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Beyond Bandung: developmental nationalism and (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia

JOSHUA BARKER

ABSTRACT This article argues that the Indonesian case is characterised by at least two important variations on the thesis of a transition from developmental to cultural nationalism. First, the transition took place with the establishment in 1966 of Soeharto's New Order, much earlier than in most other countries, and was associated less with neoliberal policies than with a pronounced capitalist bias which could be combined either with statist or economically liberal policies. Second, the variants of cultural nationalism that have been most openly adopted by Indonesia's postcolonial state have been multicultural rather than exclusionary in orientation. The article provides an overview of the transition from developmental to (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia in the mid-1960s. These changes are highly visible in the Indonesian context because each successive political regime has defined its identity in large measure by its particular nationalism. Since the Indonesian state has historically been the main site for power struggles within the political elite, the changes over time in nationalist ideology reflect quite closely the changing political and economic fortunes of particular elements within this elite. They also indicate how elites are trying to define their relations to other groups in Indonesian society, and how they are adapting to constraints imposed, and opportunities presented, by a changing national and global political economy.

But what harm is in diversity, when there is unity in desire? This Conference is not to oppose each other, it is a conference of brotherhood. It is not an Islam-Conference, nor a Christian Conference, nor a Buddhist Conference. It is not a meeting of Malayans, nor one of Arabs, nor one of Indo-Aryan stock...Rather it is a body of enlightened, tolerant opinion which seeks to impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun—to impress upon the world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one's individual identity, and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their wellbeing and survival on earth. (President Soekarno, speaking at the Bandung Conference, 1955)¹

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Events in Indonesia over the past decade could lead one to conclude that forms of authoritarian and exclusionary cultural nationalism are on the rise. In Java in the late 1990s there were numerous riots targeting Indonesia's Chinese and Christian minorities. In the Moluccas and in central Sulawesi between 1999 and 2001 thousands of people were killed in violence between Christians and Muslims. In East Timor, Aceh and Papua, longstanding separatist struggles achieved a new prominence and enjoyed varying degrees of success. On several occasions since 2002 small groups of *jihadists* in Indonesia have attracted international attention with their spectacular and deadly bombings of nightclubs, restaurants, embassies and hotels. Furthermore, some analysts have pointed to new laws and public order statutes as evidence of a 'creeping *sharia*-tisation' of the legal system.² All these developments could be used as the basis for arguing that since the mid-1990s Indonesia has been witnessing a shift away from a relatively civic and forward-looking form of developmental nationalism to more chauvinistic forms of nationalism based on reified understandings of ethnic and religious identities.

On the other hand, other events of the past decade could lead to quite the opposite conclusion. In the field of electoral politics, for example, parties with sectarian agendas have been repeatedly trounced at the ballot box; despite a lengthy economic crisis and the weakening of the authoritarian state, Indonesians have consistently elected leaders running on platforms that highlight the importance of ethnic and religious tolerance and inclusiveness. In addition, since the late 1990s, successive governments in Jakarta have sought to provide greater legal protection to minority groups, most notably the ethnic Chinese who have long been subject to discrimination, despite the economic power of many among them.³ Furthermore, most observers would probably agree that the force of Java-centrism, which had gradually permeated the Indonesian bureaucracy during the New Order period,⁴ has been significantly diminished. All these facts would seem to indicate that Indonesia is not witnessing a comprehensive shift from more inclusive to more chauvinistic forms of nationalism.

This article argues that the Indonesian case is characterised by at least two important variations on the thesis of a transition from developmental to cultural nationalism. First, the transition took place with the establishment in 1966 of Soeharto's New Order, much earlier than in most other countries, and was associated less with neoliberal policies than with a pronounced capitalist bias which could be combined either with statist or economically liberal policies. Second, the variants of cultural nationalism that have been most openly adopted by Indonesia's postcolonial state have been multi-cultural rather than exclusionary in orientation.⁵ This is only apparently paradoxical. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, cultural strands of nationalist ideologies have evolved over a long period of time and, whether ethnic, religious or philosophical, have been based on appeals either to highly exclusionary claims of cultural homogeneity or to some form of multi-culturalism. To date, however, only the latter have become hegemonic at the level of the nation-state as a whole. As I explain below, the real shift between the classical but short-lived developmental nationalism of Soekarno and

cultural nationalism under Soeharto was in the degree to which ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity, which had constituted the cultural aspects of developmental nationalism, began to be used as means to shore up the power of particular elites and to justify economic and political hierarchies and exclusions that the increasingly pro-capitalist policies produced. The Indonesian case reflects rather neatly the idea that, when inegalitarian economic policies produce 'a hierarchy of groups, among the propertied and non-propertied alike. . . one of the chief functions of the cultural component of nationalism is to reflect and reinforce, culturally, this hierarchy'.⁶

Similarly, a core meaning of development has also carried over from developmental to (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia. The term 'development' in English can be translated into Indonesian in two ways, as either *perkembangan* or as *pembangunan*. While *perkembangan* implies a development associated with flowering and expansion, *pembangunan* suggests that development is a process of awakening, building and construction.⁷ Development as *pembangunan* has been an important concept in nationalist thought since the 1930s. What has made it such a powerful term is that it can be used to signify both a physical act of building or construction and a mental process of awakening or becoming conscious. In the context of national development, this dualism has been productive since it suggests that the construction of such things as factories, monuments, communications systems, and transport infrastructures can help to awaken or fortify nationalist consciousness. Acts of physical construction—especially when they take place on the national stage—are thus invested with a deeply political and even spiritual significance. As we shall see, the idea of construction as development came to have an interesting trajectory as it went from lying at the core of developmental nationalism to becoming a hollowed-out trope within a broader ideology of (multi) cultural nationalism.

Conceptually there have been, according to Chalmers and Hadiz, three main streams of thought in Indonesian debates about national development since independence: populist, state-nationalist and liberal.⁸ What they call the populist stream, which predominated during the 1950s and early 1960s is, from the point of view of this volume, a rather classical developmental nationalism: an anti-imperialist social mobilisation to modernise productive forces in order to create a more egalitarian and self-sufficient national, albeit capitalist, economy. In contrast with this stream of thought, both state-nationalist and liberal ideologies of development are more brazenly capitalist and relatively unconcerned with social and economic inequalities. They differ, however, in that the former promotes state intervention in the economy in order to protect the Indonesian economy from the effects of international capital, while the latter promotes a minimal role for the state in economic development and greater integration with the global economy. As we shall see, during much of Soeharto's New Order regime (1966–98), there was an oscillation between state-nationalist and liberal ideologies of development. Since the onset of the Asian financial crisis, however, liberal and neoliberal ideologies have largely eclipsed both populist and state-nationalist developmental ideologies.

In this paper I will provide an overview of the transition from developmental to (multi)cultural nationalism in Indonesia in the mid-1960s. These changes are highly visible in the Indonesian context because each successive political regime has defined its identity in large measure by its particular nationalism. Since the Indonesian state has historically been the main site for power struggles within the political elite, the changes over time in nationalist ideology reflect quite closely the changing political and economic fortunes of particular elements within this elite. They also indicate how elites are trying to define their relations to other groups in Indonesian society, and how they are adapting to constraints imposed, and opportunities presented, by a changing national and global political economy. In the period after the Second World War Soekarno had emerged as one of the main Third World proponents of an egalitarian and autonomous vision of national development. In this vision multiculturalism was a means to include all groups in an overriding project of national development aimed at achieving economic self-sufficiency. Under Soeharto the ideology of multiculturalism was hollowed-out and combined with a conservative form of Javanist cultural nationalism in order to legitimise and reinforce elite power in a context of increasing economic liberalisation.

This historical backdrop sheds light on events in Indonesia over the past several years. We may be witnessing a struggle over the power to define which brand of cultural nationalism will predominate at the state level and among the elite. Will it be multicultural nationalism or will it be religious? If it is multicultural, what will the hierarchy of cultures be? If it is religious, which stream of Islam will it be? These kinds of questions have come to the fore both at the national level and at the level of districts and municipalities. In the meantime, throughout the country, neoliberal economic reform has proceeded apace.

Anti-colonial developmental nationalism

In 1955 the Indonesian city of Bandung was the site for an historic summit that is now widely regarded as having been the birthplace of both the non-aligned movement and the Third World.⁹ That summit, known as the Bandung Conference, gathered together a remarkable group of postwar African and Asian nationalist revolutionaries and leaders, including such historic figures as President Soekarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai of China, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, President Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt, and Prime Minister Kwame N'krumah of the Gold Coast (now Ghana). In many respects the meeting represented a milestone for developmental nationalism and was its international face. In their statements, the leaders looked beyond ideological disagreements between capitalism, communism and pan-Islamism, choosing instead to focus on a shared interest in the repudiation of colonialism, and of relations of dependency, war, racism and poverty. As the Chairman of the Philippine delegation, Carlos Romulo, later explained, 'the Conference was unusual in that it comprised exclusively of the poorer and

less developed countries of Asia and Africa'; and although they came from different political persuasions, 'they shared a common abhorrence of imperialism' and 'a common hope and desire for economic development and social progress'.¹⁰

The kind of 'development' and progress Soekarno envisaged, both for Indonesia and for the Third World as a whole, was evident not just in his speeches but in the staging of the conference itself. The conference was held in Bandung, a city designed by the Dutch to function as a shining example of what a modern colonial city could be. Although it had been the site of many battles and a terrible fire during the war of independence, the remarkable modernist architecture there, which included examples of Tropical Art Deco and Art Nouveau buildings, some with roofs and accents inspired by Minang, Javanese and Sundanese architectural styles, was still very much apparent. The conference building was an example of this colonial modern style. Built by Dutch architects as a simple structure in 1895, and then rebuilt in 1920 and 1928, the building had a Romanesque façade and a decorative interior that included marble and lamps imported from Europe. The building was used first as a gathering place for European plantation owners and later as an elite social club whose members included not only wealthy planters but also government officials and representatives of an emerging urban bourgeoisie. Known as the *Societeit Concordia*, this club was the source of much resentment during colonial times because all 'natives' other than those serving European guests were banned from entering there.

For the Third World nationalists gathered there the conference building acted as a stark reminder of how colonial regimes had buttressed, and in many cases still were buttressing, economic inequalities with racial apartheid. President Soekarno was particularly aware of this history. Not only had he rubbed shoulders with members of the European elite while studying for his engineering degree at Bandung's Technical School, he had been imprisoned for his political activism at a jail there. Holding the Asia–Africa conference in the *Societeit*, which he renamed the Freedom Building during a pre-conference inspection of the site, was a powerful symbol of the strength of Third World nationalism and its capacity to defeat colonialism. It also signified Soekarno's wish to create what he referred to in his opening address as 'a New Asia and a New Africa'.¹¹

The Bandung conference symbolised the subordination of more restricted identity-based claims to a broader and higher anti-imperialist solidarity. Domestically, Soekarno's ambition to promote such solidarity had emerged in part as a means to address religious, ethnic and ideological divisions among early anti-colonial groups.¹² A sense of the diversity and fault lines of anti-colonial politics before the Indonesian revolution is provided by the history of the *Sarikat Islam* (SI), one of the earliest 'nationalist' movements.¹³ The SI was an offshoot of an organisation originally established in 1911 as a racially mixed association for the protection of Islamic and Chinese traders against bandits in Surakarta.¹⁴ Breaking off from the original organisation to focus on protecting the interests of the emerging indigenous (*pribumi*) bourgeoisie against both Chinese and European competitors, SI quickly

attracted a broad membership, including merchants, journalists, farmers and workers. Muslims of various denominations were welcomed, including nominal or syncretic Muslims (*abangan*), scripturally oriented or devout Muslims (*santri*), and even those who believed in the coming of a Just King (*Ratu Adil*). While nominally the SI's ideology was inclusive of different classes and different ethnic groups, its members were repeatedly involved in street fights, often directed against the Chinese minority, a group some saw as standing in the way of the emergence of a *pribumi* middle class.¹⁵ Furthermore, although the SI was known for defending the economic and social interests of its members against the 'sinful capitalism' of people identified as Europeans and Chinese, ideological disagreements led some of its leaders to leave the party and to found, in 1920, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).¹⁶ In the wake of this split, the SI went into decline and two other groups emerged as the main leaders of the Muslim masses. The first of these was the reformist Muhammadiyah, a group that had been formed in 1912, whose supporters hailed primarily from the educated and middle-class populations of Java's towns and cities. Muhammadiyah sought to purify Islam of local influences. The other was Nahdatul Ulama, a group established in 1926, whose founders were conservative religious scholars and teachers, and whose ideology 'set out to defend traditional forms of religious belief and practice against the Muhammadiyah attack'.¹⁷ These two groups went on to become the largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia and remain so to this day.

Soekarno's own nationalist party was formed several years after the split between the SI and the PKI. In 1926 Soekarno published a paper in which he identified what he viewed to be the three most powerful streams of anti-colonial ideology within the political elite at the time: nationalism, Islam and Marxism.¹⁸ Proponents of these different ideological streams often clashed: the split between Muslims and communists in the 1920s was followed in the early 1930s by a conflict between Muslims and nationalists. All three groups maintained their bases of support and, after the Japanese occupation and the subsequent revolution, these streams became a core triad in Indonesian politics.¹⁹ they were the main ways in which Indonesia's small political elite connected to the larger mass of the Indonesian people.²⁰ A sense of the relative strength of these various streams is provided by the results of Indonesia's first elections in 1955. In that election four major parties emerged: the Nationalist Party with 22.3% of the vote, the Islamic reformist party (Masyumi) with 20.9% of the vote, the traditionalist Islamic Nahdatul Ulama with 18.4% of the vote, and the PKI with 16.4% of the vote.²¹ Given that the two main Islamic parties had quite different ideological orientations, it was clearly a highly fractious political environment.

Soekarno's version of developmental nationalism was deeply shaped by the need to balance these contending political and ideological forces. One of the main ways he did so was by trying to unify them in a common project to seek a shared national modernity. This ambition was evident in many of the government's efforts to promote *pembangunan* during this period: it launched large programmes aimed at mechanising agriculture; it began constructing a

massive National Telecommunications System, which aimed to link the nation of islands together through a chain of microwave transmission towers running like a spine across the archipelago; it built a giant sports stadium, a high-rise hotel and numerous monuments in the capital city; and it encouraged research in satellite technology and nuclear science. These 'lighthouse projects' fulfilled an important symbolic function by signalling to Indonesians and to the rest of the world that a unified Indonesia was fully capable of pursuing its own path to modernity.²²

A key feature of Soekarno's modernising ambitions was the nationalist notion that development ought to be aimed at achieving economic independence on top of the political independence that had already been achieved.²³ 'Standing on one's own two feet' (*berdiri di atas kaki sendiri*, or BERDIKARI for short), understood in deeply nationalist terms, was a ubiquitous slogan for Soekarno and a key ambition of his development policies. Indonesia had inherited a deeply dualistic economy, with a small capitalist sector and a large semi-feudal agricultural sector. The modern capitalist economy was mostly in European hands; domestic capital was in the hands of a small, mostly petty, bourgeoisie that was deeply divided between its indigenous, Muslim-oriented element and its Chinese element.²⁴ Soekarno's developmental nationalism aimed to create a unified national economy while reducing Indonesia's dependence on other countries. In both its agricultural and its industrial policies, Soekarno's government promoted development initiatives that would reduce dependence on foreign suppliers while ensuring that Indonesia's central government could secure a reliable supply of basic commodities, especially food staples like rice.²⁵ Under pressure from the PKI it also developed policies aimed at promoting greater economic equality through large-scale land reform.

Soekarno's developmental nationalism was deeply ambitious. In a world divided along cold war lines, he envisioned an Indonesian path to modernity that would follow neither the capitalist path of the USA nor the communist path of the USSR. Using his masterly oratorical skills, he encouraged Indonesians to be guided not by racism nor by religious animosity but by the common dream of a modern national future in which they would rid themselves once and for all of the shackles of foreign oppression. In Bandung in 1955 he sought to internationalise this vision for the whole of Asia and Africa.

Cultural elements of developmental nationalism

The cultural aspects of the developmental nationalism that dominated state policy during the early phase of Soekarno's rule represented an attempt to accommodate the interests of various elements of the Indonesian elite. After the revolution Indonesia inherited the territory of a colonial state that encompassed an archipelago with hundreds of different ethnic groups and many different religions. The political elite that came to dominate the new republic was drawn primarily from a small class of Dutch-educated journalists, doctors, political activists and bureaucrats. This elite shared in

a self-consciously modern, cosmopolitan, anti-colonial culture rooted in the national *lingua franca*. But the leaders of the new republic were always aware of the risk that the elite might fracture along ideological, religious or ethnic lines.

Soekarno sought to use an ideology of multiculturalism to overcome differences within the nation's elite. The multiculturalism he put forward was progressive and inclusive. It celebrated the great accomplishments of pre-colonial civilisations, especially those in Java, but rejected those aspects of these civilisations that were deemed to be at odds with the progressive ambitions of the nation. Social structures that drew sharp distinctions between aristocrats and commoners, etiquette and language that enforced status hierarchies, and non-relativist conceptions of cultural and religious difference were all deemed 'feudal' and thus unacceptable to the culture of a modern nation. The ideals of a national culture free of this feudal past were expressed in a set of philosophical principles enunciated in a speech Soekarno gave in 1945, before the proclamation of independence. These principles, known as Pancasila, which he claimed not to have invented but to have 'dug...out of the soil of Indonesia',²⁶ provided the philosophical basis for an Indonesian state by providing a 'meeting point for all different parties and groups, a common denominator of all ideologies and streams of thought existing in Indonesia'.²⁷ They included a belief in God, a just and civilised humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy through deliberation and consensus, and social justice.

The abstract theism of the first principle is notable as it represents Soekarno's attempt to promote a secular state against the ambitions of those nationalists who wanted to make Indonesia an Islamic state. The non-sectarian wording would help to ensure that the eastern islands of what had been the Dutch East Indies, where many Christians lived, would be willing to join the new republic. Some Islamists were dissatisfied with this principle, however, and tried to have it changed so that the preamble of the Constitution would read that it was obligatory for Indonesian Muslims to live according to *sharia* law.²⁸ Their failure to achieve their objective has been a source of disputes between Islamists and supporters of Pancasila ever since.

From as early as 1948 Indonesia's government faced regional rebellions in various parts of the archipelago and it was clear that maintaining the unity of what had been the Dutch East Indies would not be easy. This was not because of unbridgeable 'primordial' differences between the various groups that inhabited the islands but because of recent political history. The anti-colonial struggle had included many different kinds of movements, and most had first mobilised on the basis of regional or religious identity.²⁹ Not all local leaders were happy with the ideology promoted by Jakarta's leadership or with the status they and their regions had been granted in the new republic. In the countryside outside Bandung, for example, a movement known as the Darul Islam (DI) fought for 14 years to create an Islamic state in western Java. This rebellion, which had a distinctive millenarian cast to it, was only suppressed in 1962, when a major mobilisation of the army and local people led to the capture and execution of its charismatic leader.³⁰

Related DI rebellions also took place in Aceh (1952–61) and Sulawesi (1952–65); regionally based rebellions and secessionist movements appeared in northern Sulawesi, the Moluccas and in parts of Sumatra. While these rebellions were mostly regional in orientation, and all were put down, some have argued that they did eventually play a part in spawning some of the more violent jihadism of the 1990s and early 2000s.³¹

Within the political elite of the late 1950s conflicts were also quite pronounced. The elections of 1955 yielded a Constituent Assembly that was sharply divided along ideological and party lines. The Assembly was meant to formulate a new Constitution, but disagreements prevented it from accomplishing its task. The failure was greeted by Soekarno and the army with a declaration of martial law in 1957, the abolition of the Constituent Assembly in 1959, and the launch of a deeply autocratic regime under the banner of Guided Democracy.

One of the centrepieces of Soekarno's Guided Democracy platform was an eight-year development plan (1961–69) known as the Political Manifesto. In this document, which laid out a plan to achieve a socialist democracy with material welfare for all, 'cultural nationalism' was seen as a means to 'render a stable support to the establishment of justice and prosperity'.³² The appeal to culture as a means of providing political stability derived from the perception—and perhaps fear—on the part of the Indonesian elite that a yawning gulf existed between their self-consciously modern and highly cosmopolitan culture and the supposedly traditional culture of the Indonesian people they were meant to represent and govern.

The differences between the elite and the masses were quite pronounced in this period. The national elite consisted of an intelligentsia that had been educated in schools where Dutch was the language of instruction. This schooling made it possible for members of the elite to work in the centres of colonial government and business, exposing them to the values and mores of what Hildred Geertz and Ruth McVey came to call a 'metropolitan superculture' that was not rooted in any particular religious or cultural tradition.³³ Most ordinary Indonesians, in contrast, had been schooled only in their local languages, if at all, and had been kept at a distance from the modern institutions of government and business. While earlier colonial rule had in some areas allowed for the formation of elites that were deeply rooted in particular locales and families, the bureaucratisation of government in the late colonial period had weakened these kinds of local and familial ties.³⁴ As a result, the gap between the state, which was dominated by the metropolitan elite, and the people it ruled over was perceived to be very wide. In the development plan of the Political Manifesto, Indonesian 'culture' was to be used as a means to overcome this dualism by indigenising the government and its metropolitan superculture while modernising and developing the Indonesian people.³⁵

What was this unifying national culture to be? According to the Political Manifesto, it would be 'Indonesian identity' (*kepribadian Indonesia*). Writing about the deliberations and discussions surrounding the preparation of the Political Manifesto, Soemardjan notes that there was a broad consensus that

Indonesian identity had to be sought in ‘the Indonesian indigenous culture’, but that there was disagreement over what that meant in practical terms.³⁶ Some proposed to find it in a period of Indonesian history before foreign influences; others proposed to find it in the traditional family, village community, or guerrilla organisation; still others took a more instrumental approach, picking and choosing elements of contemporary Indonesian culture that could be used to support the development plan. In all cases, however, it seemed that what was discovered about Indonesian culture—especially its political culture—was that it was predisposed to more authoritarian and charismatic types of leadership.

One argument developed in the Political Manifesto was that political structures in the state and in village should be patterned after relations in the traditional Indonesian family, which the Manifesto claimed was customarily dominated by a benevolent, authoritarian father. According to the Manifesto, this pattern of leadership was also evident in guerilla and army organizations of the early years of the national revolution. In these organizations, subordinates treated their leader as a child would a father, and there was almost no way to separate them, not even for the purposes of administrative or military efficiency. Guerrilla and army units were often so closely attached to their leader, much as children to their father, that there was almost no way to separate them, not even for the purposes of administrative or military efficiency.³⁷

In sum, if in the immediate post-revolutionary period the cultural elements of developmental nationalism aimed primarily to resolve ideological conflicts within the elite, the period of Guided Democracy increasingly saw these elements being used as a means to connect the Indonesian elite to the Indonesian people more broadly, albeit in an authoritarian way. The connection would be provided by a shared culture in which the residual foreignness of the nation-state would be saturated in indigenous symbols. Clifford Geertz identified this preoccupation accurately:

Much of the symbol-mongering that went on under the Soekarno regime. . . was a half-deliberate attempt to close the cultural gulf between the state and society that, if not altogether created by colonial rule, had been enormously widened by it. The great crescendo of slogans, movements, monuments, and demonstrations which reached a pitch of almost hysterical intensity in the early sixties was, in part anyway, designed to make the nation-state seem indigenous.³⁸

This ‘symbol-mongering’ was in part also designed to justify, whether deliberately or not, the growing authoritarianism in the Indonesian state. By virtue of being part of Indonesian ‘culture’, such authoritarianism could come to be viewed as something the Indonesian people, supposedly locked in their traditional ways, desired. In hindsight this gradual attenuation of the progressive aspects of developmental nationalism through the appropriation of putatively authoritarian patterns of Indonesian ‘culture’ was a watershed event. It provided the ideological kernel of what would later emerge as a full-blown ideology of authoritarian cultural nationalism under President Soeharto.

The shift within Soekarno's developmental nationalism during the period of Guided Democracy coincided with a power shift within the Indonesian elite. In the 1960s Soekarno had used the Darul Islam rebellions as a pretext to ban the largest Islamic party at the time, the modernist Masyumi party. The Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) was also banned. The elimination or weakening of political parties at the elite level was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the power of the army, which along with the president, was the main beneficiary of the imposition of martial law. The success of the army at putting down regional rebellions and incorporating Papua into the republic also greatly enhanced its power and prestige. The only other group that enjoyed an increase in power during this period was the PKI, whose efforts at organising workers and peasants helped it to become the third largest communist party in the world.

Despite this sort of authoritarian strengthening, Soekarno's developmental nationalism proved to be a failure. According to Robison, the main goal of the Guided Economy had been 'to construct a national industrial economy around state-owned capital'.³⁹ During the late 1950s the government had moved strongly in the direction of state ownership of the means of production by expropriating Dutch enterprises and banks and handing them over to the military. However, poor management of state enterprises and their use for personal gain, together with conflicts and competition among bureaucratic capitalists, led to a serious decline in production, a balance of payments crisis, and high rates of inflation. The private sector bourgeoisie, which included both *pribumi* capitalists (many of whom had been associated with Masyumi) and Chinese capitalists, was far too weak to pick up the slack, and the economy stagnated. Thus, rather than creating a healthy and self-sufficient national economy in which ordinary people enjoyed a new level of material prosperity, Soekarno ended up presiding over a 'ramshackle, underpowered form of state capitalism operated by, and largely for, the benefit of the politico-bureaucrats who dominated the state apparatus, notably the military themselves'.⁴⁰

New Order multicultural nationalism and developmentalism

Developmental nationalism in Indonesia came to an abrupt halt with the inauguration of Soeharto's New Order. Soeharto's rise to power in 1965–66 was accompanied by army-sponsored and -supported massacres of up to a million alleged members of the PKI, and the imprisonment of many more. As a result of the killings, one of the most powerful forces in Indonesian politics, one which was an important link between some members of the political elite and ordinary people in villages and neighbourhoods across the nation, was eliminated. As a consequence, political pressure to pursue a more popular and progressive policy of national development was seriously weakened.

For the 32 years between 1966 and 1998 Indonesian development policy was characterised by an oscillation between what Chalmers and Hadiz refer to as state-nationalist and liberal approaches to economic development.⁴¹ Both approaches were far more brazenly and aggressively capitalist than

anything envisaged under Soekarno. The former approach aimed to promote domestic capital accumulation by using state planning and power to support domestic efforts and industrialisation, while the latter aimed for less state involvement in the economy and a greater role for international capital. The oscillation between the two approaches depended to a large degree on how much money the government had in its coffers; thus, when the price of oil was high and the government was flush with cash, policy makers pursued a state-nationalist agenda; but when oil prices were low the government adopted policies that would attract injections of capital from abroad.⁴² The overall shift away from progressive developmental nationalism was partly disguised for many years because it was only in the 1990s that any members of the Indonesian political elite would openly admit to having a liberal economic agenda.⁴³ Until that time liberal policies were justified on the basis that they were necessary in the short term even if it meant indefinitely postponing the ultimate goal of a more self-sufficient economy with greater domestic control over core industries. At the same time, while pressure for a more populist developmental agenda were catastrophically weakened by the destruction of the PKI and the subsequent marginalisation of any kind of politics dubbed 'leftist', the rhetoric supporting collective mobilisation to achieve national development, both in terms of improvement in the material conditions of existence and in terms of nation building, remained. However, now such rhetoric was used to recruit free or low-cost labour power for projects that facilitated capital accumulation. The aim of bringing about a more egalitarian society with greater social justice, while it continued to be cited in the national discourse, was seen as an objective that had to be deferred for the indefinite future.

The basic structure of the political and economic elite in Indonesia remained remarkably stable during the 32 years of Soeharto's rule. The killings that accompanied his rise to power eliminated the only other group that could offset the power of the army, so the politico-bureaucratic capitalist class became firmly entrenched in power. State-owned enterprises became progressively more capitalist in orientation, providing officials with ever more opportunities for corruption and patronage. At the same time many members of the politico-bureaucratic elite established business alliances with people in the private sector.

Their allies in the private sector were usually Chinese Indonesians whose status as pariah capitalists ensured their continued dependence on their military patrons.⁴⁴ In these alliances the bureaucrats used their government authority to enrich themselves and their partners by creating regulatory regimes and allocating contracts in a manner that served their business interests. Within this context, the elite developed strategies for using both state-nationalist and liberal ideologies to their advantage. During the mid- to late 1970s, for example, state-nationalism was used to justify the allocation of large amounts of oil revenue for the creation of state-owned domestic industries. These industries, which received regulatory protection from the government, supplied state enterprises and departments with the cement, cables, bullets and microwave stations they needed for the construction of a

massive infrastructure of roads, telecommunications and military commands. Some of these industries were quite successful, so by the late 1980s and early 1990s, when oil prices had dropped and liberalisation was the order of the day, they were often the targets of a form of privatisation that essentially allowed for the transfer of publicly held assets into private hands at a fraction of their value. Perhaps the most ironic examples of this pattern were the much vaunted 'P3s', or public–private partnerships of the 1990s in which the neoliberal jargon of international lenders was used to legitimise and legalise the kinds of alliances between bureaucrats and pariah capitalists that already dominated the economy.

The most notable changes in the elite during the New Order were its gradual Islamisation and its increasingly oligarchic form. During the 1990s Soeharto began to court indigenous *pribumi* capitalists and Muslim intellectuals in order to provide a counterbalance to the power of the military and Chinese capital.⁴⁵ For the most part the Muslim-oriented bourgeoisie that had helped Soeharto into power had remained marginalised during the 1970s and 1980s, leading to anti-Chinese sentiments and periodic anti-Chinese violence.⁴⁶ From the 1990s Soeharto sought to capitalise on these sentiments by placing a growing emphasis on Islam within the culture of the state,⁴⁷ and by making a place for non-Chinese capitalists within the elite. Some of these indigenous capitalists were selected to become part of an emerging oligarchy centred around the Soeharto family and the families of a number of other high officials, such as the long-time Minister of Technology and Soeharto's eventual successor, Habibie. This oligarchy leveraged its superior political power to establish close alliances with international capital and to co-opt or marginalise any potential competitors that might emerge from within the military and the bureaucracy. Over the years the members of this oligarchy—known in Indonesian as *konglomerat* (conglomerates)—managed to extend the reach of their familial empires to the farthest limits of the Indonesian state and economy, and beyond.⁴⁸

The entrenchment of the politico-bureaucratic elite, and the emergence of an oligarchy within it, was accompanied by the government's deployment of a highly reified ideology that combined an apparently Pancasilaist, multi-cultural nationalism with a developmentalism that emphasised visible forms of modernisation, such as the paving of roads, the provision of electricity and the spread of television. While, at the outset of the New Order, many had expected that the new government would abandon the Pancasila ideology or at least diminish its importance,⁴⁹ the opposite turned out to be true. By the mid-1980s every student was required to study the five principles and every political, social and religious organisation was obliged to adopt them as their sole foundational philosophy. Scholars, politicians and even activists cited it and interpreted it as a means to justify and explain their politics. The underlying purpose of these policies was not to cultivate support for the ideology of developmental nationalism. Rather, the aim was to create a dogma.⁵⁰ Public adherence to the dogma allowed people to dissociate themselves from the two ideologies that the government now defined as being anathema to Pancasila: communism and radical Islamism. Groups and

individuals accused of holding either of these ideologies were branded as enemies of the nation and were severely repressed.

In addition to raising Pancasila to the status of state dogma, the government also promoted a somewhat revamped version of Soekarno-era multiculturalism, but with an implicit privileging of Javanism and Islam within it. 'Culture' (*kebudayaan*), within the New Order ideology, was understood in completely dehistoricised and depoliticised terms, so ethnic and regional differences were reduced to differences in architecture, art, song, food and dance. The contours of this ideology were most clearly represented in the Disneyland-inspired Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park, Taman Mini, a pet project of the First Lady that was opened amid student protests in 1975.

The main part of Taman Mini was a miniature representation of the major islands of the archipelago, laid out in a large man-made pond. More life-size than a map but smaller than the real thing, the mini-archipelago was accessible by pedal boat but was best viewed from the cable car or the elevated train that passed overhead. When riding the cable car, one could also see—alongside the mini-archipelago—a series of impressive examples of traditional houses representing cultural traditions found in Indonesia's many provinces. Each of these houses was periodically the site for 'traditional' theatrical and music performances. The overall effect was thus a view of the nation that exhibited its so-called 'unity in diversity' while relegating 'culture' to a hyper-real past and placing it on an apolitical plane.⁵¹ The image of culture, however, was not without political effect. Pemberton has shown how the appeal to sanitised versions of a pre-colonial past provided the occasion both for a displacement of class politics and for a creeping Javanism within the New Order regime. The idea of Javanese culture that came to predominate in this period was one centred on notions of 'order' and 'stability'. Soeharto himself took particular pleasure in imagining himself as a modern-day Javanese king and tried to complete the image with the frequent use of Javanese-style regalia, ceremonies and rituals. Following in the tradition of Soekarno's Guided Democracy, his government regularly sought to justify its authoritarian practices of decision-making and rule by claiming that such practices had cultural origins and references. In this respect, Soeharto's version of cultural nationalism can be seen as a precursor to, and local variant of, what would emerge in the 1990s as a broader ideological claim that authoritarian forms of capitalist development, as seen in the so-called Tiger economies, were rooted in distinctive 'Asian values'.

While 'development' as a word remained almost ubiquitous in Indonesian political discourse, it was used in the sense of *pembangunan*. Soeharto was especially enamoured with the link between physical development and nation-building and made *pembangunan* one of the core pillars of his ideological platform. He named each of his cabinets during his 32 years of rule 'Development Cabinets' and even proclaimed himself Indonesia's 'Father of Development' (*Bapak Pembangunan*). As Bouchier and Hadiz have observed,⁵² this title represented the fusion of two political ideologies, one based in the putatively authoritarian culture of the Javanese (or

Indonesian) family, where respect for the father (*Bapak*) was paramount, and the other based in apolitical developmentalism. The ideological effect of this fusion was profound: '[By coupling] developmentalism with the idea that the state and society were part of the same 'big family' [the government was able] to constitute opposition to itself or its development programs as not only disloyal, but also an affront to Indonesian cultural norms'.⁵³

In practice the political economy underpinning New Order cultural nationalism took the very distinctive form of what were known as development 'projects' (*proyek*). The vast majority of development projects were implemented or overseen by the state. The overarching goals for these projects were laid out in the Five-Year Development Plans produced by the National Development Planning Board in consultation with relevant government departments. The realisation of these goals was achieved through the provision of a budget for a long list of development projects whose implementation was planned on an annual basis. Since project funding was distributed independently of the operational budgets that provided for the day-to-day needs of the salaried bureaucracy, the allocation of projects became an important mechanism for the distribution of political patronage, largesse and opportunities for corruption. For officials the successful implementation of projects was also an important source of prestige and could lead to promotion through the bureaucratic ranks.

The prominent involvement of state officials in development projects meant that projects became identified not only with nation-building but also with state-building. Every new development, from the paving of a village road to the construction of a new airport, would involve elaborate ground-breaking and inauguration ceremonies in which officials overseeing the project would be given centre-stage. There was also a consistent strategy on the part of the New Order regime to establish a further identification of development projects with its own political leadership of the government. This identification was implicit in the patronage system used to distribute projects, which strongly favoured individuals and groups affiliated with Golkar, the ruling party. It was also manifest in the fact that, in the months preceding each, largely ceremonial, general election, the bureaucracy kicked into gear to implement a flurry of development projects. Suddenly officials rushed to make sure that villages and urban neighbourhoods were serviced by electricity, telephone connections, or perhaps an asphalt road. Not all were given this treatment, however; popular wisdom suggested that only those that had supported Golkar in the previous election would see a return for their support. So powerful was this system that, by the end of the New Order, the term *proyek*, with its connotations of corruption, regime patronage and money, had entered the lexicon, used by ordinary people to describe the easiest (and morally suspect) way of gaining wealth and political influence.

Overall New Order cultural nationalism presented an image of Indonesia as a superficially diverse but basically unified nation-state on its way to a richer and more modern future, not through egalitarian economic development but through capitalism in its 'trickle-down' form. Given that the majority of the population did not stand to benefit from this new political

economy, it was not surprising that the regime was also constructed on a foundation of fear and hatred. The kinds of hatred and fear that circulated beneath the surface were diverse and included, among many others, the hatred and resentment of 'the Chinese' for their apparent wealth, animosity between Christians and Muslims, the hatred of Javanese migrants in the outer islands, fear of the army's violence, fear of the 'latent danger' (*bahaya laten*) of communism and other 'movements to disturb security' (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*), fear of thuggery (*premanisme*), and fear of radical Islam. Diverse as these fears were, members of the oligarchy and the rest of the politico-bureaucratic elite could make use of them to threaten and intimidate their political opponents and economic challengers. Thus, for instance, anti-Chinese riots could be used to remind Chinese businesspeople how much they depended on the army for their security; a growing appeal to Islamic identity within the government could be used to undermine the power of nationalists within the armed forces. More generally both the suggestion of underlying conflict and real eruptions of violence could be used to justify the regime's continuing repressive policies.

Cultural nationalism after the New Order

With the end of the New Order regime one might expect an end to its brand of (multi)cultural nationalism. However, things were not so simple. In 1998, just months after Soeharto was ousted from power, the Indonesian legislature passed a decree allowing social, political and cultural organisations to adhere to ideologies other than Pancasila as long as their ideologies did not contradict the tenets of Pancasila.⁵⁴ While this move provided the legal basis for the emergence of Islamic political parties and allowed mass organisations to define themselves in terms of their religious, regional or ethnic identities, it also reinforced the ritual centrality of Pancasila in the national ideology. This opening has resulted in a mushrooming of political groupings and ideologies, ranging from the militant and sectarian to the peaceable and inclusive.

The political economy of the post-Soeharto era has also been complex. The combined effects of the Asian financial crisis and the end of the Soeharto regime effectively brought the machinery of *proyek*-centred development to a standstill for several years. The whole machinery of developmentalism had depended on high rates of annual economic growth and international borrowing. The financial crisis and the ensuing period of economic stagnation meant that the government had few resources to keep the flows of *proyek* going. Even when they had resources, it was not always that easy to distribute them. The mushrooming of political parties and organisations meant that the whole clientalist system of defining development priorities and allocating projects had become much more fragmented and competitive. At least for a time, officials stopped talking about '*pembangunan*' entirely.

At the same time the end of the Soeharto regime has not been accompanied by any fundamental changes in the structure of Indonesia's elite. Student activists' efforts to use the financial crisis as an occasion to dislodge the politico-bureaucratic elite by pressuring the government to fight corruption

have met with negligible success. Similarly, attempts by the IMF and other lenders to impose neoliberal reforms on the Indonesian economy have not yielded any fundamental changes in elite power (although they have helped to make it much more acceptable for politicians to publicly embrace liberal economic policies).⁵⁵ The oligarchy has loosened up somewhat, since the most prominent oligarchs of the New Order have been pushed off centre stage, but the basic structure of the national elite has remained largely intact.⁵⁶ What has changed is the relation of this elite to its less powerful counterparts in the regions. One of the centrepieces of governmental reforms has been a programme of decentralisation in which a good deal of administrative and budgetary authority is devolved onto district and municipal governments. As a result of this reform, local elites have gained a greater autonomy from Jakarta and have started to establish local versions of the alliances that underpin the authority of the politico-bureaucratic elite. The competitive nature of this process may partly explain the mushrooming of social and political organisations that define themselves in ethnic, religious or regional terms: they are there to serve the more particularistic political and ideological needs of increasingly powerful local politico-bureaucratic elites.⁵⁷

The national elite may be less unified than it was in the past but it remains extremely powerful. Consequently, it is more than likely that improvements in the Indonesian economy will be accompanied by a return to the ideologies of cultural nationalism with which this elite is most familiar: *pribumi* nationalism, Javanism, moderate (and fragmented) Islamism, and multiculturalism. While the need for ideological renewal may lead some politicians to invoke the rhetoric of a more populist developmental nationalism, the interests of the politico-bureaucratic elite will undoubtedly dictate national development policies in the last instance.

At the regional level the dynamics are more complex. As Jacques Bertrand has shown, elite compromises over the definition of the nation have led over the past half-century to a situation in which many groups feel they have been kept out or left out of the Indonesian nation and its 'development'.⁵⁸ Over the past several years, as economic and administrative power has been devolved and regional politics has become more highly contested, appeals to more exclusionary forms of cultural nationalism have thus emerged at the local level. Even in Bandung, where overt ethnic politics were largely absent for four decades, political organisations appealing to Sundanese ethnic identity have started to appear. However, it would be easy to overstate the significance of this kind of development. Although the rise of regional elites could go some way to re-politicising multicultural nationalism, the entrenched power of the national elite will make it difficult for exclusionary forms of social mobilisation to gain any sustained traction beyond the local level.

Notes

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- 1 Quoted in GM Kahin, *The Asian–African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956, p 48.
- 2 J Olle, ‘Islamic “heresy”, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, and the privatisation of the state’, paper presented at State Authority Workshop Two, KITLV Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden, 14–15 December 2005.
- 3 S Turner, ‘Speaking out: Chinese Indonesians after Suharto’, *Asian Ethnicity*, 4 (3), 2003, pp 337–352.
- 4 MT Berger, ‘Old state and new empire in Indonesia: debating the rise and decline of Suharto’s New Order’, *Third World Quarterly*, 18 (2), 2004, pp 321–362; and J Pemberton, *On the Subject of ‘Java’*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- 5 D Henley, ‘Ethnogeographic integration and exclusion in anticolonial nationalism: Indonesia and Indochina’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 37, 1995, pp 286–324.
- 6 R Desai, ‘Nation against democracy: the rise of cultural nationalism in Asia’, in F Quadir & J Lele (eds), *Democracy and Civil Society in Asia*, Vol 1, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp 96–97.
- 7 A Heryanto, ‘The development of development’, *Indonesia*, 46, 1988, pp 1–24.
- 8 I Chalmers & VR Hadiz (eds), *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contenting Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 1997.
- 9 In those days the Third World referred not to poor or underdeveloped countries but to the bloc of countries that had chosen to chart a ‘third way’ between capitalism and communism and had refused to align themselves with either side in the Cold War.
- 10 CP Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1956, p 3.
- 11 Kahin, *The Asian–African Conference*, p 50.
- 12 A similar concern marked early developmental nationalism in India. As Zachariah has noted, ‘The vision of India to which Nehru remained publicly committed depended upon the disarming of sectarian tendencies through the delivery of economic progress for everyone, “irrespective of caste, creed, religion or sex” as the phrase went’. B Zachariah, *Nehru*, London: Routledge, 2004, p 151.
- 13 On the history of Islamic nationalism in colonial Indonesia, see MF Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds*, London: Routledge, 2003.
- 14 T Shiraishi, ‘Anti-Sinicism in Java’s New Order’, in D Chirot & A Reid (eds), *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe*, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1997, p 191.
- 15 *Ibid*, pp 190–194.
- 16 C van Dijk, ‘Communist Muslims in the Dutch East Indies’, in C van Dijk & AH de Groot (eds), *State and Islam*, Leiden: Research school CNWS, 1996, pp 77–95. With a great deal of support from *abangan* Muslims, and despite severe repression from colonial authorities, the PKI grew over the next three decades to become the largest communist party in the world outside China and the USSR.
- 17 H Feith & L Castles (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970, p 201.
- 18 Soekarno, *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*, trans KH Warouw & PD Weldon, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1970.
- 19 In their analysis of Indonesian political thinking between 1945 and 1965, Feith and Castles add two more streams to this typology, namely Javanese traditionalism and democratic socialism. Feith & Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, pp 12–16.
- 20 RT McVey, ‘Introduction’, in Soekarno, *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*, pp 1–34; and C Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- 21 Feith & Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, p 7.
- 22 J Barker, ‘Engineers and political dreams: Indonesia in the satellite age’, *Current Anthropology*, 46 (5), 2005, pp 703–727.
- 23 Modernisation theory, which gained currency in government and academic circles in the USA during the 1950s, also emphasised the importance of technological advancement; it envisioned development as following a unilinear path from a traditional agrarian stage to a modern, urban industrial stage, with new technology, capital investments and technical know-how providing the means for economic ‘take off’ from one stage to the next. For a discussion of the differences between modernisation theory and Soekarno’s type of developmental nationalism in the domain of policies regarding agricultural development, see SM Moon, ‘Takeoff or self-sufficiency? Ideologies of development in Indonesia, 1957–1961’, *Technology and Culture*, April 1998, pp 187–212.
- 24 R Robison, ‘Authoritarian states, capital-owning classes, and the politics of newly industrializing countries: the case of Indonesia’, *World Politics*, 41 (1), 1988, p 59.
- 25 Soekarno’s embrace of an ideology of autonomous national development became all the more pronounced as a result of cold war politics. Policy makers and bureaucrats in the US government, many of whom were haunted by their failure to prevent China from ‘falling’ to communism, viewed

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- Soekarno with suspicion since he did not repudiate communism. As a result, during the 1950s and 1960s, the US government took a number of steps aimed at subverting Soekarno's rule and stoking regional rebellions. See GM Kahin & AR Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, New York: New Press, 1995. These efforts had the ironic effect of cementing Soekarno's conviction that the only way to overcome neo-colonial interventions was by achieving autonomous national development.
- 26 JM van der Kroef, 'Soekarno, the ideologue', *Pacific Affairs*, 41 (2), 1968, p 246.
 - 27 Nasution, cited in D Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and Ideology of Tolerance*, London: Routledge, 1995, p 18.
 - 28 Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia*, p 14.
 - 29 C van Dijk, 'Islam, nationalism, and decolonization in Indonesia', paper presented at 'Décolonisations comparées, Colloque International', Institut D'Histoire des Pays D'Outre-Mer, University of Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 30 September–3 October 1993.
 - 30 H Horikoshi, 'The Dar'ul Islam movement in West Java (1948–62): an experience in the historical process', *Indonesia*, 20, 1975, pp 58–86.
 - 31 S Jones, 'The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59 (2), 2005, pp 169–178.
 - 32 S Soemardjan, 'Some social and cultural implications of Indonesia's unplanned and planned development', *Review of Politics*, January 1963, pp 64–90.
 - 33 H Geertz, 'Indonesian cultures and communities', in R McVey (ed), *Indonesia*, New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963, pp 33–38; and McVey 'Introduction' in Soekarno, *Nationalism, Islam and Marxism*.
 - 34 H Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi*, Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, published for the Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1979.
 - 35 As Tom Nairn put it some time ago, 'the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history: and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood'. Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain*, London: New Left Books, 1977, p 340.
 - 36 Soemardjan, 'Some social and cultural implications of Indonesia's unplanned and planned development', pp 80–81.
 - 37 *Ibid*, p 68.
 - 38 C Geertz, 'The politics of meaning', in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p 318.
 - 39 R Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1986, p 80.
 - 40 *Ibid*, p 98.
 - 41 I Chalmers & VR Hadiz (eds), *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 1997.
 - 42 See Robison 'Authoritarian states, capital-owning classes, and the politics of newly industrializing countries'; and JA Winters, *Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
 - 43 Chalmers & Hadiz, *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia*, pp 141–143.
 - 44 The pariah status of the Chinese has a long history dating back to colonial times, but Soeharto-era policies singled out Chinese Indonesians for discrimination by banning Chinese holidays, Chinese-language schools, and anything written in Chinese characters. See RW Hefner 'Shariah formalism or democratic communitarianism? The Islamic resurgence and political theory', in CB Huat (ed), *Communitarian Politics in Asia*, London: Routledge, 2004, p 138.
 - 45 RW Hefner, 'Islamization and democratization in Indonesia', in RW Hefner & P Horvatic (eds), *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, pp 95–97.
 - 46 The New Order sought to gain control over Islamic politics by incorporating both traditionalists and modernists into one political party and by bureaucratising religion. The latter policy was particularly effective with modernists, who were more susceptible to bureaucratic manipulation. It was less successful with traditionalists, who remained marginalised, and emerged as some of the most vocal critics of the regime. See R McVey, 'Faith as the outsider: Islam in Indonesian politics', in JP Piscatori (ed), *Islam in Political Process*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p 206. On the role played by the marginalisation of Islam in fomenting anti-Chinese unrest, see JT Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, pp 50–56.
 - 47 KG George, 'Designs on Indonesia's Muslim communities', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 57 (3), 1998, pp 698–701.
 - 48 See, for example, GJ Aditjondro, 'Suharto's fires', *Inside Indonesia*, January–March 2001, at <http://serve.com/inside/edit65/aditjondro.htm>, accessed 30 March 2007.
 - 49 Kroef, 'Soekarno, the ideologue', p 260.

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- 50 Even as a dogma Pancasila provided a means for various political groupings to distinguish themselves from one another. As Ramage has noted, the core political groupings within the New Order regime, which included modernist Muslims, traditionalist Muslims, nationalists, and the army, distinguished themselves by ordering the principles in different ways. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia*.
- 51 See Pemberton, *On the Subject of 'Java'*, p 156; JT Siegel, *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p 4; and B Simon & J Barker, 'Imagining the New Order nation: materiality and hyperreality in Indonesia', *Culture, Theory & Critique*, 43 (2), 2000, p 143.
- 52 D Bouchier & VR Hadiz, 'Introduction', in D Bouchier & VR Hadiz (eds), *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p 9.
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 VR Hadiz, 'The failure of state ideology in Indonesia: the rise and demise of Pancasila', in Huat, *Communitarian Politics in Asia*, London: Routledge, 2004, p 158.
- 55 VR Hadiz & R Robison, 'Neo-liberal reforms and illiberal consolidations: the Indonesian paradox', *Journal of Development Studies*, 41 (2), 2005, pp 220–241.
- 56 R Robison, G Rodan & K Hewison, 'Transplanting the neoliberal state in Southeast Asia', in R Boyd & T-W Ngo (eds), *Asian States: Beyond the Developmental Perspective*, London: Routledge, 2005, p 191.
- 57 To some extent, the 'regional autonomy' policy is a response to longstanding grievances about centre–periphery inequalities. Local elites and ordinary people, particularly in resource-rich areas, have become much more vocal about these grievances since the end of the New Order. See, for example, M Malley 'Class, region and culture: the sources of social conflict in Indonesia', in VA Kelles *et al* (eds), *Social Cohesion and Conflict in Asia: Managing Diversity through Development*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001, pp 357–358.
- 58 J Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.