ANOTHER LOOK AT THE SCOPE OF A NOMINATIVE OBJECT IN JAPANESE

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1. Introduction

Nominal objects (NomOs), such as in (1b), have been one of the well-known issues in Japanese syntax (Kuroda 1971, Kuno 1973, Sano 1985, Tada 1992, Koizumi 1994, Nomura 2003, 2005, Kawai 2006, Saito 2009, among others). Sugimura (2010:3) presents in (1) [her (4)] what is regarded as the “standard” judgment pattern on those data. After a clarification discussion, she presents in (2) [her (8b/a)] what she considers a more appropriate judgment. For the remainder of this paper, we base our discussion on the latter judgment pattern.

   John-nom right eye-only-acc close-PT-pres
   ‘John can close only his right eye’
   can>only, ??only>can

   John-nom right eye-only-nom close-PT-pres
   ‘John can close only his right eye’
   *can>only, only>can

(2) a. Taroo-wa shirogohan-dake-o tabe-rare-ru.
   Taroo-top rice-only-acc eat-PT-pres
   ‘Taroo can eat rice on its own’
   can>only, *only>can

   Taroo-top rice-only-nom eat-PT-pres
   ‘Taroo can only eat rice (and nothing else)’
   can>only, only>can

NomOs are hosted by such stative predicates as (ra)rj ‘potential (PT, henceforth)’, deki ‘can/complete’, wakar ‘understand’, -rai ‘want’, among others. In what follows, we exclusively use PT for simplicity. For concreteness,

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we assume that the nominative Case feature of NomOs is licensed in Spec-TP (Koizumi 1994) via the operation of AGREE (Chomsky 2000, 2001). For an
alternative view, see the discussion in Section 4.1.

Sugimura (2010) claims that the sentences in (2) involve restructuring,
a “cross-linguistic phenomenon where apparent bi-clausality disappears,
and clauses act as a unit.” For example, in (2), PT is a functional restructuring (FR)
predicate, which involves head movement of the lower V (tabe) to the matrix
predicate (PT); this process derives “transparency for case-agreement”
by extending the domain of AGREE. The head movement of hanas to PT extends
the case-agreement domain of the embedded object to the entire TP, as
schematically shown in (3).

(3)  a.  \[ \text{TP} \quad \{ \text{VP} \quad [\text{AccO} \quad ...t_1...] \quad \text{V}_1-\text{PT} \quad \text{T} \} \]
    b.  \[ \text{TP} \quad \text{NomO}_2 \quad \{ \text{VP} \quad ...t_2 \quad ...t_1...] \quad \text{V}_1-\text{PT} \quad \text{T} \}
    c.  \[ \text{TP} \quad \{ \text{VP} \quad \text{NomO} \quad ...t_1...] \quad \text{V}_1-\text{PT} \quad \text{T} \}

The accusative object (AccO) in (2a) takes only narrow scope, whereas the
NomO in (2b) takes wide or narrow scope relative to PT. Under Sugimura’s
analysis, the AccO is case-licensed in-situ by tabe in (2a), thus taking narrow
scope (3a). In (2b), on the other hand, the NomO can be case-licensed by
the matrix T in two ways: either (i) the NomO moves to the specifier of the matrix
T, resulting in the wide scope reading, as in (3b), or, (ii) it remains in situ for the
narrow scope reading (3c). The latter option is possible because the NomO is in
the case-licensing domain of T after restructuring via head movement. Let us
call this analysis as the Head Movement Analysis of NomOs (HMA, henceforth).

In order to support the HMA, Sugimura offers the following scope
asymmetry found in two constructions: viz., a causative (CAUS, henceforth)
sentence (4a) and a ni-purpose clause (NI, henceforth) sentence (4b).\(^\dagger\) Namely,
the NomO in (4a) can take wide scope over – or narrow scope under – PT,
whereas the NomO in (4b) can take only wide scope over PT. This asymmetry,
according to Sugimura (2010:6–7), arises because CAUS is a FR-predicate,
whereas ik in (4b) is a lexically restructuring (LR) predicate.

    Taroo-top Hanako-dat rice-only-nom eat-CAUS-PT-pres
    ‘Taroo can make Hanako only eat rice (and nothing else)’
    ‘Taroo can make Hanako eat rice on its own’
    only>can, *can>only

    \[(\text{Sugimura 2010:} \approx (9a))\]

    Mirodi-top that cafê-to ice cream-only-nom eat-NI go-PT-pres
    ‘Modori can only go to that cafê to eat an ice cream
    only>can, *can>only

    \[(\text{Sugimura 2010:} \approx (10a))\]

Sugimura (2010:11) describes the scope asymmetry found in (4a) and (4b) as
follows:

\(^\dagger\) (4b) is somewhat awkward, but, in proper context, it is perfectly acceptable. For some
reason, it sounds better if it is embedded; the sentence improves dramatically inside a
relative clause, for example.
when head movement is available, a nominative object can appear either in the complement of an embedded verb or in the domain of a matrix verb since the relevant opaque domain is expanded. In contrast, when head movement is not available, a nominative object must be base-generated in the domain of the matrix verb. This means that –sase has two options for its structural realization, whereas ik has only one option.

In this paper, we closely examine the scope property of NomOs in CAUS- and NI-sentences, showing the empirical problem of the HMA. In her discussion, Sugimura (2010) exclusively uses NP-dake-ga ‘only-NP-nom’, which strongly biases toward the wide scope reading (Section 3.1). When we use an indefinite NomO in NI-sentences, which is known to take narrow scope (Lasnik 1999, 2007, Saito 2009), the narrow scope reading of the NomO is available (Section 3.2). We conclude that the alleged FR/LR-scope asymmetry in (4) is an artifact of the choice of NomOs, and, thus, the HMA cannot be maintained. Section 4 offers an informal discussion on the nominative case licensing mechanism, and a brief concluding remark is given in Section 5.

2. Nominative object, restructuring, and two derivations

Let us return to the baseline data in (4). Since they are not a minimal pair, some pragmatic factors may interfere with proper judgment. In order to control this, we use (5), instead, as the baseline data for the subsequent discussion. Recall that, according to Sugimura, the NomO has ambiguous scope in a causative (CAUS) sentence (5a), whereas it has only wide scope over PT in a purpose clause (NI) sentence (5b).

(5)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Mari-wa Chie-ni zensai-dake-ga tabe-sase-rare-ru.} \\
& \text{Mari-top Chie-dat appetizer-nom eat-CAUS-PT-pres} \\
& \text{‘Mari can make Chie eat only appetizer’} \\
& \text{can>only} \\
& \text{‘The only thing Mari can make Chie eat are appetizers’} \\
& \text{only>can} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Mari-wa sono café-ni zensai-dake-ga tabe-ni ik-e-ru.} \\
& \text{Mari-top the café-to appetizers-only-nom eat-NI go-PT-pres} \\
& \text{‘*Mari can go to the café to eat only appetizers’} \\
& \text{*can>only} \\
& \text{‘Appetizers are the only thing Mari can go to eat at the café’} \\
& \text{only>can}
\end{align*}

Sugimura argues that this follows from the HMA. Namely, (i) having an FR-predicate, (5a) involves head movement of tabe ‘eat’ to CAUS, whereas the postposition –ni in the purpose clause blocks head movement of tabe to ik in (5b), as schematically illustrated in (6a)/(6b), respectively; (ii) functional restructuring extends the agreement domain of tabe to the matrix clause (6a) but

\[ \text{\footnote{Lisa Travis (p.c.) has informed me that Sugimura (2012) became aware of some of the concerns expressed here, acknowledging them in footnotes. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain a copy of Sugimura 2012 while writing this paper; thus, I base all my remarks here solely on Sugimura 2010 and Dobler, Sugimura, and Travis 2010.} } \]
not with a LR-predicate (6b); (iii) thus, the matrix T in (5a) can case-license the NomO either in-situ or in Spec-TP because they are in the same case-licensing domain (7); but (iv) the matrix T cannot do the same in (5b) because the NomO is not in its case-licensing domain (8a).

(6)  
a. $[[[\text{OBJ V-}] \text{CAUSE-PT } T]]$ head movement  
b. $[[[\text{OBJ V-NI}] \text{go-PT } T]]$ *head movement

(7)  
a. $[[[\text{NomO } t_1] [V_1\text{-CAUS }-PT ] T]]$  
b. $[[[\text{NomO}_2 [t_1 t_2] V_1\text{-CAUS }-PT ] T]]$

Case-licensing domain of NomO

(8)  
a. * $[[[\text{Nom-O } V \ldots-NI \text{go-PT } T]]]$

Case licensing domain of NomO  
b. $[[[\text{NomO}_2 [[\text{pro}_2 V \ldots-NI \text{go-PT } T]]]]$

Given (iv), the wide scope reading in (5b) must involve base generation of NomO in the matrix Spec-TP, which binds pro in the embedded object position (6b). Sugimura (2010), thus, concludes that both the movement-approach (e.g., Tada 1992, Koizumi 1994, Bobaljik and Wurmbrand 2005, 2007) and the base-generation approach (Takano 2003) to NomOs must be available in Japanese. If Sugimura is correct, then LR-predicates do not undergo restructuring in the sense described by Sugimura above, because (8b) remains bi-clausal.

Observe that the HMA is essentially designed to capture the scope asymmetry outlined in (5). In other words, it aims to derive the descriptive generalizations in (9) from (10) in conjunction with other principles of grammar. Therefore, the correctness of (9) and (10) is critical for the HMA. If either statement in (9) turns out to be descriptively incorrect, then the HMA cannot be maintained, since (10) specifically derives the dichotomy in (9).

(9)  
a. The scope of a Japanese NomO with an FR predicate can be either wide or narrow, as shown in (5a).  
b. A Japanese NomO in a non-FR predicate takes only wide scope, as shown in (5b).

(10)  
a. CAUS is a FR-predicate, triggering restructuring  
b. (NI-) ik is not a FR-predicate; thus no restructuring takes place.

If, on the other hand, either of the statements in (10) turns out to be false, then the core of HMA may still be maintained. Naturally, by doing so, the elegance of the analysis might be reduced somewhat. Sugimura (2010:8–10) offers supporting arguments for (9) and (10). For (10), she offers two arguments (i.e., question-answer pairs and reduplication) with the assumption that “word formation is part of the syntax (Halle & Marantz 1993),” although we do not
review her arguments here. It suffices us to observe that causative (s)ase- is a bound morpheme attaching to a verb stem, as shown in (11).

(11) a. tabe -ase -ru. b. * ase-ru.³
eat -CAUS -pres CAUS-pres
‘cause someone to eat’

It is highly plausible that tabe in (11a) syntactically incorporates into CAUS via head movement. NI-clauses, on the other hand, are not morphologically bound to ik, judging from the surface morphology. Under the HMA, that means that a NI-clause does not incorporate into ik, and, thus, the embedded verb does not head-move to ik. Thus, (10) seems quite plausible.

The same cannot be said about (9), however. Sugimura does argue for (9a), mainly using Nomura’s (2003, 2005) argument.⁴ Interestingly, Sugimura (2010) spares few empirical argument for (9b), simply stating that a NomO “obligatorily takes wide scope” (p. 6). I am sympathetic to Sugimura’s judgment; the wide-scope reading of the NomO in (5b) is indeed dominant. But, then, Sugimura only uses dake-NomO for her discussion, the dominant reading of which is the wide scope reading, as to be shown below. Therefore, (9b) must be tested against other types of NomOs.

3. Scope properties of nominative objects

³ A process similar to do-support (Lasnik 1995) applies to a CAUS, when it is used by itself, as in (i). This strongly suggests that a CAUS cannot be stranded. Also, this raises a question on the validity of Sugimura’s question-answer argument. She claims that s-ase-ta alone cannot be a legitimate answer to the question in (iia). Yet, in proper context it can be used as a proper answer without the verb, as in (ib).

(i) a. Hontoo-ni Mari-ni toshokan-no hon-o kaes-ase-ta-no?
   True-adv Mari-dat library-gen books-acc return-CAUS-past-Q
   ‘Did you really make Mari return the library books?’

   Yeah Properly do-CAUS-past -prt
   ‘Yeah, I made her do it as I was supposed to’

(ii) a. John-o hashir-ase-ta-no?
    John-acc run-CAUS-past-Q
    ‘Did you make John run?’

   b. Un. Hashir-ase-ta -yo.’
   Yes run-CAUS-past -part Yes caused
   ‘Yes, I did’ or ‘Yes, I made (him) to run’

⁴ This issue is far from being settled. See Bobaljik and Wurmbrand’s (2012) comment on this. Neither do I intend to try to settle it here. One source of the difficulties is that minute prosodic changes, such as a slight pause, or intonation change, after a NomO, could subtly affect the interpretation. Sugimura (2010) follows Nomura’s (2003, 2005) arguments on this matter, and we, in turn, follow Sugimura’s position for our discussion.
In this section, we will examine the empirical validity of (9b) using NomOs other than *NP-dake-ga ‘only NP’*. In particular, we show that NomOs behave differently with respect to scope if they are indefinite.

### 3.1. *Only, everyone, and indefinite NPs.*

Saito (2009) notes that different types of nouns behave differently with respect to scope taking: e.g., (i) indefinite NPs take narrow scope relative to negation, as in (12a); and (ii) quantified NPs, such as *NP-dake-ga*, tend to take wide scope over negation, as in (12b). Lasnik (1999) shows essentially the same point; the raised subject can take the wide or narrow scope if it is indefinite (13a); however, the same is not the case with quantified NPs, as in (13b).

(12) a. Kono ike -ni-wa sakana-ga i-na-i.  
This pond-in-Top fish-nom be-not  
‘There is no fish in this pond.’  

b. Kono ike -ni-wa koi-dake-ga i-na-i.  
This pond -in-Top carp-only-nom be-not  
‘It is only carp that this pond does not have’  

(13) a. Some politician, is likely [t1 to address John’s constituency].  

b. Every coin1 is 3% likely [t1 to land heads ].  

In this discussion, we will leave it open as to how the narrow scope reading of indefinites, such as in (12a)/(13a), is obtained. If we allow A-reconstruction of scope in a principled way, then the unavailability of scope reconstruction for quantified NPs, as in (12b)/(13b), becomes unexplained. If we were to follow Lasnik (1999), but *contra* Bobaljik and Wurmbrand (2012), in that there is no quantifier reconstruction of A-movement, then the narrow scope reading of a raised indefinite NP must be possible for an independent reason (Saito 2009). Settling this question is well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, here, we follow Saito (2009) in assuming that “reconstruction in...Case chains...is difficult with quantified NPs but is readily available or even forced with indefinites.”

To sum up, examples (12b) and (13b) show that *dake ‘only’* has a strong tendency to take wide scope. With this property of *dake*, we would expect a strong bias toward the wide scope reading for (5b), the crucial test case for Sugimura’s (2010) analysis. That is, the alleged unambiguous wide scope reading of NomOs in LR-context may be due to this property of *dake*, not a reflection of the lack of head movement.

The examples in (15) demonstrate the distinct scope properties of nominative marked *everyone, most, only, and indefinites (14) (Lasnik 1999, 2007, Miyagawa 2003, Saito 2009). As (16)–(18) show, the generalizations in (14) hold in Japanese, as well.
(14)  
a.  everyone can take scope over or under negation.
b.  most and only take scope over negation.
c.  indefinites (have strong tendency to) take scope under negation.

(15)  
a.  Everyone didn’t take that exam.  everyone>not, not>everyone
b.  Most people didn’t take that exam.  most>not
   c.  Only John didn’t take that exam.  only>not

(16)  
Mari-wa  zen-in-ga  hihan-deki-  na-i.
Mari-Top  all-nom  criticize-can-  not-present
   ‘Mari can’t criticize anyone’   all>not>can
   ‘Mari can’t criticize everyone’  not>can>all

(17)  
Mari-wa  Chie-dake-ga  hihan-deki-  na-i.
Mari-Top  Chie-only-nom  criticize-can-  not-present
   ‘It is only Chie that Mari cannot criticize’  only>not>can,
   ‘*Mari cannot criticize only Chie’  *not>can>only

(18)  
Mari-wa  hito-ga  hihan-deki-  na-i.
Mari-Top  person-nom  criticize-can-  not-present
   ‘*Mari cannot criticize a person’  *not>can>a person
   ‘There is a person who Mari cannot criticize’  *a person>not>can

The generalizations in (14) capture the scope relation of NomOs and negation. 
PT is known to take scope under negation; thus, the same generalizations hold 
with the NomOs and PT, as shown in (19)–(21). Thus, we obtain (22) for 
Japanese, a set of parallel conditions to (14) (See also Nomura 2005).

(19)  
Mari-wa  zen-in-ga  hihan-deki-  -ru.
Mari-Top  all-nom  criticize-PT-  -present
   ‘For each one of them, Mari can criticize’  all>can
   ‘Mari can criticize everyone’  can>all

(20)  
Mari-wa  Chie-dake-ga  hihan-deki-  -ru.
Mari-Top  Chie-only-nom  criticize-PT-  -present
   ‘It is only Chie that Mari can criticize’  only>can,
   ‘*Mari can criticize only Chie’  *?can>only

(21)  
Mari-wa  hito-ga  hihan-deki-  -ru.
Mari-Top  person-nom  criticize-PT-  -present
   ‘Mari can criticize a person’  not>can>a person
   ‘*There is a person who Mari can criticize’  * a person>not>can

(22)  
a.  Zen-in- ‘all’ takes either wide or narrow scope.
b.  DP-dake has a tendency to take scope over negation/PT.
c.  Indefinites (e.g. hito) tend to take scope under negation/PT.

If so, it is expected that the quantified NP zensai-dake-ga in (5b) has a strong 
bias toward the wide scope interpretation. That is, the generalization in (9b) 
may be an artifact of (22). In order to test (9b), we need data with indefinites.
3.2. Modified baseline data with indefinites

Now, we examine the baseline data in light of (22). If the HMA is indeed correct in that head movement of the lower predicate is blocked, then, even an indefinite NomO must take wide scope because it cannot be nominative-licensed in its 0-position. This predication, however, is not borne out, as shown below. In (23), I do not think the wide scope reading is available.

(23) Mari-wa sono jugyoo-ni kanji-ga benkyooshi-ni ik-e-ru
Mari-top the class-to kanji-nom study-NI go-PT-pres

(koto-o shir-anak-atta).
(that-acc know-not-did)

‘Mari (did not know that she) can go to the class to practice kanji’

\textit{can \(\rightarrow\) kanji, \(\star\) kanji \(\rightarrow\) can}

(24) Mari-wa sono jugyoo-ni zen-in-ga hihansi-ni ik-e-ru (koto-o…
Mari-top the class-to everyone-nom criticize-NI go-PT-pres …

‘Midori (did not know that she) can go to the class to criticize everyone’

\textit{can \(\rightarrow\) all, all \(\rightarrow\) can}

On the other hand, as shown in (24), \textit{zen-in-ga} ‘everyone’ is compatible with both the wide and narrow scope reading. This result is duplicated with negation in (25)/(26).

Mari-top the class-to kanji-nom study-NI go-PT-not-pres

(koto-o shir-anak-atta).
(that-acc know-not-did)

‘Mari (did not know that she) can’t go to the class to practice kanji’

\textit{can \(\rightarrow\) not \(\rightarrow\) kanji,}

\textit{*\(\rightarrow\) (… know that) kanji was what she couldn’t go to the class to study’}

\textit{kanji \(\rightarrow\) not \(\rightarrow\) can}

(26) Mari-wa sono jugyoo-ni zen-in-ga hihansi-ni ik-e-na-i (koto-o …
Mari-top the class-to everyone-nom criticize-NI go-POT-not-pres …

‘Mari (… know that she) can’t go to the class to criticize everyone.’

\textit{not \(\rightarrow\) can \(\rightarrow\) all,}

\textit{\(\star\) (… know that) not everyone, she can go to the class to criticize’}

\textit{all \(\rightarrow\) not \(\rightarrow\) can}

In fact, the \textit{NI}-sentences above show precisely the results predicted by (22); viz., \textit{zen-in} ‘everyone’ may take either wide or narrow scope, whereas indefinite \textit{kanji} ‘Chinese characters’ takes narrow scope. This result is problematic for the HMA since NomOs are taking narrow scope in a LR-context, contrary to (9b).

Now, recall that Sugimura (2010) does not offer any empirical argument for the alleged inaccessibility of narrow scope reading of NomOs in \textit{NI}-sentences. As for the evidence for (9b), Sugimura (2010) does not use a
minimal pair. By not doing so, some unwanted (pragmatic) factors might have interfered with the judgment. When we use a minimal pair, as in (27) and (28), I do not find any marked scope asymmetry.

    Mari-top the café-to Bach-only-nom listen-NI go-PT-pres
    ‘Mari can go to the café to listen to only Bach’
    can>only
    ‘Mari can’t go to that café to listen to anything but Bach’
    only<can

(28) Mari-wa Chie-ni sono café-de Bahha-dake-ga kik-ase- rare-ru.
    Mari-nom Chie-dat the café-at Bach-only-nom listen-CAUS- PT-pres
    ‘Mari can make Chie listen to only Bach at the café.’
    can>only
    ‘Mari can’t make Chie listen anything but Bach at the café’
    only<can

The wide scope reading of the NomO says that the café has no other records but Bach’s music; the narrow scope interpretation is that the café allows Chie to listen exclusively to Bach’s music, even though the café has a good collection of other classical music. The wide scope reading is the preferred one, in my view; yet, together with the informants I consulted with, I found the narrow scope reading of NomOs readily accessible in both cases. I even find the contrast between (5a) and (5b) comparable to (27) and (28). In short, we do not find any empirical evidence for (9b), but evidence against it.

To sum up, the alleged scope asymmetry of NomOs between CAUS and NI was shown to be absent, and, therefore, the HMA of nominative case-licensing analysis, which predicts its existence, cannot be maintained. On the basis of the result of this study, we may say that the case-licensing of NomOs is not blocked even when the lower predicate does not morphologically incorporate (i.e., head-move) to the matrix predicate.

3.3. Restructuring and head movement

Let us return to (10b): NI-sentences do not involve FR (head movement). Thus, under the HMA, NI-sentences are without restructuring; they maintain biclausality (cf. (8)). This is contradictory to our findings above. We saw that indefinite NomOs can take narrow scope, indicating that they can be case-licensed in-situ. In other words, NI-sentences seem to undergo restructuring.

Consider (29). The goal PP is an argument of ik, thus, being outside the NI-purpose clause (29a). (29b/c) shows that a NomO/AccO may scramble out of a NI-clause without affecting the interpretation. This indicates that the purpose clause is not an island for scrambling.

    Mari-top the café-to appetizers-only-nom eat-NI go-PT-pres
    ‘Mari can go to the café to eat only appetizers’

b. Mari-wa [zensai-dake1, ga sono café-ni[ t1 tabe-ni] ik]-e-ru.
    Mari-top appetizers-only-nom the café-toeat-NI go-PT-pres

c. Mari-wa [zensai-dake1, o sono café-ni[ t1 tabe-ni] ik]-e-ru.
    Mari-top appetizers-only-acc the café-toeat-NI go-PT-pres
Interestingly, a NI-purpose clause itself can be scrambled above the goal with AceO, as in (30a). This does not seem possible with a NomO, as in (30b).

(30) a. Mari-wa [ [zensai-dake-o tabe]-ni sono cafè-ni t1 ik]-e-ru.
Mari-top appetizers-only-acc eat-NI the cafè-to go-PT-pres
'Mari can go to the cafè to only eat appetizers’

b. ?? Mari-wa [ [zensai-dake-ga tabe]-ni sono cafè-ni t1 ik]-e-ru.
Mari-top appetizers-only-nameat-NI the cafè-to go-PT-pres
'Mari can go to the cafè to only eat’

The contrast in (30a/b), though subtle, suggests that licensing of NomO requires the structural proximity of NI- and ik, even though they are not morphologically incorporated. This strongly suggests that NI-sentences do undergo a restructuring process – by eliminating the bi-clausality, and that this process requires adjacency of the NI-clause and ik. If this view is correct, then contrary to the HMA’s position, restructuring does not require head movement, and, thus, the FR/LR-distinction is superfluous with respect to restructuring, per se.

This conclusion is tentative, even though I still think the contrast in (30) is real. The contrast in (30) is quite subtle, and (30b) improves when it is embedded in another sentence, such as Mari did not know that. Further investigation is in order.

4. Case-licensing of NomO: Covert Á-movement

Below, we briefly speculate on the mechanism of case licensing of NomOs and scope marking that is compatible with the findings above. Under the HMA, nominative case is licensed in the Spec TP, and the scope is marked by the surface position of the NomOs. For the low scope reading, the NomO remains in-situ, and, for wide scope, the NomO “optionally undergo movement to satisfy an EPP feature on T, where it takes scope over the modal, along the line of Nomura (2005)” (Sugimura 2010:7). The EPP-feature must be eliminated immediately after it enters into the derivation (Chomsky 2000), so NomOs must move overtly. This is a problematic assumption since wide scope of NomOs obtains without overt raising, as shown in (31).

Mari-top friends-with rice-only-acc eat-PT-pres
‘Mari can eat only rice with her friends’
can>only, *only>can

Mari-top friends-with rice-only-nom eat-PT-pres
‘Mari can only eat rice (and nothing else) with her friends’
can>only, only>can

The examples in (31) are exactly like the examples in (2) except for the presence of tomodachi-to ‘with friends’ on the left of the NomOs; both the PPs and NomOs must be inside the lower clause. In (31b) wide scope reading of the NomO is available, even though the NomO remains in-situ.
a. Mari-wa [steiji-ni piano-dake-o ok]-e-ru.
Mari-top stage-on piano-only-acc place-PT-pres
'Mari can place only the piano on the stage'
can>only, only>can
b. Mari-wa [steiji-ni piano-dake-ga ok]-e-ru.
Mari-top stage-on piano-only-nom place-PT-pres
'Mari can place only the piano on the stage'
only>can, can>only

The same holds with (32a/b), where the PP is an argument of ok 'place'. The wide scope reading of the NomO is available in (32b), indicating that scope is not overtly marked in Japanese, contrary to the view under the HMA.

This conclusion is consistent with that of Saito's (2009): viz., Japanese NomOs covertly move to the outer Spec, not the (inner) Spec of TP. Below, a abbreviated version of his argument is given. If a NomO moves to the TP Spec, an A-position, then the NomO would acquire a cluster of properties associated with A-moved items (Saito 1985, Mahajan 1990); for example, A-moved NomOs are expected to exhibit subject properties; however, they do not. Japanese reflexive jibun is a subject oriented reflective; in (33), only Mari is the antecedent for jibun, even though Chie should be able to be, if it were A-moved. (See Saito 1982, 2009, for more arguments on this). If a NomO is licensed by T, but not inside TP Spec, the NomO must be moved to an A-position, i.e., the outer Spec of TP (34).

(33) Mari-ga Chie2-ga jibun1,-,-,- no ie-de shikar-e-ru (koto).
Mari-nom Chie-nom self-gen house-in scold-PT-pres fact
'(the fact that) Mari can scold Chie in her house'


The next question is: where is the NomO in (35a) – in-situ or in TP Spec? The HMA assume the latter. Saito (2009), however, argues that this movement must be covert using the data with floated quantifiers (FQs). It has been well-established (cf. Kuroda 1980, Haig 1980) that Japanese FQs must be linearly adjacent to their associates or their traces (copies).

students-nomTelugu-nom speak-PT-pres (that)
'(that) the students can speak Telugu'
students-nom3-FQ subj Telugu-nom speak-PT-pres (that)
'(that) three students can speak Telugu'
c. ?? Gakusee-ga Terugugo-ga san-nin hanas-e-ru (koto).
students-nomTelugu-nom 3-FQ subj speak-PT-pres (that)
'(that) three students can speak Telugu'

(35b) shows that FQ subj is adjacent to the subject, thus being well-formed. (35c), on the other hand, is ungrammatical because the NomO intervenes between the
subject and the FQ. Saito (2009) suggests that the structure involved in (35c) must be (36a), with the NomO (somewhere) inside VP. Suppose that the NomO overtly raises, instead; then, the subject must also scramble out so as to maintain the surface word order, resulting in (36b).

\[(36) \quad \begin{align*}
&\text{a. } [\text{TP subject } [\text{VP NomO FQ}_{\text{subj}} V]] \\
&\text{b. } [\text{subject}_1 [\text{NomO}_2 [\text{TP t}_1 \text{FQ}_{\text{subj}} [\text{VP t}_2 V]]]]
\end{align*}\]

If so, (35c) would have been well-formed, since FQ_{subj} is adjacent to the trace (copy) of the subject. In other words, given the ungrammaticality of (35c), the NomO may not be in Spec-TP. While this account leaves open the question of where the NomO is in (36a), the problem of (36b) seems clear. Therefore, Saito concludes that the ungrammaticality of (35c) shows that the NomO must not overtly move into Spec of TP.

What remains is how to capture covert movement in the minimalist theoretical apparatus (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2008). In the standard approach, overt movement is motivated by a movement-inducing feature (e.g., EPP- or OCC-feature), but what motivates covert raising? To be more precise, under the recent minimalist view, movement is the internal merge of terms, and the overt/covert distinction reduces to whether the head or tail of a chain (i.e., a sequence of occurrences) is pronounced (e.g., Bobaljik 1995, Brody 1995). The optionality of movement vanishes.

Lasnik (1999) discusses an interesting case of optional overt movement and covert feature raising in English. Lasnik reports that some dialect of English allows make-out (= pretend) with or without particle movement, as shown in (39a/b), respectively. The sentence in (39a) involves the raising of John to the matrix object position (Lasnik and Saito 1991, Lasnik 1999), as illustrated in (40a), whereas John in (39b) remains in-situ, as in (40b).

\[(39) \quad \begin{align*}
&\text{a. } \text{Mary made John out to be a fool.} \\
&\text{b. } \text{Mary makes out John to be a fool.}
\end{align*}\]

\[(40) \quad \begin{align*}
&\text{a. } \text{Mary makes John out } [\text{John to be a fool}]. \\
&\text{b. } \text{Mary makes } \underline{\text{non}} \text{ out } [\text{John to be a fool}].
\end{align*}\]

This optional raising to object has consequences in scope in this dialect, Lasnik reports. With overt raising to object, the object must take wide scope, whereas without overt raising, the object may take narrow scope reading. For example, in this dialect, the raised universal quantifier in (41a) may not take scope under the negation of the infinitive, whereas the non-raised quantifier in (41b) can.

\[(41) \quad \begin{align*}
&\text{a. } \text{The mathematician made every even number out not to be the sum of two primes.} \\
&\text{b. } \text{The mathematician made out every even number not to be the sum of two primes.}
\end{align*}\]

The data in (42) and (43) show the same point. The NPI (any) in the matrix PP can be licensed by the negation in the raised object (42b), but not in the non-raised object (42b). Likewise, each other in the matrix PP is licensed by the defendants only if it is raised (43a); otherwise, the anaphor license fails (43b).
(42) a. The lawyer made no witness out to be idiots during any of the trials.
   b. * The lawyer made out no witness to be idiots during any of the trials.

(43) a. The DA made the defendants out to be guilty during each other’s trial.
   b. * The DA made out the defendants to be guilty during each other’s trial.

Lasnik (1999:202) concludes that “[w]hen raising of a universal does take place … that universal cannot “reconstruct” so as to take scope under lower clausal negation.” The optionality raising may be due to the optionality of EPP-feature in the matrix V (or, in Agr). When no raising takes place, “the nominal’s Case will be checked by covert raising of its formal features to the V” (p. 204). Let us assume the overall correctness of Lasnik’s analysis of this construction. That is, overt movement is triggered by optional EPP-features, whereas the case of the embedded subject is licensed via covert feature raising. Within the present theoretical framework, covert feature raising for case-licensing (i.e., case-feature checking) seems to be best handled by AGREE, as suggested by Sugimura (2010). Let us assume with many other researchers that it suffices for nominative case features to case-agree with its licensor.

Recall that, in this dialect of English, the scope is marked by the surface position of the scope bearing item. This fact contrasts with the scope marking of NomOs in Japanese, as we saw above: viz., the scope marking of NomOs is not overt. In a sense, one may expect this contrast from the fact that English is a wh-movement language and Japanese, a wh-in-situ language. In Japanese, “overt” movement of DP does not seem to be the primary mechanism for scope marking, although scrambling does affect scope (Saito 1985, Miyagawa 2001). Rather, Japanese marks wh-scope with the scope particle –ka (Hagstrom 1998, 2000). Unlike wh-scope, a NomO has no scope-marking particle associated with it; yet, the position of T associated with it should suffice for wide scope marking. That is, the relevant feature of T agrees with that of a NomO, thereby marking the T as the scope marker of the NomO at the interface. As for narrow scope, the surface position of a NomO would suffice for the interface to identify it.

5. Summary

In this paper, we argued that the HMA account for the scope asymmetry alleged in (1)/(3)/(5) fails. The HMA attempts to derive the asymmetry in terms of the dichotomy between FR- and LR-predicates, which in turn follows from the presence/absence of head movement (Section 2). However, we demonstrated that the (un)availability of head movement does not correlate with the scope asymmetry; in fact, the alleged scope asymmetry does not seem to exist (Section 3). With indefinite NomOs, narrow scope reading is available with a NI-sentence (Section 3.2). Therefore, there was no empirical basis for (9b): i.e., NomOs in NI-sentences obligatorily take wide scope, the effect of which the HMA is designed to derive. It appears that NI-sentences undergo restructuring, in spite of the absence of head movement (Section 3.3).

We then speculated an alternative mechanism of nominative case-licensing for NomOs (Section 4). What seems promising is that a NomO does
not overtly raise to the (outer) Spec-TP in Japanese (Saito 2009). The case-licensing is done via AGREE, and, thus it suffices for the NomO to be in the agreement domain of the licenser (Chomsky 2008); it need not raise to the specifier of its licenser. If so, restructuring must take place irrespective of CAUS- and NI-construction; that is, contrary to the HMA, restructuring takes place in both FR- and LR-predicates, thereby rendering the FR-LR distinction superfluous for syntax.

In the English make-out construction (Lasnik 1999), scope is overtly marked by the position of the relevant DP, whose movement is triggered by the EPP-feature (or AgrO) optional in these dialects of English. Case-licensing of the non-raised DPs is done covert feature raising, or (long-distance) feature agreement. In Japanese, on the other hand, scope marking of NomOs can be done without (overt) movement (pro Saito 2009, and contra Koizumi 1994, Bobaljik and Wurmbrand 2005, Sugimura 2010, among others); rather, the interface reads off the scope from the position of a NomO in situ (narrow scope), or from the position of the licenser T (wide scope) via agreement established for case-licensing of the DP. Naturally, there are many outstanding questions regarding this topic, and more empirical investigation is in order.

References


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