchrony, & Wisdom Reduction in Q [NovTSup 91; Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1998]) does not discuss alternative Synoptic theories, and Richard Horsley and Jonathan Draper (Whoever Hears You Hears Me: Prophets, Performance, and Tradition in Q [Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999]) have no discussion of the Synoptic problem and only comment that ‘many New Testament interpreters do not believe in the existence of Q’ (2).

mischaracterizations of the MwQH in North America, it has been promoted by E. P. Sanders and Margaret Davies in the American edition of their *Studying the Synoptic Gospels,* featured in a symposium at Johns Hopkins University, and discussed critically by C. M. Tuckett (*Q and the History of Early Christianity,* also in an American edition), and by Canadians Robert A. Derrenbacker, Zeba Crook, and J. S. Kloppenborg.

Objections to the MwQH

Next Goodacre turns to three arguments that have been invoked repeatedly against the supposition that Luke used Matthew (and hence in support of the independence of Matthew and Luke), and two positive arguments that have been mounted in favour of Q (noting rightly that the latter are relevant only if the former are valid). Thus he first considers the objections that (1) Luke is ignorant of Matthew’s modifications to Mark; (2) Luke seems unaware of Matthew’s ‘M’ additions to Mark; and (3) in the double tradition, sometimes Matthew’s


formulation and sometimes Luke’s seems the more primitive. He then discusses suggestions that (4) Q displays a distinctive profile and character and that (5) in favour of the 2DH is the fact that it is an effective hypothesis that accounts for much of the data of the Synoptic gospels. If these three objections to the MwQH and two arguments in favour of Q can be shown to be without merit, Goodacre will have succeeded in clearing logical space for his own proposals.

1. Matthew’s additions in the triple tradition

Detractors of the MwQH regularly note that Luke shows no knowledge of Matthew’s additions to Mark in the triple tradition. Goodacre is quick to point out that this objection is actually formulated from the perspective of the 2DH, for it ignores the Mark–Q overlaps, ‘Q’ material itself, and the minor agreements, all of which on the MwQH are materials which Matthew added to Mark and which Luke took from Matthew.

Still, the objection cannot be evaded so easily. What the objection normally has in view are the Matthean additions to Markan pericopae in Matt 3.15; 12.5–7; 13.14–17; 14.28–31; 16.16–19; 19.9, 19b; 27.19, 24, all of which Luke lacks. Two of these offer no difficulty to the MwQH: Matt 14.28–31 (Peter’s maritime outing) and 19.9 (Matthew’s qualification of the divorce prohibition with μὴ ἔρπονείας) are additions to Markan pericopae that Luke omits entirely. Goodacre does not comment on the Matthean additions in 12.5–7; 13.14–17; 19.19b; 27.19, 24, and instead focuses his defence on Matthean additions to Mark at Matt 3.15 and 16.16–19.

Matt 3.15. It is true that as it stands Luke cannot preserve Matthew’s conversation between Jesus and John in his baptism scene because in Luke John is already in prison. But this begs the question of Luke’s reasons for the elaborate expedient of incarcerating John prior to Jesus’ baptism. If Conzelmann’s view of Lukan periodizing, which he based on reading the phrase ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται μέχρι Ἰωάννου (Luke 16.16) as including John, were to be accepted, one might conjecture that Luke felt compelled to segregate John from Jesus and implicitly to relegate him to a bygone era, despite the fact that Matthew treated John and Jesus as colleagues. But there are difficulties with Conzelmann’s version of Lukan periodizing: the striking parallels that Luke created between John and Jesus in the infancy stories, Luke’s depiction of John as a prophetic precursor to Jesus in 3.1–2, and in particular his stipulation in Acts 1.21–2 that all of the events from John’s

baptism until the ascension are *sine qua non* for apostolic witnesses (όρξιμονος ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτισματος Ἰωάννου ἐως τῆς ἡμέρας ἡ ἀνελήμφη ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν) all suggest that for Luke John belongs to the central period of salvation history and not to the conclusion of the preceding era. The more likely reasons for Luke’s incarceration of John in 3.19–20 have to do with the fact that Luke had taken over Mark’s description of John’s baptism as βάπτισμα μετανοίας εἰς ἀφέσιν ἁμαρτιῶν (Mark 1.4 = Luke 3.3) and that Jesus’ baptism by John would inevitably raise the issues of Jesus’ sinfulness and the status of Jesus vis-à-vis John. It seems doubtful that Luke’s incarceration of John would have been necessary had he been aware that Matthew had solved both problems. By having John expressly acknowledge Jesus as his superior (Matt 3.15) John ceased to be a competitor to Jesus; and by having Jesus describe the purpose of his baptism as πληρώσαι πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην Jesus’ baptism was no longer associated with the elimination of sin.

*Matt 16.16b–19.* In accounting for Luke’s omission of Jesus’ words to Peter in Matt 16.16b–19 Goodacre invokes Farrer’s notion of certain elements of Matthew being ‘Luke pleasing’. Thus Luke omitted some elements of Matthew because they were not ‘Luke pleasing’. This is a principle of exceedingly dubious merit. ‘Luke pleasing’ words are simply words that Luke has in common with Matthew. On the 2DH they represent ‘minimal Q’. ‘Luke displeasing’ words are merely points where Matthew and Luke disagree and where, on the 2DH, either Matthew or Luke (or both) have altered Q. Farrer’s standard explanation of why Luke took certain materials from Matthew and omitted others is that he was ‘moved’ or ‘inspired’ to do so. But this only takes certain textual features and converts them

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30 Farrer (‘Dispensing with Q’, 325) described the contents of Matthew as ‘rabbinic’ (‘M’) and ‘non-rabbinic, popular’ (‘Q’) materials; only the latter were ‘Luke-pleasing’. Farrer further explained that ‘St. Luke was not interested in the detail of the anti-Pharisaic controversy and neglects much teaching of Christ which attacks the Pharisees on their own ground’ (324–5). But Farrer never defined what he meant by ‘rabbinic’, with the consequence that the principle was empty as an explanatory device. Since Luke preserves anti-Pharisaic sayings from Q or Matthew (11.37–52) and has other anti-Pharisaic sayings of his own (12.1; 16.14–15; 18.10–14), and since he uses *qal wehomer* arguments (14.5), a typical rabbinic argument, Farrer’s attempt to define Luke-pleasingness became tautological: Luke preserved from Matthew what he preserved (= Luke-pleasing) and did not preserve what he did not preserve (= Luke-displeasing). Farrer’s ‘explanations’ of Luke’s inclusion and exclusion of Matthean materials, Luke’s sometimes more primitive-looking formulations, his reordering of Matthew, and his separation of double tradition from the triple tradition in Matthew (333–53) simply paraphrase the contents of Luke with the comment that Luke was ‘inspired’ (335) or ‘moved’ (342) to write in this way. Such paraphrases have no explanatory value but merely rename the problem.
into aesthetic preferences attributed to Luke with the help of the hypothesis that it presupposes. That is, it merely *renames the problem*; it does not offer an *explanation*.

Goodacre realizes that the notion of ‘Luke displeasingness’ must be justified by pointing to certain patterns in Lukan redaction. This is precisely the sort of argument that is needed to render Farrer’s bald assertions plausible. Hence, Goodacre avers, Matthew’s additions in Matt 16.17–19 would not have appealed to Luke, since ‘Luke is not as positive about Peter overall as Matthew’, and in the narrative development of Acts Peter progressively recedes (p. 51).

What are we to make of this explanation? In the first place it is slightly inattentive to textual details, for Luke in fact accentuates the role of Peter. Although Luke presumably knew the brief Markan account of the call of Simon and Andrew (Mark 1.16–18), he substituted a version that omitted Andrew entirely and featured the exchange between Simon and Jesus prominently (5.1–11). The miraculous catch of fish (5.1–11) along with the immediately preceding healing of Simon’s mother-in-law (4.38–9) combine to explain his recognition of Jesus as one endowed with divine power, making him the first disciple to do so and placing this recognition far earlier in the gospel narrative than either Mark or Matthew does. Elsewhere Luke redactionally highlights the role of Peter. At 8.45 he transfers a comment by Mark’s disciples (5.31) to Peter, making him a spokesperson; at 12.41 Luke has Peter interject a question that introduces another parable (12.42–6); and at 22.8 Luke identifies Mark’s two anonymous disciples (14.13) as Peter and John, the heroes of the first part of Acts. And Luke omits the sharp rebuke of Peter in Mark 8.32b–33.

Second, Goodacre’s suggestion runs aground on Luke’s treatment of the prediction of Peter’s denial in 22.31–4. Not only does Luke pre-empt the denial by having Jesus announce that his prayer for him will mean that his faith will not fail, but Jesus predicts that Peter will assume a leading function in ‘strengthening’ his friends. Luke thereby assigns to Peter a key pastoral role in the post-Easter church, so that 22.31–4 functions rather as a parallel (though not equivalent) to Matt 16.17–19.

Finally, Goodacre’s assertion also runs foul of the fact that the first half of Acts features Peter’s activities prominently, making him a key preacher and apologist, and featuring him in the origins of the Gentile mission. Goodacre rather weakly observes that Peter ‘progressively recedes’ in Acts. Such a statement misleadingly suggests a tendency in Lukan redaction. But such is not the case. Peter appears 61 times in the first 12 chapters of Acts and disappears thereafter (except at 15.19) not because Luke is not ‘positive’ about Peter but because Luke’s focus has shifted to Paul. The disappearance of Peter is a function of Luke’s source material in Acts 13–28 and his interest in Paul, not a symptom of a redactional tendency to eliminate or downplay Peter’s role. In Acts 1–12 and the gospel, which after all is what
Goodacre must explain, Luke assigns to Peter a key role in church-founding and in the inauguration of the Gentile mission. Had Luke seen Matt 16.17–19, we might well expect him to have rephrased some of it; given the positive role that Luke assigns to Peter, it seems doubtful that Matt 16.17-19 would have made no impact at all on Luke.

The notion of ‘Luke-displeasing’ elements cannot save the day in the case of Matt 12.5–7 (Matthew’s addition to Mark 2.23–8), since Luke has Jesus use a very similar argument at Luke 14.4–6. Nor will it work for Matt 13.14–17 (added to Mark 4.10–12), for in that case we know from Luke 3.4–6 (= Isa 40.3 + 4–6) that Luke elsewhere extends quotations from the Tanak and adds other Isaian quotations (cf. also Luke 4.18–19 = Isa 61.1–2; 58.6). Moreover, the second part of Matthew’s extension of Mark (Matt 13.16–17) appears elsewhere in Luke (10.23–4). Nor does Farrer’s expedient work with Matthew’s modifications to the portrait of Pilate, since it is manifest from Luke’s own treatment of the passion narrative that he is keen to shift the blame from the Romans to the high priests. Pilate’s wife’s dream (Matt 27.19, inserting into Mark 15.10–11) and Matthew’s hand-washing scene (27.24, added to Mark 15.15) would have served Luke’s purposes admirably, especially since the dream declares Jesus to be δικαίος, which is precisely what Luke’s centurion says of Jesus (23.47), and the handwashing scene has Pilate declare Jesus to be innocent, something that Luke has redactionally added to Mark at Luke 23.4, 14, 22.

In these cases it is difficult to account for Luke’s omission of Matthean additions to Mark since Luke is demonstrably interested in precisely those motifs that also appear in the Matthean additions. That these additions were ‘Luke displeasing’ is manifestly not the case.

2. Luke’s lack of ‘M’

Next, Goodacre takes on the objection that Luke lacks ‘M’ material. Of course this is analytically true: ‘M’ material is what is present only in Matthew. Responding to a criticism of Robert Stein31 Goodacre correctly observes again that this objection is framed from the point of view of the 2DH. For although Luke has little of what appears in Matt 1–2 and Matt 28, it is misleading to suggest that Luke

31 R. H. Stein, *The Synoptic Problem: An Introduction* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987) 102: ‘If we assume that Luke used Matthew, how are we to explain his great omission of all the narrative material outside of the triple tradition found in Matthew? Why would Luke have omitted such material as the coming of the wise men (Matt 2.1–12)? Would not the presence of such Gentiles at the birth of Jesus have been meaningful for Luke’s Gentile-oriented Gospel? Why would he have omitted the flight to Egypt and the return to Nazareth (Matt 2.13–23); the story of the guards at the tomb (Matt 27.62–66) and their report (Matt 28.11–15); and so on? . . . It would therefore appear that Luke’s use of Matthew is improbable, due to the lack of his incorporation of the M material into his Gospel.’
passes over the bulk of narrative materials that Matthew added to Mark, for Matthew on the MwQH has added a longer temptation story, the healing of the centurion’s serving boy, and John’s question from prison, all of which Luke took over.

The key issue for Goodacre remains to define grounds for Luke’s omission of the material that he does leave out, regardless of where it is found in Matthew. Thus he pleads that Luke’s tendency in not having Jesus come into direct contact with Gentiles would have been sufficient grounds for him to have omitted Matthew’s story of the magi. But this hardly suffices to account for Luke’s neglect of all of Matt 1–2. So Goodacre argues that Luke does betray knowledge of Matthew’s birth account: the mention of Bethlehem, the name of Jesus’ father, and the notion of the virginal conception. He even points to the verbal parallels between Matt 1.21 and Luke 1.31 as evidence that Luke saw Matthew, not apparently noticing that the phrases τίκτειν υἱόν and καλέσεις τὸ νόμα αὐτοῦ NN are purely formulaic (Gen 16.11; Isa 7.14; 8.3; Hos 1.1–4; 1.6, etc.) and hardly unexpected given the context. None of this special pleading helps with the bulk of Matthean material that Luke has omitted, including such items as the account of Herod’s deeds and the those of his son Archelaus, which one would think would have attracted Luke’s attention, who also takes a dim view of the Herodian family.


3. Alternating primitivity

To the third objection – that sometimes Luke seems to preserve versions of sayings or stories that are more primitive than Matthew – Goodacre raises a counter-objection that the normal procedures for reconstructing Q involve the elimination of Matthean elements. Hence, ‘Q’ will invariably appear to be non-Matthean (and Lukan) and thus Luke will appear to be more primitive. This, as Derrenbacker and Kloppenborg have argued in a reply to Michael Goulder, misstates the usual procedures for reconstructing Q and certainly the procedure of

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32 Goodacre (Case Against Q, 71) states that Matt 25.31–46 is in direct conflict with Luke’s theology but does not explain the basis for this assertion.
the International Q Project (IQP). Matthean (and Lukan) elements in double tradition pericopae are treated as secondary when there are good statistical grounds for believing that the element in question is Matthean (or Lukan) and when there is no reason to suppose that Luke (or Matthew) would have eliminated it. That is, there is no systematic prejudgment in favour of Lukan formulations in the reconstruction of Q. The resultant text of Q obviously shares some elements with Matthew, but it also has elements that appear in Luke; what it lacks are those features that appear to be Matthean and Lukan editorializing.

But this really avoids the force of the objection, which is that such items as Luke 6.20b (οι πτωχοί), 22–3 (ἐκβάλλωσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὑμῶν ὡς πονηρόν ἐνεκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος); 11.2–4; 11.20 (ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ); 11.30 (ἐγένετο Ἰωάννας τοῖς Νινεύταις σημείον); and 12.8–9 (ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὡμολογήσει) appear to be more primitive than the corresponding Matthean saying. Goodacre’s response, which sharply distinguishes him from Goulder, is that in the case of 11.20, where Matthew has εἰ δὲ ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ ἐγὼ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμόνια (12.28), Luke has ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ, a rather obscure phrase appearing only in Exod 8.15 (in connection with the plagues) and Exod 31.18 (in connection with the inscribing of the Ten Words). Since Luke connects Jesus’ programme of liberation and healing with his endowment with the Spirit (4.18), and since he expressly associates Jesus’ abilities as an exorcist with the Spirit (Acts 10.38), it seems likely that Luke would have retained Matthew’s expression had he seen it. The conclusion is almost unavoidable that Luke’s phrase is the lectio difficilior and the original and that Matthew has

33 Derrenbacker and Kloppenborg, ‘Self-Contradiction’.
34 See C. M. Tuckett, ‘The Son of Man in Q’, From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology in Honour of Marinus de Jonge (JSNTS 84; ed. M. C. de Boer; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993) 196–216, and J. Lambrecht, ‘A Note on Mark 8.38 and Q 12.8–9’, JSNT 85 (2002) 117–25 for discussions of the priority of the Lukian version. To argue that Matt 10.32–3 is the more primitive version of the saying runs foul of the fact that Mark 8.38 also has ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἐπαισχυνθῆσαται αὐτῶν against Matthew’s first person formulation, and requires one either to suppose (on the MwQH) that Matthew adapted and altered Mark 8.38, rejecting Mark’s ‘son of Man’ for ‘I’ at 10.32, but keeping Mark’s ‘son of Man’ at 16.27 in a transformed version of the saying, and that Luke 12.8 used Matt 10.32 but rejected Matthew’s alteration in favour of Mark’s ‘son of Man’ and preserved Mark 8.38 at Luke 9.26, or (on the 2DH) that the original form of the Q saying had ‘I’ (so P. Hoffmann et al., Q 12.8–12, Documenta Q: Reconstructions of Q Through Two Centuries of Gospel Research Excerpted, Sorted and Evaluated [ed. C. Heil; Leuven: Peeters, 1997] 210–38) and that both Mark and Luke (12.8) changed this to ‘son of Man’.
replaced Q’s obscure expression. Such a scenario makes sense on the 2DH but not on the MwQH.

It should be stressed that one or two counter-examples do not amount to a disproof of Goodacre’s thesis, any more than a few ‘minor agreements’ cause the 2DH to collapse. Every Synoptic theory has to accommodate anomalous data.\[36\] The force of the objection is to show that the problem cannot be solved as simply and cleanly as Goodacre proposes. While the MwQH might be able to account for some of the Synoptic data in an efficient and credible manner, other data present far more difficult challenges.

4. The coherence of Q

The other part of Goodacre’s response to critics takes the form of his response to assertions, including those made by this writer, that the ‘Q’ material displays a coherence and structure that does not derive from the redaction of Matthew and Luke.\[37\] The argument is not, as Goodacre seems to think, that prominent features of Q – the announcement of judgment, references to the Coming One, allusions to the Lot cycle, and the deuteronomistic view of history\[38\] – are not related to elements in Matthew and Luke; of course they are, since Q is extracted from its successor documents. It is even the case, as Goodacre points out, that Matthew may have imitated some Q-locutions such as the taunt ‘brood of vipers’ (Q 3.7; Matt 23.33). For that matter, Luke imitated Q’s use of gender pairing.\[39\] But the point is that the elements that appear to be key in the organization of Q are *not* the key elements of Matthean (or Lukan) redaction: Q is not programmatically interested in Jesus as Torah-observant and as a fulfilment of Torah, nor as a messianic shepherd, nor in Lukan themes such as Jesus’ piety, meal settings, reconciliation, or euergetism. Conversely, the Lot cycle and deuteronomistic theology are not the key organizing elements of either Matthew or Luke. The logical point is that the double tradition (along with a few Mark–Q overlaps) exhibits a thematic coherence that does not derive from Matthew’s redactional interests. Nor is it plausible to argue that Luke’s principles of selection of

36 See Kloppenborg, ‘Goulder and the New Paradigm’.
37 Kloppenborg, *Excavating Q*, 163–4. Compare Farrer’s statement: ‘There are . . . possible cases in which the hypothesis of a lost and unevidenced source might compete on equal terms with the hypothesis of simple borrowing. Suppose, for example, that the passages common to A and B have a strong distinctive flavor, unlike the remaining parts of either A or B. Suppose further that the common passages, once we have extracted them, cry aloud to be strung together in one order rather than in any other, and that being so strung together they make up a satisfyingly complete little book, with beginning, middle and end. Then indeed we might postulate the existence of a common source, without waiting to prove that B cannot derive directly from A, nor A from B’ (‘Dispensing with Q’, 324).
38 For a discussion, see Kloppenborg, *Excavating Q*, 118–22.
the M + Q material in Matthew created such coherence. On the contrary, the Q material looks like a coherent document because it represents a coherent document.

5. *Brauchbarkeit*

That the 2DH is an effective hypothesis – making sense of a good deal of Synoptic data – is a consideration that has been invoked in its favour.\(^{40}\) Goodacre rightly comments that one should distinguish between Markan priority and the supposition of the existence of Q, for in the case of the Markan material one can ask whether the assumption of Matthew and Luke’s redaction of Mark yields coherent editorial patterns. In the case of the double tradition, there is obviously circularity involved, since one has no independent access to the wording or sequence of Q. One cannot say with much certainty, ‘Faced with a particular word or concept in Q, Matthew (or Luke) tends to do x’, since that word or concept must be reconstructed in Q by assuming a particular redactional tendency in Matthew (or Luke). Moreover, as I have suggested elsewhere, the 2DH, because of its dominance, has replicated and entrenched itself in all sorts of other suppositions, from the dating of the gospels to the probable lines of christological, eschatological, and ecclesiastical development, to suppositions of what the evangelists were able to do as editors.\(^{41}\) In any event, the argument from *Brauchbarkeit* is hardly a compelling one and no one, I should think, would accept the 2DH merely because it is useful. It is an argument that is more telling in its negative form: a hypothesis that is not successful in making sense of the data – that is, is *unbrauchbar* – ought to be abandoned or modified.

**Unscrambling the egg**


42 This chapter appeared earlier as ‘The Synoptic Jesus and the Celluloid Christ: Solving the Synoptic Problem Through Film’, *JSNT* 80 (2000) 31–43.

this is a topic that already has a massive literature, and one cannot hope to do it justice in a few comments. Second and more pertinently, the minor agreements have a ready solution under the MwQH as points where Matthew’s reformulations of Mark have influenced Luke. As such they do not represent a problem for the MwQH.


Goodacre’s answer to Fuller depends on three assumptions: first, that Luke knew and used Mark long before coming to know Matthew, and hence his use of the latter was determined by his basic decision to employ Mark as a backbone. Since in most cases Luke had already used the Markan version as his primary source, he had to fit in Matthew’s additions to Mark where best he could, which usually meant relocating them. Second, he observes that Luke shortened Mark’s parable discourse (Mark 3.1–34; Luke 8.4–18) and Mark 9.33–50 (Luke 9.46–8, 49–50), and generalizes from this that Luke preferred short speech units of 12 to 20 verses. Finally, he asserts that the second part of Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount is a miscellany or a ‘rag bag’. Hence Luke, confronted by an overly long and rather disjointed Matthean sermon, justly thought it prudent to shorten it, preserving only the ‘Luke-pleasing’ elements and redistributing some of them to other parts of the gospel.

Obviously, the first assumption – that Luke used Mark as his primary guide – is not capable of proof or disproof, but is a reasonable belief given the prior supposition that Luke used both Mark and Matthew and the way in which Markan and non-Markan materials are actually deployed in Luke. If the other two assumptions could be rendered credible, the MwQH might indeed offer a plausible accounting for Luke’s arrangement. But there are two problems. First, that Matt 6.19–7.27 is a ‘rag bag’ is repeatedly asserted but not defended beyond citing

a comment of Graham Stanton.45 Such is hardly the view of most Matthean commentators: Bornkamm related the structure of Matt 6.19–7.6 to individual petitions of the Lord’s Prayer and in this is followed (with some modifications) by Lambrecht and Guelich.46 Others see the Lord’s Prayer as the centre of an extended chiastic structure (Grundmann; Luz); others still divide Matt 6.19–7.12 into one (Gnilka) or two (Hagner) topically arranged units before the concluding section (Matt 7.13–27). With an even finer analysis, Dale Allison sees Matt 6.19–34 as divided into four ‘paragraphs’ and unified by a common theme, and 7.1–12 as the ‘structural twin’ of 6.19–34.47 Matt 7.13–27 likewise displays a deliberate structure controlled formally by the contrast of the two ways (7.13–14, 24–7) and thematically by contrast between superficial adherence to Jesus’ teaching and full adherence and the respective consequences.

Of course one might argue that Luke failed to perceive the design of Matthew’s sermon. But once editorial misperception becomes part of a scenario, the explanatory power of such a thesis is diminished. This is because directional arguments (‘it is more likely that $x \Rightarrow y$ than the reverse’) normally involve either (a) the supposition of a competent editor improving $x$ by augmentation, revision, or omission, or (b) the appeal to mechanical transcriptional errors (haplography, dittography) that produce an incoherence in $y$. But if Goodacre assumes, as it seems he must, that Luke did not perceive Matthew’s structure in Matt 6.19–7.27, then his contention that Luke shortened the Sermon by creating smaller clusters of sayings in Luke 12.22–32, 33–4 (Matt 6.25–34 + 9.19–21), Luke 11.2–13 (Matt 6.9–13 + 7.7–11), and Luke 13.24–30 (Matt 7.13–14 + 7.22–3) is no more probable, and indeed less probable, than the view of the 2DH, that Matthew collected related sayings into the Sermon on the Mount. Goodacre himself concedes that it is difficult to know why Luke moved Matt 6.22–3 to its Lukan location (11.34–6). And one wonders why, on Goodacre’s view, Luke did not maintain the connection between

Matt 6.24 (serving God or Mammon) and 6.25–34 (an admonition to rely on, and to seek, God rather than possessions) instead of moving the former to 16.13 where it contradicts the point of Luke 16.8, 9–12. Luke’s procedure in 13.24–30 also seems rather odd, since he begins with a Matthean saying about a narrow gate that is difficult to enter and then continues with another Matthean saying (25.10–12) concerning locked doors, concluding with another Matthean saying (8.11–12) that concerns persons being thrown out of a house, evidently to destruction, a motif Luke ignored in his reproduction of Matt 7.13–14. One might reply, of course, that on the 2DH Luke 13.24–9 represents Q’s sequence and these odd shifts in imagery belong to Q.\(^{48}\) While this is true, it must be noted that on the 2DH, Luke is merely taking over a sequence from Q, while on the MwQH, Luke has seen a coherent sequence in Matthew, prefaced by the Two Ways saying (7.13–14), featuring sayings that contrast the outward appearance of prophetic figures with their inner reality (7.15–20) and verbal assent with deeds (7.21), and concluding with a description of the fate of those charismatic figures (7.22–3). Luke has created from this a less coherent sequence.

Second, Goodacre’s argument is premised on the assumption that Luke dislikes long speeches. But this generalization seems faulty. Luke indeed shortens two of Mark’s discourses. On the other hand, Luke not only has a 52-verse speech in Acts 7, but he typically associates large bodies of speech material with a single discursive occasion, strung together with brief indications of Jesus’ various addressees. Luke 12.1–13.9 is a single discursive event, set outdoors and introduced by ἐν οἷς ἐπισυναχθεῖσον τῶν μιριάδων τοῦ ὀχλοῦ . . . ἵρξατο λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ (12.1) and concluded with Jesus’ movement into a synagogue (13.10). The body of the speech is subdivided by indications of shifting addressees:

\[\text{ἐἶπεν δὲ τὶς ἐκ τοῦ ὀχλοῦ αὐτῶ (12.13) . . . ὁ δὲ ἐἶπεν αὐτῶ (12.14) . . .} \]

\[\text{ἐἶπεν δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς . . . (12.15) . . .} \]

\[\text{ἐἴπεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ . . . (12.22) . . .} \]

\[\text{ἐἴπεν δὲ ὁ Πέτρος . . . (12.41), καὶ ἐἴπεν ὁ κύριος . . . (12.42) . . .} \]

\[\text{ἐλεγεν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὀχλοῖς . . . (12.54) . . .} \]

\[\text{παρῆσαν δὲ τινὲς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ καιρῷ ἀπαγγέλλοντες αὐτῷ περί τῶν Γαλιλαίων ὅν τὸ σίμα Πιλάτου ἐμιξεν μετὰ τῶν θυσιῶν. καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ἐἴπεν αὐτοῖς . . . (13.1–2) .} \]

The crowd of 12.1 is the same crowd from which a question is put (12.13), and the same crowd addressed in 12.54 and 13.1–2. Thus Luke imagines Jesus as alternately addressing the disciples (12.1–12, 22–53) and the crowd (12.13–21, 54–9; 13.1–9). In all,

Luke has 69 verses of speech material, more than twice as much as in his Sermon on the Plain.

On another occasion while eating at another Pharisee’s house, Jesus delivers a long set of teachings, variously addressed to the invitees (14.7), then to his host (14.12), then to one of the guests (14.15), then to a crowd that had somehow materialized (14.25), then to a group of Pharisees and scribes (15.2–3), then to his disciples (16.1), to Pharisees again (16.15), and finally to the disciples (17.1). Only at 17.11 is there an indication of a scene change. That Luke leaves unexplained the presence in a Pharisee’s house of a crowd, including tax collectors (15.1), only underscores the fact that Luke can tolerate such implausibilities. He merely subdivides these 112 verses by having Jesus alternately address various persons and groups present.

Of course Luke might have broken up Matthew’s Sermon. But the arguments that Goodacre provides do not give us sufficient reason to think that Luke had an intolerance to long swathes of speech; on the contrary, faced with the Sermon on the Mount one might more reasonably expect Luke simply to insert some transitional phrases, which is precisely what he has done at 6.39 (ἐἰ πεν δὲ καὶ παραβολὴν αὐτοῖς), whether one presupposes the 2DH or the MwQH.

The coherence of Lukan redaction


Goodacre also devotes a chapter (7) to showing that one might account for Luke’s transformation of Matthew’s ‘blessed are the poor in spirit’ into ‘blessed are you poor’ (6.20b) if one takes into account Luke’s redactional interest in the poor and eschatological reversal elsewhere in his gospel, and the narrative logic of Jesus blessing the poor disciples (6.20a) right after they have ‘left everything’ to follow him (5.11, 28).

Goodacre sees the ‘advantage’ of studies of Lukan redaction predicated on the MwQH in that they would inevitably have to attend much more keenly to Luke’s literary creativity and artistry, since Luke’s editorial activity entails not simply the alternating use of Mark and Q, with occasional insertion of L materials, but the large-scale reworking and rearrangement of Matthew. The value in Goodacre’s argument is to point out the logic in Luke’s arrangement of Matthean (or ‘Q’)
materials – a point that is not, of course, new to Lukan critics. It also underscores the degree to which aesthetic judgement is part of arguments about the Synoptic problem. Directional arguments are often based on claims that the arrangement or grammar or theology of \(y\) is superior to that of \(x\), and hence it is preferable to conclude that \(x \Rightarrow y\) than the reverse. But as those current with the history of argumentation know, it is all too frequent to find aesthetic arguments invoked in support of mutually exclusive theses. Goodacre stresses Matthew’s unartistic arrangement and Luke’s superiority; but Matthean commentators such as Allison and Davies, working on the assumption that it is Matthew who engaged in large-scale reworking of Mark and Q, find superior artistry in Matthew. I would not wish to claim that the Synoptic problem comes down to aesthetic preferences that cannot be further justified. On the contrary, I wish only to point out that there is an irreducible aesthetic component in Synoptic arguments. That there is thematic coherence in Luke 11.1–13 or Luke 12.13–34, or that Luke 6.20b has a ‘place’ in Luke’s gospel by being related to other Lukan and pre-Lukan elements, should not surprise anyone. As a competent editor Luke tried to make sense of the material he used, whether he received it from Matthew or from Q. That intelligent organization can be seen in both Matthew and Luke does not assist in deciding directions of dependence. Hence we are driven back to Goodacre’s argument about Luke’s tendency to shorten and abbreviate, where Goodacre has not made his case.

Petering out

Goodacre’s final chapter, ‘Narrative Sequence in a Sayings Gospel?’, is perhaps the most innovative and challenging. He begins by conceding for the sake of argument the existence of Q and the observation, made by this author and others, that the first part of Q has a proto-narrative sequence and several progressions that hold Q 3–7 together. There is a geographical progression from the Jordan valley (3.2), to the wilderness (4.1–13), to Nazara (4.16), and finally to Capernaum (7.1), with later references to Khorazin and Bethsaida (10.13) and Jerusalem (13.34). Corresponding to this geographical progression is a series of transitional editorial markers (3.2; 3.21–2; 4.1, 16; 7.1, 18). Second, the first half of Q is bound together by a logical progression from John’s preaching of repentance associated with his baptizing activities, to his prediction of the Coming One’s baptism, to Jesus’ baptism,49 to John’s question as to whether Jesus might be the Coming One (7.18–23).50 This ‘narrativizing direction’ of Q sets it off from the Gospel of Thomas.

49 Although the IQP has voted to include the baptism of Jesus, I have dissented from the judgement of my colleagues. See ibid., 18–21; Kloppenborg, Excavating Q, 93; and Neirynck, ‘The Minor Agreements and Q’, 67.
Goodacre then recalls an aphorism of Farrer’s that towards its end Q ‘peters out into miscellaneous oracles’ and offers an ingenious way of making sense of this. Rather than supposing that there was a Q that was well organized at the beginning and miscellaneous towards the end, Goodacre argues that the appearance of structure is the result of Luke’s editorial decision to draw on Matt 3–11 for his two non-Markan blocks (Luke 3.7–4.16; 6.20–7.35). Thus Luke inadvertently took over elements of Matthew’s non-Markan framework: geographical references to the circuit of the Jordan (Matt 3.5 || Luke 3.3), to Nazara just before the Sermon (Matt 4.13 || Luke 4.16), and to Capernaum just after it (Matt 8.5 || Luke 7.1b). One could add that on this view the logical progression that begins with John’s prediction of a Coming One (Luke 3.16) and ends with the question of John’s disciples (7.18–23) is the result of Luke’s taking over Matthew’s addition to Mark at Matt 11.2–6.

According to Goodacre, while Matthew had rearranged Mark in Matt 3–11 but followed Mark in Matt 12–25, Luke did just the opposite, following Matthew in Luke 3–7 and ‘depart[ing] from Mark altogether’ (p. 181). Thus ‘the presence of a narrative sequence for some Q material at the beginning of the Gospel, and the absence of a narrative sequence in the Q material throughout the rest of the Gospel, is simply a source-critical inevitability’ (p. 181).

Goodacre’s argument might be emended somewhat. Contrary to what he says, the narrative sequence does not ‘dissipate’ at Q 7.35; a new progression begins with Q 9.57–8 (the volunteering of some disciples) and continues through to at least 10.21–2 (23–4), which is said to take place ‘in that very hour’ (10.21a). On the MwQH this represents the remnants of non-Markan framework materials in Matt 8.18–22; 9.37–10.42; 11.20–4, 25–7.

But all is not well with this general approach. For while, ex hypothesi, Luke departed from Matthew’s Markan structure in Matt 12–25 (p. 181), he nonetheless took over several non-Markan Matthean blocks: Matt 23.4–39; 24.23, 26–8, 37–51; 25.14–30. Yet Luke betrays no awareness of the particular ways that Matthew

51 Farrer, ‘Dispensing with Q’, 60. As I noted elsewhere, Farrer was able to make this observation only because he did not investigate other gnomic collections. Prov 1–9 is highly structured, but most of Prov 10–22.14 is not; Ankhsheshonq and the Sentences of Secundus both begin in a quasi-biographical way but continue and conclude with miscellaneous sayings. See Kloppenborg, ‘Theological Stakes’, 118 n. 90.

52 Goodacre, Case Against Q, 181.

53 This comment is somewhat imprecise but seems to refer to the fact that on the MwQH, after using Matt 11.2–19 to conclude the Sermon–Centurion–John the Baptist sequence, Luke abandoned Mark since he had already used Mark 2.23–3.12 (|| Matt 12.1–21) prior to the Sermon (Luke 6.14–19). Then, after adapting Mark 14.3–9 (Luke 7.36–50) and inserting Luke 8.1–3, Luke returned to Mark (4.1) and followed Mark up to 6.44, omitting only Mark 4.26–9, 30–2 (relocated to 13.18–19), 33–4; 6.1–6a (relocated to 4.16–30), and 6.17–29 (relocated to 3.19–20).
attached these to Mark’s framework. Luke’s woes against the Pharisees (11.37–54) are delivered in the house of an anonymous Pharisee who lived outside of Judea. Matthew’s woes, delivered to a crowd, are attached to Mark’s attack on the scribes (12.37b–40), posed out-of-doors in Jerusalem. Since Luke later took over Mark’s attack on the scribes (12.37b–40 = Luke 20.45–7), one might conjecture that Luke deliberately eschewed Matthew’s Jerusalem setting for the woes on the scribes and Pharisees, knowing that he would later use Mark 12. But Luke’s motives for disengaging Matt 23 from its Markan location and setting are still very far from clear. And in the case of the Jerusalem word (13.34–5), Luke has also eschewed its Matthean setting (in Jerusalem), placing it in some nameless location in Samaria in response to the comments of more extra-Judaean Pharisees (13.31–3). It might be tempting to think that the presence of Pharisees in 13.31–3 is an echo of Matt 23. But in that case, Luke has completely reversed the characterization of the Pharisees, who in 13.31–3 seem to be friendly to Jesus. And in the case of 13.34–5 one cannot appeal to a later Markan parallel in order to account for Luke’s separating the Jerusalem saying from its Matthean setting. Luke’s procedure on the MwQH is at the very least puzzling.

Similarly, Luke’s apocalyptic materials in Luke 12.39–59; 17.23–37; 19.11–27 betray no influence of the fact that Matthew has them spoken to the disciples on the Mount of Olives. Instead, Luke 17.23–37 is framed as speech in Samaria (17.11–19), where again Pharisees are present (17.20) (!). Luke 12.39–59 belongs to discourses delivered to growing crowds somewhere in the Galilee or Samaria (12.1). Luke 19.11–27 is also moved backward to a point where Jesus is between Jericho and Bethany (rather than in Jerusalem) and spoken in response to the comments of some anonymous interlocutors. In short, Luke has not only consistently altered the geographical settings that Matthew gave to this material, but he has also consistently changed the addressees. If Luke knew Matthew, he has curiously not retained any of the framing elements of Matthew’s version.

If Goodacre wishes to derive ‘Q’s narrative structure from Matthew for the ‘Q’ material in Luke 3–7 on the grounds that ‘Q’ there reflects elements of Matthew’s geographical framing, then one should by Goodacre’s own principles conclude that for the ‘Q’ material in Luke 11–13, 17, and 19 Luke was not using Matthew at all, but some other non-Markan, non-Matthean source.

The other part of Goodacre’s argument is equally ingenious: that ‘Q’ betrays knowledge of Matthean elements not present in ‘Q’ and thus is better seen as a subset of Matthean material rather than as a discrete document. Thus Q 3.7–8 assumes a connection between John’s baptism and repentance that is made explicit in Matthew’s editing of Mark, where John is made to anticipate Jesus’ call to repentance (3.2 = 4.17) and where John’s baptism is said to be εἰς μετάνοιαν Jesus’ question, τί ἐξῆλθοτε εἰς τὴν ἔρημον θεώσασθαι; (7.24), presupposes Matthew’s description of John’s wilderness locale; Q 7.18–19 assumes that John is
in prison, something that is only narrated by Matthew (in dependence on Mark); Q 7.18–23 assumes that Jesus has performed an entire range of wonders from healing eyes, ears, and limbs to raising the dead, even though only one wonder has actually been narrated up to this point in Q; and Q 7.34 takes for granted that Jesus ate with ‘toll collectors and sinners’ even though this detail is narrated only in material that Matthew derived from Mark. One might add to Goodacre’s argument that the wonder in Q 7.1–10 does not obviously belong to the list of wonders in 7.22 since the patient in Q 7 is only vaguely described as κακω̂ς ἔχων. And while Q 6.20 directs the Sermon to disciples, Q never indicates how Jesus had acquired those disciples (or those sent out in Q 10.3), something that is already explained by Matt 4.18–22 (‖ Mark 1.18–22).

Closer inspection of these arguments, however, casts doubt on their force. Jesus’ question in Q 7.24 hardly needs a Markan explanation when Q places John and those coming to see him in the circuit of the Jordan (3.2, 7a). Moreover, in Q the question makes more sense than it does in Matthew. Given Q’s primitive narrative and geographical framework, it is pointless to ask whether the crowds of Q 3.7a are the same as those of Q 7.24a, since Q uses ὃχλος as a stock foil for the pronouncements of John and Jesus (Q 3.7; 7.24; 11.14, 27, 29, 39; 12.54). However in the case of Matthew, who has a highly developed topographical outline, the question in Matt 11.7 makes sense only if one assumes that the crowd addressed in 11.7 is the same as that mentioned in Matt 4.25, comprising people from Jerusalem, Judea, and the trans-Jordan as well as from Galilee and the Decapolis, and the same crowd as that mentioned in 9.36, and that it includes some of the persons mentioned in Matt 3.5 (‖ Mark 1.6). In the context of Matthew’s elaborate geographical scenario this seems improbable. Matthew’s use of the crowd in 11.7 thus seems more likely explained as the result of his taking over Q’s more limited sequence involving John’s initial activities in Q 3.2–17 and his disciples’ question in 7.18–35.

There is no strong reason to suppose that Q 7.18 imagines John to be in prison and hence no reason to suppose that Q betrays knowledge of Matt 4.12 or 14.3–12. In a culture as conscious of honour and status as that of the Mediterranean in the first century, there are more obvious reasons for an influential individual to have employed envoys for communication than that he or she was physically prevented from direct communication. The Fourth Gospel imagines as normal that disciples or agents function as go-betweens for John and Jesus (1.35–7; 3.25–7) and for the temple authorities and John (1.19, 24), even though the gospel also places Jesus and John together on one occasion (1.29–34) and imagines them to be active

54 Q situates John in η περιχωρο[0] του’ Ιορδάνου (Q 3.2) and has the crowds ‘coming’ to him (ἐξεν τοις ἐρχομένοις ὃχλοις βαπτισθήναι). See Robinson, Hoffmann and Kloppenborg, _Critical Edition of Q_, 6–8.
at the same time (John 4.1–3). As to Q’s assumption that baptism and repentance belong together, one can only point to Josephus, Ant. 18.117, where the connection between baptism and moral reform is taken for granted.

The other features to which Goodacre calls attention are perhaps more interesting. ‘Q’’s statements about Jesus’ dining habits and the variety of his wonders seem to take for granted what is expressly narrated by Mark. But what is the source-critical significance of this? It should be noted that Mark narrates the call of a single τελώνης (2.14) and relates a χριστιάνον καὶ ὀμαρτωλοί and is criticized for this. But neither pericope implies that this was a normal practice for Jesus. It is the clearly editorial comment in Mark 2.15 (ἦσαν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἠκολούθουν αὐτῷ) that suggests that the discrete events of 2.14 and 2.16–17 instantiated a much more general pattern. But must we then seek a prior narrative to account for what Mark 2.15 claims to be the case? Hardly. Mark 2.15 seems simply to be Mark’s inference, although he does not have any further narratives to relate about Jesus and the toll gatherers. But if one were seeking the genesis of Mark’s editorializing, Q 7.34 is a good candidate. On this scenario, Mark has narrativized the accusation recorded by Q.

Finally, there is the list of wonders in Q 7.22. On the 2DH the specific wonders of sight to the blind, mobility to the lame, cleansing of lepers, speech and hearing restored, resuscitation of the dead, and evangelization of the poor provided the reason for Matthew’s manoeuvring stories that correspond to (and hence anticipate) each of the items mentioned in Matt 11.5: the healing of two blind men (9.27–31 || Mark 10.46–52); the healing of a paralytic (9.1–8 || Mark 2.1–12); the cleansing of a leper (8.1–4 || Mark 1.40–5); restoration of hearing and speech (9.32–4; Q); a resuscitation (9.18–26 || Mark 5.21–43), and preaching to the poor (5.3–12; 9.35–10.42 [Q + Mark 6.34]). Luke, who had not rearranged Markan miracles, had Jesus conjure some miracles on the spot to please John’s envoys (7.21). On the MwQH Matt 11.5 (Q 7.22) is a summary of the wonders that have already occurred in Matthew to this point. Luke evidently did not recognize Matthew’s expedient even though he had already related Mark 1.40–5; 2.1–12 and the Sermon on the Plain and had added a resuscitation of his own (Luke 7.11–17).

But one hardly needs Matt 5–10 to account for the list of wonders in Q 7.22, especially when we now have a remarkably similar text from Qumran, 4Q521, which describes the deeds of an Elijah-like Messiah, including freeing captives, restoring sight, raising up those who are bowed down, healing wounds, reviving

55 An analogy is offered by Matt 11.21 || Luke 10.13, which refers to wonders performed in Khorazin and Bethsaida, despite the fact that no wonders have been narrated at Khorazin at all, and both Matthew and Luke have omitted Mark’s story of the blind man at Bethsaida (8.22–6). It should be obvious that early Christian writers did not feel obliged to narrate all of the events to which they might refer en passant.
the dead, and evangelizing the humble. Q’s pastiche of texts from Isaiah, Ps 146 and 1 Kgs 5.1–9 appears to belong to the same view of the eschatological hero (though Q does not use the term ‘Messiah’).

To conclude. Although Goodacre has presented an interesting case defending the possibility of Luke’s direct dependence on Matthew, none of his arguments can be considered to be sufficiently weighty to displace the alternative scenario, which is at least as plausible, that Luke and Matthew independently drew on Q. Goodacre’s account of Luke’s omissions of Matthean redactional additions to Mark, though it is a significant advance on Farrer’s vacuous notion of ‘Luke-displeasingness’, is still unpersuasive; Luke’s elimination of Peter is hardly intelligible given the role that Luke assigns to him. Goodacre’s effort to deal with primitive elements in Luke is perhaps a step beyond Goulder, but his solution is not any more efficient an explanation than that offered by the 2DH. The attempt to account for the fact that Luke’s Sermon on the Plain is much shorter than Matthew’s Sermon is fraught with difficulties, and the argument that the ‘double tradition’ in Luke betrays knowledge of Matthew’s editorial constructions can be turned against Goodacre’s case.

In concluding that Goodacre has not made his case, I do not wish to leave the impression that a case might not be made or that the venture is doomed from the outset. On the contrary, those engaged in Synoptic problem research ought to acknowledge that all hypotheses remain open to fair and careful discussion – a discussion that, regardless of its outcome, ought to aim at clarifying the real points of agreement and disagreement and at vetting compositional scenarios that might shed further light on the processes that went into the composition of the Synoptics.


57 I am grateful to Leslie Hayes (Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, Claremont) and to the anonymous reviewer for NTS for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.