This paper examines the properties of psych-predicates in Blackfoot, which have not been studied in depth. Strikingly, predicates of this type behave like predicates with agentive subjects. Although this fact is surprising, I argue that psych-predicates being agentive is consistent with the grammar of Blackfoot, namely PERSON/animacy-oriented grammar.1

1. Classification of psych-predicates and Blackfoot psych-predicates

Belletti and Rizzi (1988) classify psych-predicates into three types, as illustrated in (1): 2

(1) a. He fears her.

b. The news frightened me.

c. Swuni-eykey Inho-ka/ku kulim-i silh-ess-ta
   Suni-DAT Inho-NOM/DEM picture-NOM hate-PAST-DEC
   ‘Suni hated Inho/that picture.’

1I would like to thank Sandra Many Feathers (formerly Crazybull) and Brent Prairie Chicken for sharing their language with me, and Betsy Ritter for her support and valuable comments. I also thank Martina Wiltschko, Don Frantz, and the audience at the 2013 CLA of useful comments. Of course, all errors are my own. This research is supported by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada postdoctoral fellowship to the author (#756-2012-0483). Additional support comes from the Jacobs Research Fund and the Philips Fund for Native American Research. Unless otherwise noted, all data presented in this paper are from my own fieldwork. The data presented come from the Kainaa (Blood) dialect.

2At this point, it is not clear how animacy and PERSON are different, and thus I use them interchangeably for now.

The following abbreviations are used in the paper: 1/2/3 – 1st/2nd/3rd person; ACC – accusative; AN – animate; DAT – dative; DEC – declarative; DIR – direct object theme; DEM – demonstrative; AI – intransitive animate; II – intransitive inanimate; IN – inanimate; INST – instrument; INV – inverse theme; NOM – nominative; PL – plural; PAST – past; PRES – present; S – singular; TA – transitive animate; TI – transitive inanimate.

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The classification is mainly based on theta roles and case of the arguments. Class I (1a) has nominative experiencer, *He*, as a subject and an accusative theme object, *her*, and is thus often referred to as a subject-experiencer construction. Class II (1b), on the other hand, has an object experiencer, *me*, and a causer subject, *the news*, i.e., an object-experiencer construction (Pesetsky 1995). Class III usually has non-nominative case on the experiencer subject, e.g., dative case on the experiencer 'Suni' as in (1c), and the theme object *Inho* or *ku kulim* has nominative case, -ka/-i. A Class III clause is often referred to as a dative-subject experiencer construction. Blackfoot is well known for its PERSON-oriented grammar; that is, it is an animacy-oriented language (Ritter and Wiltschko 2009, to appear). For instance, it has been shown in Ritter and Rosen (2010) that there is an animacy constraint on external arguments in Blackfoot: only human subjects are allowed. Animacy also plays a role in the mass/count distinction on nouns (Wiltschko 2009). Keeping in mind Blackfoot’s PERSON/animacy-oriented grammar, this paper addresses two questions with respect to psych-predicates: (i) where Blackfoot psych-predicates can be situated within the theta-based classification in (1), and (ii) to what extent the PERSON/animacy-oriented grammar of Blackfoot affects the classification. I show that Blackfoot has no Class II (1b) or Class III (1c) predicates; psych-predicates in Blackfoot may be of the Class I type (1a), as the subject is an experiencer and the object is the theme. However, I demonstrate the striking fact that the experiencer of a psych-predicate does not differ from agents of normal predicates in the language, unlike experiencer subjects in canonical Class I predicates (1a). I argue that this surprising finding is the result of PERSON/animacy-oriented Blackfoot grammar. Another interesting consequence is that the properties of Blackfoot psych-predicates provide evidence that not all experiencers are locative, i.e., PP, contra Landau (2010).

This paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview on Blackfoot verbal system. Section 3 discusses transitivity of psych-predicates in Blackfoot. Section 4 shows that psych-predicates in Blackfoot may be Class I, but differ from canonical Class I predicates in that they are agentive and not atelic. Section 5 shows that Blackfoot does not have Class II or III type psych-predicates. Section 6 discusses the consequences of having agentive experiencers, and section 7 concludes the paper.

### 2. The structure of Blackfoot verbs

In Blackfoot, person, number, and gender features of at most two arguments are cross-referenced in verbal affixes. The most relevant verbal affixes for the purposes of this paper are finals and theme markers. Finals are suffixes indicating the transitivity of the verb and the animacy of subject or object. Four types of finals are presented in (2).

(2)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Animate Intransitive (AI): S is animate</td>
<td><em>S</em> is animate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Inanimate Intransitive (II): S is inanimate</td>
<td><em>S</em> is inanimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Transitive Animate (TA): O is animate</td>
<td><em>O</em> is animate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Transitive Inanimate (TI): O is inanimate</td>
<td><em>O</em> is inanimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For instance, in (3a), the verb 'eat' is marked with the TA final, indicating that the verb is transitive. Thus, the verb can appear with both the subject 'I' and the object 'that chicken'. The same final also indicates that the object of the verb, 'that chicken', is animate, in contrast to the TI final in (3b) whose object, 'that bread', is inanimate.

(3) a. nitsóowata ni nítawááki
   nit-soowat-a-wa ani nítawaaki TA
   1-ate.TA-DIR-3S DEM chicken
   'I ate that chicken.' (1 > 3)

   b. nitsówato'p na napayín
   nit-sowatoo'-p-wa ana napayin TI
   1-ate.TI-DIR-3S DEM bread
   'I ate that bread.' (1 > 3)

Theme markers are found in all Algonquian languages, and indicate the role of the argument, e.g., an actor or theme. Direct-inverse systems make reference to a person scale (4), which is simplified for the purposes of this paper. For instance, if the actor (subject) outranks the theme on the person scale, the verb is marked as being direct. Thus, the direct markers on the verbs, -a (3a) for TA forms and -'p (3b) for TI forms, indicate that the first person 'I' acts on the 3rd person theme, 'that chicken' or 'that bread'.

(4) a. 1st, 2nd > 3rd
   b. 1st > 2nd

3. Psych-predicates in Blackfoot

There have been no studies dedicated to psych-predicates in Blackfoot except for Johansson (2007). This study showed that there are no psych-predicates marked with II finals, and that experiencers in Blackfoot must be sentient and animate. However, no research has been done regarding the distribution and properties of psych-predicates. This paper represents some initial findings in this direction. In particular, I discuss the morphological forms and properties of psych-predicates, focusing on the issue of transitivity.

3.1 Morphological forms

Psych-predicates can be marked with the finals TA, TI, or AI, as illustrated in (5). The suffix -imm indicates that a verb is a TA form, the suffix -'tsi is for a TI verb form, and the suffix -'taki is for an AI verb form.

(5) a. a'ka-imm
    a'ka-i'tsi    a'ka-i'taki   'hate'
b. a'poina'-imm
    a'poina'-i'tsi a'poina'-i'taki   'being bothered'
c. i's-imm
    i's-i'tsi     i's-i'taki     'distrust/fear'
There are also psych-predicates that do not show regular final markers, as shown in (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TA</th>
<th>TI</th>
<th>AI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(6) a.</td>
<td>sstonno</td>
<td>sstonno</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b.</td>
<td>sski'i</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c.</td>
<td>a'pitsiihtaa</td>
<td>a'pitsiihtaa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the forms in (6) are absent or identical. In (6a), for instance, the TA and TI forms of the verb 'fear' are identical, and AI form of the verb is absent. How, then, do we know whether a given form is TA or TI? This can be determined based on the theme marker that appears on the verb. Consider the examples in (7). In (7a), the verb a'poina 'be bothered' takes the TI suffix, -i'tsi. In (7b), on the other hand, the verb a'potsiihtaa 'worry' does not carry a regular final suffix. In (7a), the first person actor 'I' acts on the 3rd person theme 'the house' (1 > 3), and thus the verb 'be bothered' is marked by the direct morpheme -'p for TI forms. In (7b), in which the verb does not have a final suffix, the direction of the act is the same: 'I' acts on the 3rd person 'this house'. Importantly, the verb 'worry' in (7b) shows the same direct morpheme as the verb in (7a), -'p, indicating that the verb is a TI form.

(7) a. nitsiik-a'potsiistoo amoyni napioyisi
    nit-a'poina-i'tsi-’p-wa amoyni napioyisi TI
    1-be.bothered-TI-DIR-3S DEM house
    'I am bothered with this house.' (1 > 3)

b. nitsiik-a'potsiisto’p amoyni napioyisi
    nit-iik-a'potsiihtaa-’p-wa amoyni napioyisi TI
    1-very-worry.TI-DIR-3S DEM house
    'I worry about this house.' (1 > 3)

Psych-predicates do not differ in terms of transitivity (section 3.2) or agentivity and aspectual property (section 5) whether or not they have finals. The examples in the rest of this paper mainly present forms that have regular finals.

3.2 Transitivity

In Blackfoot, normal TA and TI verbs must have a DP object, but do not allow an NP object (Ritter and Rosen 2010). This is exemplified in (8) below:

(8) a. naowatsiw amo mamii
    na-oow-at-yii-wa [amo mamii]/*mamii TA
    PAST-eat-TA-DIR-3SG DEM fish.AN/ fish.AN
    'S/he ate this fish.'
b.  naowatoom ani akoopis
   na-oow-atoo-m-wa   [ani akoopis]/akoopis  TI
   PST-eat-TI-DIR-3SG  DEM soup.IN/soup.IN
   ‘S/he ate that soup.’  (Ritter and Rosen 2010)

In (8b), the verb 'eat' is marked with TI suffix -atoo, and the object is inanimate 'that soup'. The TI form of the verb does not allow the bare NP object akoopis, but must have the DP object ani akoopis 'that soup'. The same pattern is shown with the TA form of the same verb in (8a).

By contrast, AI forms of usual verbs with corresponding TA or TI forms allow an optional NP object and prohibit a DP object (Ritter and Rosen 2010), as illustrated in (9). The same verb 'eat' in (8) is marked with the AI suffix -i in (9), and the AI form of the verb can have an NP object, such as 'fish' or 'soup', but cannot have a DP object, such as 'the fish' or 'the soup'.

(9)  naoyiw (mamii/akoopis)
   na-ooy-i-wa   (mamii/akoopis)/amo mamii/amo akoopis  AI
   PST-eat-AI-3SG (fish/soup)/  DEM fish.AN/ DEM soup.IN
   ‘S/he ate (fish/soup).’  (Ritter and Rosen 2010)

Ritter and Rosen (2010) suggest that these AI forms are pseudo-transitive in that they allow an optional NP object only.

TA and TI psych-predicates show the same transitivity properties seen in (8). For example, the verb 'hate' has a TA suffix -imm in (10a) and the TI suffix -i'tsi in (10b). Both forms must have a DP object, amo mamii 'this fish' or ani akoopis 'that soup' respectively, but do not allow an NP object, 'fish' or 'soup'.

(10) a.  nita'kaimmaa amo mamii
   nit-a'ka-imm-a-wa   [amo mamii]/*mamii  TA
   1-hate-TA-DIR-3SG  DEM fish.AN/ fish.AN
   ‘I hate this fish/fish.’

b.  nita'kai 'tsi'p ni akoopis/*akoopis
   nit-a'ka -i'tsi-'p-wa   [ani akoopis]/akoopis  TI
   1-hate-TI-DIR-3SG  DEM soup.IN/ soup.IN
   ‘I hate that soup.’

Surprisingly, however, a psych-verb in the AI form does not allow any object, either a DP or an NP, unlike usual AI forms (9). In (11a), the psych-verb 'hate' has the AI suffix -i'taki, and the sentence is ungrammatical with either an NP or a DP object. The sentience of the object does not affect the grammaticality, as shown in (11b): the sentient object 'boy' is not allowed. Moreover, the number of the object does not affect the grammaticality; neither the singular 'the boy'/boy' or plural 'the boys' is allowed. Also, AI forms of psych-predicate do not allow a mass noun object NP, such as 'snow', as shown in (11c). (11a)-(11c) demonstrate that any form of an object is not allowed with AI psych-predicates, regardless of sentience, number, or mass/count properties. The
only grammatical sentence with the AI forms of psych-predicates is shown in (11d), where no object appears. My fieldwork reveals that this is a general property of the AI psych-forms.

(11) a.  *nit-a'ka-i'taki  [mamii/amo mamii]/[ni akoopis/akoopis]
     \[\text{1-hate-AI-3SG fish.AN/DEM fish.AN soup/DEM soup.IN} \]
     'I hate [fish/this fish]/[soup/that soup].'

b.  nit'a'ki'taki na saahkomáápi/saahkomáápi/saahkomáápi
     *nit-a'ka-i'taki ana saahkomaapi
     \[\text{1-hate-AI DEM boy} \]
     (aniksi) saahkomaapiki/saahkomaapi (DEM) boy-PL/boy
     'I hate [the boy/boys/a boy].'

c.  nit'a'ki'taki koonssko
     *nit-a'ka-i'taki koonssko
     \[\text{1-hate-AI snow.IN} \]
     'I hate snow. '

d.  nit'a'ki'taki
     *nit-a'ka-i'taki
     \[\text{1-hate-AI} \]
     'I have hatred.'  (i.e., I am in the state of disliking/hating)

The examples in (11) clearly suggest that AI forms of psych-predicates cannot be pseudo-transitive, unlike usual AI forms as shown in (9). In other words, the psych-AI forms are intransitives. A question, then, is whether the single argument of the AI forms is interpreted as an experiencer or a theme. Evidence from a picture-matching task indicates that the argument bears an experiencer role, not a theme. In the task, the consultants were presented with some images along with some sentences, and asked to pick out sentences that correctly describe the images. For instance, consider the images shown in (12). In (12a), Mickey is happy, and in (12b) Minnie is not. The context given was that Mickey likes Minnie, but Minnie does not like Mickey. The consultants were presented with these types of images together with the relevant contexts. In addition, sentences such as (13)-(14) were presented to the consultants, and they were asked to pick out the best sentence that describes the images. In the task, the sentences were presented without glosses. As shown in (13)-(14), the single argument of AI-psych forms were consistently interpreted as an experiencer. For instance, in (14), with the verb 'love', the consultants chose (14a), where Mickey is interpreted as an experiencer, 'Mickey has love'. (14b), which has a theme interpretation, was always rejected. (14b) means that Minnie is loved (by Mickey) in the given context with the images.
In sum, I have shown that psych-predicates in Blackfoot can have regular final suffixes TA, TI, or AI. TA and TI forms are transitive in that they must have a DP object, not an NP object. AI forms are not pseudo-transitive, unlike usual AI forms; rather, they are intransitive and have a single experiencer argument.

4. Psych-predicates in Blackfoot may be Class I

In this section, I show that the psych-predicates discussed in the previous section may be Class I in that they have experiencer subjects and theme objects. However, I show how they are different from canonical Class I predicates with respect to agentivity and aspectual properties. This discussion suggests that an experiencer in Blackfoot is agentive and aspectually not atelic, unlike that of canonical Class I.

As discussed in section 1, Class I psych-predicates have experiencer subjects and theme objects, as shown in (15). It has been shown that Class I verbs pattern with regular transitive verbs in that they do not show any of the psych effects that Class II predicates display (e.g., Belletti and Rizzi 1988, Arad 1998). It is also known that Class I is always aspectually stative, i.e., atelic (Belletti and Rizzi 1988, Grimshaw 1990, Pylkkänen 2000).

(15) a. John fears her.
   b. He fears Mary.

3AI psych forms are intransitive, but the single argument of the form is an experiencer, as shown in section 3; moreover, it is a subject (i.e., an external argument) and agentive, as shown in this section and section 5. Thus, I treat AI psych forms in the same way as TA and TI psych forms (that is, as Class I in that they all have experiencer subjects.)
I start the discussion with agentivity in the next section and discuss aspect in the following section.

4.1 Psych-predicates in Blackfoot are agentive

Usual verbs are agentive in that they allow an agent-oriented adverb, *sstahpik* 'willingly/on purpose', regardless of the forms of the verb. An example of an AI form is presented in (16).

(16)  *ana saahkomáápi esstahpiksooyii*

*ana saahkomapi e-ststahpik-sooyii*

DEM boy 3-willingly-ate.AI

'The boy ate on purpose.'

Psych-predicates also allow the same adverb regardless of form. Each form of the verb with a relevant context is presented in (17)-(19). For instance, in (18) with TI form, the experiencer 'the boy' is compatible with the adverb.

(17)  Context: The girl steals the boy's muffin every morning, and now the boy decides to be bothered by the girl (his choice to be bothered; it's up to him).

*ana saahkomáápi esstahpika'poinamma ni aakiikoani*

*ana saahkomapi e-ststahpik-a'poina-imm-a-wa ani aakiikoan*

DEM boy 3-willingly-be.bothered-TA-DIR-3S DEM girl

'The boy is bothered by the girl on purpose.'

(18)  Context: The house has a problem with the roof, and now the boy decides to be bothered by the problem.

*ana saahkomáápi esstahpika'poinai'tsi'p amo napioyisi*

*ana saahkomapi esststahpik-a'poina-'tsi'p-wa amo napioyisi*

DEM boy 3-willingly-be.bothered-TI-DIR-3S DEM house

'The boy is bothered by this house on purpose.'

(19)  Either context in (17) or (18)

*ana saahkomáápi esstahpika'poinai'taki*

*ana saahkomapi e-ststahpik-a'poina-i'taki*

DEM boy 3-willingly-be.bothered-AI

'The boy is bothered on purpose.'

Another piece of evidence that shows that psych-predicates are agentive comes from imperatives. The ability to be an imperative clause has been identified as a test for agentivity for a given clause (e.g., Jackendoff 1972). Usual verbs can appear in imperative forms regardless of final forms. The TA form of the verb 'eat' is presented in (20). In Blackfoot, imperatives have an ending -*t* when the
verb is in the AI or TI form and the subject is singular (Frantz 2009). In addition, TA forms can have the ending -is when both the subject and the 3rd person object are singular, as shown in (21).

(20)  
oowatsis ni ni'tawáakii!
oowat-is  ani ni'tawaakii  
eat.TA-IMP.2SG.3OBJ DEM chicken  
'Eat this chicken!'

Psych-predicates can appear in imperatives, and have the same morphological ending. As shown in (21a), for instance, the imperative of a TA psych-form has the same suffix -is as with the regular TA (20). The AI and TI imperative psych-forms have the -t ending, like regular verbs: an examples of the AI imperative is shown in (21b). The grammaticality of the sentences in (21) indicates that psych-predicates are agentive like regular verbs.

(21)  

a.  
a'poinammis ana saahkomaapi!  
a'poina-mm-is  ana saahkomaapi  
bother-TA-IMP.2SG.3OBJ DEM boy  
'Be bothered by this boy.'

b.  
a'poinai'takit!  
a'point-i'taki-t  
be.bothered-AI-IMP.2SG  
'Be bothered!'

This section demonstrates that psych-predicates in Blackfoot pattern with regular verbs in agentivity. Surprisingly, this is different from canonical Class I predicates, which are usually non-agentive.4

4.2 No telicity differences of psych-predicates

In Blackfoot, there is no difference between intransitives (AI) and transitives (TA or TI) in terms of telicity, as summarized in Table 1 (Ritter and Rosen 2010). Moreover, Ritter and Rosen suggest that the results of the tests in Table 1 show that verbs with TA, TI, and AI finals belong to the class of accomplishment predicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telicity test</th>
<th>ooyi 'eat-AI'</th>
<th>oowat 'eat-TA'</th>
<th>Psych-predicates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Stop V-ing</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Finish V-ing</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Almost V= almost start -ing</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Thus, AI psych-forms may be considered unergatives rather than unaccusatives, as they are agentive.
My fieldwork has shown that psych-predicates pattern with regular predicates with respect to these telicity tests, suggesting that they may also be accomplishment predicates. For the reasons of space, I present the results of test (d) only, but it is important to note that psych-predicates do not show a difference in telicity from usual predicates, as presented in the last column of Table 1.

The reading involved in test (d) is only possible with the aspectual class of accomplishments. Accomplishments consist of a process and a result, while an activity is a process with homogeneous subparts. The prediction is that accomplishments are ambiguous between modifying the result or start of the event, while activities can modify only the start of the event. In Blackfoot, there is a prefix ai’tamaak ‘almost’, which only indicates that an event is almost finished, and this prefix requires the aspectual preverb iksist- ‘finish’. Thus, an accomplishment will be compatible with this set of prefixes, but an activity will not. As indicated in Table 1, usual verbs can have an ‘almost finish V-ing’ reading; this reading is only possible with the aforementioned set of prefixes, as shown in (22) with the AI forms. Importantly, the sentence does not have the interpretation of ‘almost started V-ing’. The grammaticality of (22) with the reading suggests that the AI form in (22) is an accomplishment.

(22)  ai’tamaakiksistsoyi (owaai)
ai’tamaak-iksist-ooy-i-wa (owaai)
almost-finish-eat-AI-3S (egg IN)
‘S/he’s almost finished eating (eggs).’ (Ritter and Rosen 2010)

Psych-predicates of TA, TI, and AI forms have the same reading with the same set of prefixes, as shown with the TA form in (23) with a relevant context, which indicates that it is also an accomplishment.

(23)  Context: Your son is stealing my muffin every morning, but now I am almost finished being bothered with him, even if your son keeps stealing my muffin.
nitai’tammakiksistsia’poinamma kohko
ti’ai’tamaak-iksist-apoina-imm-a-wa kohko TA
1-almost-finish-be.bothered-TA-DIR-3S your son
‘I am almost finished being bothered with your son.’

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For those who are interested in other data not presented here, please see the handout version presented at the conference found in http://sites.google.com/site/kyumin.kim2012/publications
This section has shown that psych-predicates in Blackfoot pattern with usual verbs regardless of the forms in aspect: they are aspectually not atelic. I conclude that psych-predicates in Blackfoot may belong to Class I, having an experiencer subject and a theme object; however, their agentivity and aspecual properties are not the same as those of Class I.

5. The absence of Class III and II in Blackfoot

5.1 No Class III in Blackfoot

Class III predicates (1c) from Korean, repeated in (24) below, are known to be always non-agentive and stative (Arad 1998, Landau 2010). Moreover, an experiencer in Class III shows different properties from those of a canonical subject; for instance, it is marked with non-nominative case, dative (24), or with a P (Landau 2010). In some studies, experiencers of Class III are shown to appear in the specifier of Appl (Kim 2011, 2012), or in the complement position of P (Landau 2010). In other words, they do not appear in the canonical external argument position, i.e., in the specifier of little v (Chomsky 1995) or Voice (Kratzer 1996).

(24) Swuni-eykey Inho-ka/ku kulim-i (*ilpwule) silh-ess-ta
   Suni-DAT Inho-NOM/picture-NOM on purpose hate-PAST-DEC
   'Suni hated Inho/that picture.'

However, as shown in section 3, psych-predicates in Blackfoot are agentive, unlike the experiencers of Class III. Moreover, experiencers are external arguments, no different from agents of regular verbs, as psych-predicates are marked with regular final suffixes, TA, TI, or AI. In Blackfoot, the finals have been proposed to be represented as v, which introduces an external argument (Ritter and Rosen 2010). The fact that experiencers are introduced by the finals also suggest that they are not PPs, as PPs in Blackfoot are introduced by a linker (Frantz 2009, Louie 2009, Kim 2013). In (25), the adjunct PP 'the knife' is introduced by the instrument linker prefix iiht-, not by a final suffix.  

(25) oma isttoána iihtsikahksínii ’pi annistsi ikkstsiksiistsi
    oma isttoanwa iiht-ikahksini-’p-yi ann-istsi ikkstsiksi-istsi
    DEM knife.AN INST-cut.TI-DIR-IN.PL DEM-IN.PL branch-IN.PL
    ‘By means of the knife, the branches were cut off.’ (Frantz 2009)

Therefore, I conclude that psych-predicates in Blackfoot do not belong to Class III.

5.2 No Class II in Blackfoot

\footnote{In Algonquian literature, these prefixes are called relative roots (Rhodes 2006).}
Blackfoot does not have Class II either. Class II predicates like (1b), repeated as (26), have a causer subject and an object experiencer. A causer can be either animate 'John' (26a) or inanimate 'the news' (26b).

(26)  a. John frightened me.                    b. The news frightened me.

In other languages, Class II is often marked with a causative morpheme on the verb; in (27), the Korean psych-predicate *sulpwu 'be sad' is marked with the causative morpheme *-key ha.

(27)  ku sosik-i    Swuni-lul  sulpwu-key.ha-ss-ta
      the news-NOM Suni-ACC be.sad-CAUSE-PAST-DEC
    'The news made Suni sad.'

It has been noted that with an animate causer, Class II constructions can be agentive, as shown with a Korean example in (28), where the psych-predicate in (27) appears with an animate causer, 'the boy'. As the compatibility of the agent-oriented adverb in (28) indicates, the causer is agentive, in contrast to the inanimate causer 'the news' in (27).

(28)  ku sonyen-i Swuni-lul ipwule sulpwu-key.ha-ss-ta
      the boy-NOM Suni-ACC on purpose be.sad-CAUSE-PAST-DEC
    'The boy made Suni sad on purpose.'

A common view in the literature is that a causer in a Class II construction is introduced by an external argument introducing little v head (e.g., Pesetsky 1995).

In Blackfoot, a causer can be added to a clause with an AI psych-predicate, and it is introduced by an instrument linker, *iiht/-oht- (Kim 2013). This is exemplified in (29).

(29)  a.  *ana John nohta'kai'taki
      *ana John nit-oht-a'ka-i'taki
      DEM John 1-INST-hate-AI
    'John makes me have hatred.'

b.  nohta'poinai'taki ni isttoan
    nit-oht-a'poina-i'taki   ani   isttoan
    1-INST-be.bothered-AI   DEM   knife
    'This knife makes me bothered.'

\[ ^7 \text{It might be possible that the causative suffix in the language can add a causer as in other languages. However, with causative suffix *-attsi the judgment is questionable.} \]

(i)  *?/?? *ana John nit-a'poina-i'taki-attsi-ok-wa
      ana John nit-a'poina-i'taki-attsi-ok-wa
      DEM John 1-be.bothered-AI-CAUSE-INV-3S
    'John makes me bothered.'
Either animate 'John' (29a) or inanimate 'this knife' (29b) can be introduced by the linker, which is similar to Class II (see (27)). However, this does not mean that the examples (29) are Class II predicates. The first piece of evidence against this possibility is that the causers introduced by the linker are not external arguments. As mentioned earlier, in Blackfoot, only final suffixes introduce an external argument. There is other supporting evidence indicating that the arguments of the linkers are not external arguments; in Kim (2013a), I show that unlike external arguments introduced by final suffixes, the arguments of the linkers (i) cannot be expressed as a person prefix, (ii) do not show animacy restrictions, (iii) do not participate in the direct/inverse distinction, and (iv) do not show agreement. For instance, property (i) is shown in (30). In (30a), the causer 'I' introduced by the linker oht- cannot be expressed as a person prefix nit-, as the ungrammaticality of the sentence shows. The argument of the linker has to be expressed as an independent pronoun, as in (30b). I conclude that a causer introduced by the linker is not an external argument.

(30)  a. nohtááwaakomí’taki ana John
    *nit-oht-aawaakomí’taki-wa ana John
    1-INST-love-AI-3S DEM John
    'John makes me have love.'

    b. niistó iihtááwaakomí’ taki ana John
    niisto iiht-aawaakomí-’ taki-wa ana John
    I INST-love-AI-3S DEM John
    'John makes me have love.'

Another piece of evidence that examples such as (31) cannot belong to Class II is that the animate causer is not compatible with an agent-oriented adverb, which is not the case of Class II (27).

(31)  ana saahkomáápi iihtasstahpika’ poinataki anni John
    ana saahkomaapi iiht-issstahpik-a’poina-’ taki anni John
    DEM boy INST-willingly-be.bothered-AI-3S DEM John
    'John makes the boy be purposely bothered.'
    *‘John on purpose makes the boy be bothered.'

In (31), the causer 'John' is not agentive, but the experiencer 'the boy' is, which is consistent with the discussion in section 4.1. Thus, Blackfoot does not have Class II psych-predicates.

6. Consequences: not all experiencers are PPs

This paper has shown that psych-predicates in Blackfoot may belong to Class I, but unlike canonical Class I predicates, they are agentive and not atelic. This has an interesting consequence with respect to a recent claim that all experiencers
are universally oblique and are therefore syntactically PPs (Landau 2010).\(^8\)

Morphological evidence for this claim can be found in languages (e.g., Irish) where an experiencer is marked with P (see Landau 2010 for data).

However, the data presented in this paper suggest that experiencers in Blackfoot are not oblique and cannot be PPs, contrary to the claim in Landau (2010), as also shown with the Korean dative experiencer construction (Kim 2012). As discussed in section 4.1, an experiencer in Blackfoot is an external argument, like canonical agent arguments of usual verbs; they are introduced by a final suffix represented by \(v\). Moreover, as shown in Kim (2013a), PPs in Blackfoot are introduced by a linker (e.g., see (25)), not by a final suffix. These PPs have different properties from those of external arguments introduced by final suffixes, including experiencers. Lastly, there is a class of prefixes in Blackfoot, called non-linkers (Frantz 2009), that seem to be adpositional. Non-linkers are similar to linkers in that they are prefixed to verb stems, but are different from linkers in that they do not introduce an argument to the event of the clause. For instance, in (32a), the non-linker \(\text{waamis 'up'}\) does not introduce an argument, but modifies an event of ‘going’. In particular, the non-linkers can add a path \((32a-b)\) to the event described by the verb.

\[(32)\]

\[\text{a. }\]
\[\text{nitaakaamisoo}\]
\[\text{nit-yaak-waamis-oo}\]
\[1\text{-FUT-up-go.AI}\]
\[\text{‘I will go up.’}\]

\[\text{b. }\]
\[\text{nitaak-aamsskaapaatoo'p oomi sspahkoyi}\]
\[\text{nit-yaak-waamsskaap-aatoo-'p-wa oomi sspahkoyi}\]
\[1\text{-FUT-south-go.TI-DIR-3S DEM hill}\]
\[\text{‘I will go to the southward of the hill.’}\]

Importantly, none of these Blackfoot non-linkers mark an experiencer, unlike languages where P marks an experiencer, as shown in Landau (2010). Thus, the properties of Blackfoot psych-predicates shown in this paper provide empirical evidence that not all experiencers are oblique.

### 7. Conclusion

I have shown that Blackfoot psych-predicates may belong to Class I, and there is no Class II or III in the language, which answers the first question posed at the beginning of this paper. However, surprisingly, I have shown that psych-constructions in Blackfoot are agentive and are not atelic, unlike Class I in other languages. The reason that Blackfoot psych-predicates differ from canonical Class I predicates may be the animacy-oriented Blackfoot grammar, which allows animate subjects only; this may provide an answer to the second question presented in section 1. Remaining issues are how animacy, agency, and \textsc{person}

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\(^8\) The view that experiencers are semantically locative has been noted in many works, e.g., Jackendoff (1990), Arad (1998).
in Blackfoot are different and/or similar, which would further contribute to the understanding of the issues raised in this paper.

References


Kim, Kyumin. 2013. The instrument linker ihit-loht- in Blackfoot as a functional p. Paper presented at 18th Workshop on Structure and Constituency in the Languages of the America (WSCLA 18). University of California, Berkeley, USA.


