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“Congruence, Conflict, and Continental Governance: Canada’s and Mexico’s Responses to Paradigm Shift in the United States”

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“Congruence, Conflict, and Continental Governance: Canada’s and Mexico’s Responses to Paradigm Shift in the United States”

The context for this study is a broader inquiry into continental governance under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in which three approaches have yielded relatively meager evidence of an emerging transnational political reality. Continentalism from above falters due to NAFTA’s institutional deficit. Continentalism from below has produced little lasting solidarity among the major civil society organizations. Meanwhile, continentalism in the marketplace has not demonstrated much structural integration that is specifically North American in character. This quest has brought us back to the notion that, NAFTA notwithstanding, governance in North America is still comprised basically of three national governing systems linked together in two major asymmetric dyads. Intergovernmental relations in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 provide material for exploring this reality.

Introduction

The catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the Pentagon and on New York’s World Trade Center impelled the administration of George W. Bush to bolster the policing powers of the American state, declare war on terrorism, engage in regime change among rogue states, and—of particular salience for this study—secure its territorial borders. With the defense of national security legitimating its unilateralist proclivities, a militantly neo-conservative White House “found a threat and built a world

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We would also like to thank the following individuals for interviews with Daniella Aburto Valle in Mexico City: Raul Benitez, Jose Luis Valdez, Monica Vera at the Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte, UNAM; Athanasios Hristoulas at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México; Jorge Schiavon at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica; Jean-François Prud’homme and Gustavo Vega-Canovas at the Colegio de Mexico; Luis Rubio at the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo A.C.; Christian Rojas at Sin Fronteras; Andres Penalosa at the Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio; a confidential interview at the Department of Trade and Commerce at the American Chamber of Commerce; Alberto Fierro Garza, at the North American Division of the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.
order around it,” forcing every other sovereign state to reconfigure its relationship to the crusading hegemon.²

The new global stance adopted by Washington engendered particular consternation in its two contiguous neighbors, whose economies and societies were so “intermestically” integrated that any action it took to deal with militant Islamist terrorism could seriously compromise their interests. Despite the common nature of the United States’ challenge to both its peripheries, observers were not used to analyzing the problem posed by American hegemony comparatively since the evolution of and the scholarship on Canada’s and Mexico’s place in the North American continent had long proceeded in their own vacuums.³ Developments in the U.S.A. had influenced domestic policy responses in Canada throughout the twentieth century, because, by the end of the nineteenth, the two countries’ economies, societies, and polities had already become deeply interconnected. Given its greater autarchy for seven decades following its revolution (1910-17), Mexico had been far less responsive to American trends until its adoption of neoconservative liberalization in the mid-1980s, when it had quickly become deeply dependent on the world’s only super-power.

Even then, each periphery still had good reason to believe in the uniqueness of its own contested relationship with Uncle Sam. Where one belonged to the First World, the other was located unmistakably in the Third. Where the former was culturally anchored in a protestant, north-Atlantic, Anglo-Saxon triangle, the latter found its references in the catholic Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella and the Latinate Americas of Simon Bolivar. It was only in 1994, when NAFTA brought Mexico into an intimate association with the other two continental cohabitants under a common set of economic rules, that it became evident how many commonalities—both past⁴ and recent⁵—Ottawa and Mexico City already shared. These historical, diachronic differences and more recent, synchronic similarities make the responses of the global hegemon’s two neighbors in the aftermath of September 11th a fruitful subject for comparison.

Two principal approaches have already yielded welcome insights into the present complexities of the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico relationships. International relations scholarship has focused on the actions of the three federal leaders and their governments in the fallout from Ground Zero.⁶ Political economy presents the continental dynamic in terms of more structural relationships.⁷ Embracing elements of both approaches, this

study will apply a policy-centered conceptual framework to compare the two continental peripheries’ sometimes parallel, sometimes opposing approaches.

Paradigm Conflict

Since a prime characteristic of the post-September-11 period was confusion about what priority should be given to, and what actions should be taken in, a considerable number of interconnected fields—economic and social, immigration and intelligence, armed forces and diplomacy, we will present our analysis as a struggle within and between each country among competing policy paradigms.

For our purposes, a ‘paradigm’ is a set or hierarchy of policy areas or fields. A policy area, or policy field, demonstrates a number of features.

- It has its own specialized network of players who are mobilized within their national state but often develop transnational linkages and epistemic communities.8

- Because government policies create winners as well as losers, struggles among competing interests can be observed in every policy area.

- This continuing contest is typically expressed along ideological spectra formulated between polarities such as Left versus Right, protestant versus catholic, local versus central, national autonomy versus international convergence.

- Beyond its political discourse, a policy field also has its own technical vocabulary specific to the social reality—agriculture or Native affairs—for which government action has to be crafted.

- Over the decades, battles over particular issues typically result in the creation of such institutions as government departments or specialized courts dedicated to producing and applying policies on behalf of the clientele that has successfully voiced demands for government action.

Not only do political forces struggle to develop a policy area and then battle for control over its contents. They also compete with other policy fields for priority. At any moment, the themes of popular political discourse and the reality of budgetary allocations demonstrate which policies dominate and which are subordinate, the ordering determined by political choices expressing societal values. Under the Keynesian paradigm, for instance, the dominance of welfare policies could be inferred from the overwhelming proportion of government budgets that was earmarked for healthcare, pensions, education, job creation, and other redistributive measures.

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Within a given hierarchy of policies, some coexist more easily and some more conflictually than others. Tax monies allocated for guns are so many dollars not spent on butter, but during the Cold War, the military and social paradigms coexisted, because defense against communism was as necessary to guard the social state as were social policies required to generate support for an anti-communist foreign policy.

If the relationship among a country’s policy fields is more congruent than conflictual, a paradigm may persist over a period of time, as was the case in the decades when Keynesianism nominally held sway. This stability may be shattered if conflicts within or among paradigms become too intense, and a period of instability may ensue from which a new paradigm may emerge.

Paradigm shift is not an exclusively domestic affair. For centuries, paradigms have spread across borders, sometimes in the mouth of an exponent, sometimes at the barrel of a gun, sometimes through a combination of zeal and of force. Given the increasing interpenetration of societies and their resulting interdependence under globalization, it becomes an open question whether incompatibilities between different countries’ policy hierarchies can persist without one set prevailing over the others.

“Paradigm” in our usage does not have the same epochal grandiosity as it does in the hands of T.S. Kuhn whose scientific revolutions indicate a complete transformation of the logics and assumptions underpinning an intellectual universe. Rather than denote discourse change among scientists, our paradigms address the national community and the collective choices made by its leaders among competing visions involving many fields. At the same time, we understand paradigm change to be a more monumental, macro shift of societal priority ordering than the simpler, micro changes of the political agenda that characterize most political change.

Tracing interactions among the paradigm shifts within the three governments of North America may help make sense of the impact on Ottawa and Mexico City of the shockwaves that emanated from the United States of America’s paradigm shift in 2001. Beyond revealing something about the nature of the two U.S. peripheries when pressed hard by Washington in the pursuit of its own national interests, we hope to clarify the following issues:

- The unique qualities differentiating the two peripheral powers of North America from those not contiguous with the global hegemon;
- Their possibilities for national autonomy despite North American convergence;
- The implications of government in the three countries for continental governance.

In the fallout from the Al Qaida attacks, guaranteeing national security became the watchword of the U.S. government. But “security” is a chameleon-like notion which can take on many guises—economic security or prosperity, social security or well-being, human security against violence, employment security in the face of foreign workers, industrial security of guaranteed supplies, and even medical security against pandemics.

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10 The U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick went so far as to identify trade expansion authority with the fight against terrorism: “Trade, Growth, Integration, and Political Stability Go Together.” G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” *Foreign Affairs* (Sept./Oct. 2002), 47.
or disease-bearing mosquitoes. Having so many potential meanings, security has lost its analytical utility, so we will retain it primarily to describe the overarching political concern articulated as national security.

We identify the United States shifting from a paradigm based on economic liberalization (in ascendance since the revolt against Keynesianism in the 1980s) to one of national security. But this new paradigm was far from stable. It rapidly went through three variants focused successively on:

- counter-terrorism (homeland security measures taken after September 11, 2001);
- diplomatically sanctioned military force (evidenced in the intervention in Afghanistan),
- Pre-emptive regime change rationalized by the unilateralist Bush Doctrine that sanctioned disregarding international opposition (war on Iraq).

Our text will start by establishing as background the economic liberalization paradigm that prevailed up to September 11, 2001 [Section I], then observe how the U.S. changed its focus to counter-terrorism [Section II], and proceeded to elevate military force to pre-eminence with (a) continental defense, (b) the war on Afghanistan, and finally (c) the war on Iraq [Section III].

I Economic Liberalization

General elections in the year 2000 in all three NAFTA countries heralded a new stage in what had been for Canada a gradual—and what had been for Mexico a sudden—transition to institutionalized, continental governance. In July, Vicente Fox’s dramatic electoral defeat of the PRI set Mexico more firmly on the path of democratization. The re-election in October of Jean Chrétien’s Liberal Party with its third consecutive majority in the House of Commons suggested that Canada would be able to move quickly on any change to deepen or broaden NAFTA that the prime minister endorsed.

Because of its world dominance, the most important changing of the guard took place the next month, when the victorious Texas governor, George W. Bush, repudiated the diplomatic legacy of Bill Clinton. The Republicans took over the White House vowing to proceed, in the words of the National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, “from the firm ground of the national interest and not from the interest of an illusory international community.”

The neo-conservatives wanted to roll back what they saw as the rabid globalism of the Clinton years which influenced the issues that they wanted to reserve for U.S. sovereignty. In his presidential campaign, Bush described his approach to foreign policy as a “new realism:” America’s efforts should steer clear of “international social work” and return to cultivating great power relations, rebuilding the military, and fostering free trade.

The administration soon announced its opposition to the Kyoto Accord, the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the International Criminal Court.

The new president and his foreign policy advisers who had been recruited from such nationalist think tanks as the American Enterprise Institute would have welcomed

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12 Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” 46.
the opportunity to release the United States from all perceived constraints of globalization. But they came up against the reality of complex interdependence manifested by their own transnational corporations, whose globalized production networks required the kind of global governance norms on trade and investment that had been institutionalized in the World Trade Organization and which set limits to the administration’s unilateralism.

The economic liberalization paradigm had long had its institutional base in the Office of the United States Trade Representative, which had directed successive administrations’ efforts to persuade their trading partners to accept U.S.-defined commercial norms. In Canada, the institutional base for paradigm shift was laid in the 1982 merger of Ottawa’s trade bureaucracy with the foreign service, a reverse takeover that was ultimately recognized when the merged department was rechristened Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). When Prime Minister Brian Mulroney bet the house on negotiating an economic integration agreement with the Reagan administration, he signaled the institutional primacy of this undertaking by creating a Trade Negotiation Office to which were seconded many of his other departments’ most talented officials while the palavers continued.

Mexico’s institutional consecration of trade liberalization took the form of excluding the weak foreign affairs ministry, the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, from the trade negotiating function, which was entrusted to a reorganized Secretaria del Comercio y Fomento Industrial (SECOFI) that hired young technocrats freshly trained in neoliberal economic theory by American graduate schools. Since the triumph of the neoconservative counter-revolution in the 1980s, the paradigms in all three North American states were in agreement. As a result by the end of 2000, los tres amigos seemed well positioned to strengthen the economic liberalization paradigm to which all three professed commitment.

This picture of continental congruence should not be overstated. Mexico’s shift to the new paradigm took place in a Third-World country in whose policy hierarchy liberalization still vied for priority with social development and democratization. Fox had won the 2000 elections not on a commitment to free trade (in whose aftermath Mexico suffered its most serious recession) but to comprehensive reforms. To resolve the tension between the necessity and the unpopularity of economic integration, Fox and his foreign minister, Jorge Castañeda, enthusiastically endorsed Robert Pastor’s proposals to correct NAFTA’s institutional deficit while fostering Mexico’s development with capital, trade, and aid. The plan included a customs union, considerable policy

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coordination, transborder labor mobility, and supranational institutions which could transfer funds to Mexico from its richer partners for renovating its generally rudimentary infrastructure.

Several factors made Fox’s program for a “NAFTA Plus” seem tantalizingly viable. In contrast with Clinton as the “globalization president,” Bush was the “continentalization president” with a particular affinity for Mexico, the one foreign country about which he had personal knowledge including dealing with his gubernatorial neighbor, Vicente Fox, governor of Guanajuato. Fox seized the opportunity afforded by this personal friendship to change Mexico’s relationship with Washington as an important part of the transformation platform suggested by his campaign slogan, “cambio ya!”

If Fox-Bush relations brought to mind the Reagan-Mulroney friendship fifteen years earlier, the Chrétien-Bush relationship was more reminiscent of the Trudeau-Reagan disconnect. The bilateral agenda was disturbed by recurring harassment of Canadian staple exports: George Bush’s Washington, which still preached free trade for the rest of the world, practiced protectionism for swing states whose support the Republicans to keep control of Congress. Canadian businesses were pressing for trade-facilitating, infrastructural improvements at the border, but bureaucratic opposition and a lack of concern in the U.S. about facilitating more secure crossings stifled progress along the northern border.

For the most part, Canada-U.S. relations functioned according to what a former U.S. ambassador had called “the wheel that didn't squeak” theory: a seamless, “intermestic,” and interdependent relationship between two similar countries equally committed to market integration. Although the paradigms in the two developed North American neighbors were congruent, reflecting not just deep integration but considerable ideological compatibility, Ottawa was concerned that the “specialness” of its U.S. relationship was being pre-empted by President Fox.

That the Fox “Vision 20/20” and Mexico’s policy hierarchy taken the initiative for the Mexico-U.S.— though not the trilateral — agenda by 2001 was suggested by the continuous U.S. attention that powered action on the southern border, symbolized by the announcement of a migration/labor deal. But, the date of Fox’s apparent triumph in the American capital was September 6, 2001, by which time Osama bin Laden had already

18 Canada opposed U.S. plans for customs/immigration controls coordination that would have required joint staffing in border facilities or the sharing of passenger lists on commercial flights. Letting American officers carry weapons in Niagara Falls alongside their RCMP colleagues was unimaginable; providing the U.S. with passenger lists was said to violate the Charter (Interview with Gordon Giffin).
set in motion a scheme so traumatizing that it would overturn the U.S. paradigm structure and replace it with a re-energized and reconstructed policy set far less palatable to its two neighbors.

II National Security

Washington’s response to the terrorist attacks reconfigured its entire paradigm, putting a newly-dominant national security paradigm in conflict not only with the world order it had constructed with its allies after World War II and with its own economic liberalization paradigm, but also with the policy orders of its neighbors who had reconfigured themselves in response to Washington’s demands for their liberalization and who now depended on maintaining economic flows across their borders with the U.S. The contours of a new international system—defined by America’s rise to undisputed dominance—had emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Enjoying unipolarity in the 1990s, the United States maintained at least a rhetorical commitment to liberal internationalism under the administrations of George Bush the elder and Bill Clinton. Unlike his two predecessors, George W. Bush not only carried a big stick but also spoke loudly at the same time, making declarations of American pre-eminence “unprecedented since the early days of the Cold War.”

The Bush administration’s conception of “homeland security” initially focused on strengthening domestic intelligence, immigration, and police services—the institutional complex of the CIA, INS, and FBI that had failed to identify the agents of jihad abroad, then allowed the terrorists to enter the United States, where it had not managed to detect their conspiracy. But, proactively preventing sabotage by foreign-based agents required international engagement. To counter global terrorism by locating terrorists and preventing their travel, the U.S. had to cooperate with the security and immigration services of other states. It was this set of issues that we identify as the counter-terrorism variant of the new national security paradigm.

The rise of counter-terrorism was confirmed by the creation in Washington of a new set of security-themed institutions. The U.S. Attorney General set up the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. The Department of Justice established another fifty-six joint terrorism task forces and ninety-three anti-terrorism task forces. A color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System was put in place for public consumption. Final evidence of policy area shift was a new mega-ministry, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was created out of twenty-two separate existing agencies to give counter-terrorism its institutional base within the Beltway.

22 Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2003), 78. Other institutional changes took the form of U.S. Senate and House of Representatives committee reorganizations.
23 While DHS officially came into operation in March 2003, a significant number of high-level appointments had still not been confirmed one month later. A real concern on the Canadian side was the loss of institutional memory and agency-level contacts that had developed over decades of bilateral customs, intelligence, and border security cooperation.
Since the Americans’ counter-terrorism understanding of “security” was territorially defined, actions of a security-obsessed American government unconstrained by economic concerns threat the very essence of continental integration that it had relentlessly fostered under the previous paradigm set.

Nevertheless, the economic liberalization paradigm could not be entirely jettisoned. Washington soon relaxed its blockade in the interest of its own corporate sector whose entire system of just-in-time production was jeopardized by bottlenecks at American land borders, seaports, and airports. In August 2002, U.S. Congress also granted Bush what it had stubbornly withheld from Clinton, the fast-track authority to negotiate trade agreements with more than a half dozen “strategic countries.”

Nowhere was the effect of the American paradigm shift more profound than on America’s two immediate neighbors. The new policy hierarchy in which security trumps trade directly jeopardized the previous paradigm’s project of erasing economic borders to create an integrated North American market. Canada’s 5,525 miles of land border with the U.S. and Mexico’s 1,989 miles meant that the two peripheries found themselves sitting directly on the U.S. counter-terrorism perimeter. Canada was perceived as being of greater immediate concern to the United States, since enemy terrorists could be lurking within its multiracial communities.

The rapid elevation of the U.S. national security paradigm did not accord with its neighbors’ perception of their security threats. While Canada and Mexico took similar border security measures, the sense of shock was much greater in the northern periphery, which feared a “Mexicanization” (read: militarization) of the world’s longest putatively undefended border and saw a direct risk to its short- and long-term economic security.

For Canada, the shock of September 11 was less the loss of twenty-three fellow citizens in the World Trade Center’s wreckage than Washington’s immediate shutdown of its territorial borders, which undermined its whole project of securing access to the U.S. market for unimpeded flows of trade and investment in the hope of closing its productivity gap. If Ottawa quickly gave urgent priority to toughening counter-terrorism policies, it was not because Canadians felt particularly threatened by Al Qaida, but because the government was trying to rescue its neoconservative economic paradigm.

24 To the dismay of their own business community, members of Congress refused to enter “economic security” as one of the objectives of the new Department. It was only after a major lobbying effort by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that the token position of “Special Assistant to the Secretary (Private Sector)” was established. Interview with John Murphy, April 11, 2003.


To restore a freely flowing economic channel, the United States had to be satisfied that the common border was secure enough in terms of homeland security norms.

Ottawa thus quickly elevated counter-terrorism to the top of its policy hierarchy, which meant tightening immigration policy, passing extensive anti-terrorism legislation, enhancing border controls, and stepping up law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. Institutional evidence that these urgent measures constituted only a provisional shift in its policy set was the Prime Minister’s creating an ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism in October chaired by Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley to coordinate significant improvements to border infrastructure, introduce high-tech programs for speeding the crossing of vehicles and people, and buttress other security measures.  

In subsequent weeks, intense negotiations between Washington and Ottawa came to grips with specific security questions, many of which had been proposed in a series of border agreements from 1997 and 1999 but subsequently ignored. With business associations lobbying desperately for measures that could simultaneously speed border crossings (and preserve their project of economic liberalization) and enhance security (to meet the U.S. requirements for counter-terrorism), Canadian proposals formed the basis of a 30-Point Smart Border Plan that was ultimately signed by Homeland Security Advisor Tom Ridge and John Manley in Ottawa on December 12, 2001.

Fiscal corroboration of the counter-terrorism policy set’s elevation to priority status was the $7.7-billion allocated over five years for anti-terrorism and border security measures in the special budget Finance Minister Paul Martin announced in December.

The swiftness of Canadian response in reordering its domestic policy set in congruence with the new U.S. paradigm was facilitated by historical attitudes. As during the Cold War, Ottawa found itself on the familiar terrain of having to coordinate, if not harmonize, policies with a security-obsessed Washington. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the nature of the threat, the players, the ideologies, and the theatre of war had all changed beyond recognition, but the old patterns of cooperation, asymmetry, and interdependence reappeared once the U.S. shifted to a national security paradigm.
The southern periphery also felt that trade-liberalization, as the necessary ingredient to further its social-development, had been threatened. The closing of the United States’ southern border had had significant impacts on the Mexican economy, requiring it to “increase security cooperation with the United States, if only to prevent further unilateral action.”33 Even after the U.S. loosened its border blockade, counter-terrorism had “shifted U.S. attention away from North America.”34 Although Mexico traditionally defined its security in social and economic terms of migration and development, cooperation with the U.S. on counter-terrorism was also in the southern periphery’s national interest, as Fox’s offer to coordinate customs and intelligence gathering demonstrated.35 Mexico also presented a terrorism risk, albeit a longer-term, less direct one for the United States, but since the largely militarized Mexican-U.S. border was already considered a threat to U.S. security (defined in terms of smuggling narcotics and illegal immigrants), fewer security changes were required than had been the case on the northern border. Thus many of the established paramilitary policies remained in place, and drug control found its way into the Mexico-U.S. Smart Border Action Plan.36 Mexico moved to secure its oil refineries and pipelines against attack, but was reluctant to reconstruct its overall paradigm—physically, institutionally, and fiscally. The authorities did not provide counter-terrorism with an autonomous institutional base, but they did accord the new field some fiscal priority by investing US$8.5-million in modernizing its customs inspection procedures and creating a more secure border with Guatemala and Belize. Under the G8/G20 auspices, Mexico further joined international efforts to trace terrorist funds through intelligence cooperation with the U.S. and participated in the G8 Health Ministers conference to develop a strategy for combating such threats of biological terrorism as anthrax.

Mexico’s responses were domestically determined by a historical mistrust that kept its paradigm from becoming fully congruent with the U.S. after the shift to counter-terrorism. Although the U.S. president had laid out an “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”37 approach to his allies, President Fox downplayed the significance of September 11 in order to placate the anti-American Left in the congress. The Bush team took this as proof that Mexico could not be relied upon at a difficult time.38 Where Canada’s swift demonstration of solidarity with the United States earned it temporary

33 Partners in North America, 82.
36 Counter-narcotics funds came from the $25-million that the United States had allocated for the broader program based on the “Letter of Understanding between the United States of America and the United Mexican States in the Cooperation against Drugs” (See Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Dirección General para América del Norte, Dirección para Asuntos Fronterizos. Released Statement on “Fronteras inteligentes”).
gratitude (having already provided haven for 33,000 passengers of grounded airliners), Mexico’s “hesitant, tepid expressions of support” stirred resentment in Washington.\textsuperscript{39} As a result, warm Mexico-U.S. relations became “one of the first casualties” of September 11\textsuperscript{40} and heralded the end of congruence between the Mexican and American policy hierarchies.

### III Military Force

Whereas the September 11 attacks were understood abroad as sabotage requiring a defensive stance achieved by transnational cooperation among intelligence agencies, the Bush administration quickly constructed them as an act of war requiring not just defense through intelligence but offence in the shape of retribution through armed intervention. With military force prevailing over undercover intelligence operations, the Pentagon soon took over as the principal institutional actor. The ascent of the military could be seen from the budget allocations: Bush “beefed up the defense budget to Cold War levels”—it stood at $390-billion in 2001, exceeding the combined budgets of the next fourteen largest spenders.\textsuperscript{41} The restored pre-eminence of the military was applied in three geographic theatres—in North America, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq.

#### a. North America: continental defense

The priority Washington gave its new national security paradigm in North America could be seen in a sweeping structural change in the internal U.S. defense organization with implications for, continental defense. The decision announced on April 17, 2002 to create the Northern Command (Northcom)\textsuperscript{42}—a defense mega-structure integrating all American forces in the continental United States, as well as for the geographic area stretching from the North Pole to Guatemala and part of the Caribbean—placed Canada and Mexico in the same reactive position. In this respect, the two peripheries displayed similar behavior, reflecting their discomfort with using the military to deal with what they considered an essentially non-military threat.

Canada was politically reluctant and officially non-committal about deeper continental military integration with the United States. Most commentators were initially dubious about Northcom’s potentially demanding implications for the existing structure of bilateral defense cooperation.\textsuperscript{43} Ottawa resisted endorsing an expansion of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to embrace the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) program. However, within the Department of National Defence there

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\textsuperscript{39} Kammer, “Mexico is a contrast,” A23.
\textsuperscript{42} Northcom became operational on October 1, 2002.
\textsuperscript{43} SCFAIT and a number of other observers were sceptical about this opaque process, whose broader implications were not understood even by the government’s policymakers: “Recommendation 11,” Partners in North America, 106.
was strong support for further integration and increased interoperability of its forces with the Americans’.

Ottawa ultimately revised its priorities in order to be more congruent with the U.S. paradigm. Ever since the day of the attacks when the Canadian second-in-command at NORAD had been in charge of North America’s airspace, Canadian and American military personnel co-operated at an increased pace at NORAD. The two countries also agreed on December 5, 2002 to create a Planning Group—located at the NORAD/Northcom headquarters in Colorado Springs.\(^4^4\) Canada’s elaborate structure of reciprocal defense obligations with the United States including over eighty treaty-level defense agreements, 250 memoranda of understanding, and 145 bilateral defense discussion fora\(^4^5\) enabled it to re-engage with its neighbor with relatively little controversy—or public deliberation. As a result, the two military partners’ policy hierarchies remained nearly congruent in the continental theatre.

The Commander of Northcom (and NORAD), Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, also expressed interest in defense cooperation with Mexico by expanding NORAD or even forming a bilateral defense alliance.\(^4^6\) But U.S. attempts to engage the southern periphery in military cooperation came up against historical Mexican suspicions and reluctance,\(^4^7\) and the Mexican Defense Secretary immediately denied any intent to change any aspect of the bilateral military relationship.\(^4^8\)

Mexico could and would not elevate its military paradigm to the top. Its already low military budget went into providing internal security, social order, and disaster relief.\(^4^9\) Institutionally, the Mexican military commands were so fragmented that cooperation with the U.S. was unfeasible.\(^5^0\) Moreover, September 11 hardly changed Mexico’s conception of security from the one laid out in Fox’s address to the OAS on September 7, 2001: “In the new globalized system, national vulnerability does not come primarily from military considerations, given that the hemisphere does not currently face an extra-continental enemy that obligates us to defend ourselves through military alliances.”\(^5^1\)

On the same occasion, Fox had floated Mexico’s proposal to abrogate its commitments under the 1947 Inter-American Defense Treaty (the Rio Treaty), made “obsolete” by the end of the Cold War and by its signatories’ disarray during the

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\(^4^4\) The Group has no forces at its disposal. It is intended to prepare contingency plans for maritime and land threats and for military assistance to civilian authorities in emergencies. It is not part of NORAD, but there is a personnel overlap. For instance, NORAD’s Deputy Commander—a Canadian—is the Director of the Planning Group. Northcom is headquartered in the same location. Confidential interview.


\(^4^7\) Confidential interview.

\(^4^8\) Alegre, “Bajo la sombra militar de EU.” 7.


\(^5^0\) Deare and Benitez, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations.”

Falkland/Malvinas conflict. Instead, he wanted to develop a cooperative alternative to defend the region against natural disasters, poverty, and crime. September 11 put those plans on hold. Mexico’s human security agenda for Latin America could hardly have been less congruent with the new U.S. military stance.

While Mexico’s military forces had been cooperating with their two NAFTA partners in the hemisphere-wide Conference of American Armies (CAA) and bilaterally with the U.S. law enforcement agencies and the coast guard in fighting narco-crime and illegal migration, in the most recent instance of continental defense restructuring it opted for abstention.

b. Afghanistan: the global defense paradigm
Within a month of the attacks, George W. Bush linked his nominal “war on terrorism” to an actual war. Since the State Department was needed to mobilize international support for armed intervention, Washington’s military-force approach was at first congruently linked to its diplomacy. With Secretary of State Colin Powell promising a clear mission and credibly tying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to Al Qaida, the White House assembled a multilateral “coalition of the willing” to topple the Muslim fundamentalist government. As a result, 136 countries offered a range of military assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, which began on October 7, 2001.

The link seemed real enough and the threat grave enough to make Ottawa decide by early 2002 to send 750 Canadian soldiers from the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry Regiment to be deployed around Kandahar as part of a U.S. Army task force. Canadian troops had a history of fighting with the U.S. military. In the only post-Cold War examples (Bosnia and Kosovo), they had formed part of multilateral forces under UN or NATO mandates. In contrast, Afghanistan was an American mission, and the Canadians were fully integrated under U.S. command. Many in Canada were appalled at the implications for Canadian treaty obligations of fighting for rather than just with the Americans, who had already decided not to abide by the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war. From handing over the captured Taliban fighters to the U.S. in contravention of international law, to covertly deploying the elite JTF-2 military unit, to losing troops in an American ‘friendly fire’ incident for which President Bush issued an offensively belated apology, Canadian participation did not go without

52 Mexico was to host the Special Conference on Hemispheric Security on May 6-8, 2003. Jorge G. Castañeda, “The Forgotten Relationship,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002), 80. It was postponed to October 27-28.

53 This is not to say that the U.S. pulled out of Latin America. On the contrary, by early 2002, the Bush administration broadened the Plan Colombia anti-drug initiative to include direct anti-insurgency efforts, which was motivated by a “sense that any area plagued by armed instability was a potential host for terrorism. Castañeda, “The Forgotten Relationship,” 68.


55 The Bush Administration did not want to repeat the cumbersome decision-making of Clinton’s Kosovo episode, which was dubbed “War by Committee” (NATO). The new approach was nicely expressed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “The mission must determine the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission.”
controversy. The operation of the naval units in the Arabian Gulf region under Canadian command was less contentious but still important for the coalition’s success.  

Canada’s dispatch of naval, land, and air forces to Afghanistan and surrounding areas was built on sixty years of a unique defense relationship with the United States. As Canada reverted to its Cold War patterns of behavior that NORAD had institutionalized, it resembled its European allies in NATO more than Mexico, the Cold-War neutralist. In this second stage of the Bush administration’s promotion of a paradigm based on military force, Ottawa’s institutional decisions and budgetary allocations ensured that the Canadian order remained congruent with that of the U.S. Despite its slow initial response, Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan thus wrote another chapter in a long story of defense cooperation with its neighbor.

The military phase of the United States’ war on terrorism exposed dramatic differences in its historical relationship with Mexico that a decade of cohabitation under NAFTA turned out not to have erased. Whereas Canada offered troops for the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Mexican government did not make even symbolic gestures such as sending nurses or support staff. Instead, it became “embroiled in a bitter domestic dispute over how to react” and remained marginalized throughout the intervention. Hobbled by constitutional prohibitions, by fiercely nationalist anti-Americanism in Congress, and by public concerns about the direction of American policies under counter-terrorism, Mexico had neither the capacity nor the will to contribute to the continental hegemon’s global military reach.

The socio-economic development paradigm still claimed priority in Mexico’s domestic policy order. The government’s continued insistence on pressing its immigration agenda in the U.S. revealed its misreading of Washington’s redefined paradigm, which meant that “there is the terrorism issue, and everything else comes second.” Mexico City did not seem to understand how much the U.S. had been transformed by September 11. Instead, it kept trying to redirect the agenda, not comprehending how difficult it is for a U.S. administration to take on more than one important issue at a time. Indeed, Fox tried getting the Bush administration to refocus on the continent, saying “They have to understand in the United States that the destinies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada can be much more positive if we consider ourselves partners.” While recognizing how closely integrated the two nations had become, he did not see that Mexican national security could not be isolated from U.S. national security. Despite high levels of cooperation in other sectors, the issue of

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56 Confidential interview.
57 Stephen Clarkson, “The View from the Attic: Towards a Gated Continental Community?” in Andreas and Bierstecker, Re-Bordering North America?
60 Robert Leiken of the Nixon Center in Washington cited in Kammer, “Mexico is a contrast with Canada,” A23. At the Los Cabos APEC Summit, Fox insisted on his migratory agenda, while Bush’s only interest was Iraq.
62 Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, Director of the Mexico Project at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), cited in Kammer, “Mexico is a contrast with Canada,” A23.
defense (non)-cooperation revealed a basic incongruence between the two policy sets. Mexico’s history had risen up to relegate it to the status of a sidelined observer.

c. *Iraq: the pre-emptive defense variant*

The war in Afghanistan provided a preview of the Bush Doctrine that was articulated first at West Point in June 2002. Formalized in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, it provided the final proof that a hard-line, military-weighted approach was winning out over the softer, diplomacy-led variant. The realist and unilateralist, Straussean, neo-conservative, anti-détente policy network from the old Reagan administration (from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy-Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Vice-President Dick Cheney, to the arch-hawk Richard Perle) elbowed aside the moderate multilateralist community at the State Department led by Colin Powell and his Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Richard Haass.

The outcome of this Beltway struggle made little difference to Mexico, but it made a world of difference to Canada, because it signaled that compliance or acquiescence would not be rewarded. On the contrary, the Canadian contribution to the U.S. war on terror was met with a 29 per cent duty on B.C. lumber and prairie wheat. Within the continental system’s asymmetries in which influence depended on mutual consultation and policy coordination, Canada’s “voice opportunities” closed down as American liberal internationalism was silenced. The official commitment of the Bush White House to pre-emptive use of military power was at odds with Canada’s foreign policy rationale. Unlike the diplomatic and economic arenas where its influence corresponded to its considerable size, Canada was a “pygmy” in the realm of war power.

As long as the United States sought the international community’s support at the United Nations, it seemed to have subordinated its military- to its diplomacy-led tactic under Colin Powell’s guidance. However, the essential decision to go to war had already been made in Washington. Once it became obvious that American diplomacy at the UN was aimed to secure cover for a war that Canadian and Mexican diplomacy was aimed to avert, the discrepancy between the U.S. and its unwilling partners’ policy hierarchies became fully obvious.

The third variant of the new U.S. national security paradigm in effect blended counter-terrorism with pre-emptive war. As it softened the uncorroborated charges about Saddam Hussein’s sponsorship of Al Qaida to concentrate on his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as in the original UN Security Council Resolution 1441, the Bush administration used the war on Iraq to implement its doctrine of military preponderance. This paradigm tilt required a far greater leap of faith on the part of its partners than had

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65 NATO Secretary-General George Robertson cited in Hirsh, “Bush and the World,” 38.
the first conflation of counter-terrorism and military policies in late 2001 to oust the Taliban from Kabul.66

The gap between the hegemon and its two neighbors’ policy sets became difficult to bridge when the Bush administration elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its security agenda.67 The White House advocacy of forced disarmament of the Hussein regime was at odds with the Canadian and Mexican non-interventionist views of non-proliferation. When the Bush administration then announced that it would enforce regime change even with Iraq’s voluntary disarmament, nothing could make the two policy orders congruent. The world got “marching orders from Bush and not a common vision,” so was disinclined to stay in step.68

As the United States moved to promote its regime change over its counter-terrorism variant of national security, Canada and Mexico elevated their diplomatic strategies, intensifying their activity on the international scene. Canadian diplomacy was rooted in traditional doctrines of multilateralism, internationalism, institutionalism (respect for international organizations and primacy of international law), and ‘soft-power’ (diplomacy, aid, and trade). Mexico’s foreign policy was grounded in respect for sovereignty and non-intervention as mandated by its constitution. While diverging from Washington’s paradigm variant, those of its two peripheries converged.

Canadian diplomats made heroic efforts in multilateral fora to avert the looming crisis first by preventing an irreparable schism in NATO and then in putting forward a compromise resolution at the UN. Canada reverted to its instinctive role of helpful fixer but now it did so with the help of its NAFTA partner, whose seat on the Security Council placed it in the global limelight. The two peripheries coordinated their efforts to find a diplomatic alternative to war.69

Washington interpreted its neighbors’ goodwill in trying to bridge the transatlantic divide as unhelpful meddling.70 This stiffened Mexico’s obduracy even though it would have had to do little more than make an official statement of support to be counted in the effort.

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66 Osama bin Laden had expressly cited Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, and the U.K. as targets in an audiotape that surfaced in November 2002, so, in retrospect, the counter-terrorist paradigm was justifiable in Canada from a domestic point of view. The military paradigm and war on Iraq was not—Saddam Hussein had never made such proclamations. Mexico, however, was not included in the list of targets. Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,” 82.

67 Ikenberry, “America's Imperial Ambition,” 56.


69 Mexican Foreign Minister Derbez raised the Canadian proposal with Powell in a meeting in Washington on March 4, 2003, after Prime Minister Chrétien had discussed it with President Fox during a visit to Mexico on February 27-28, 2003. Allison Dunfield, “Fox appears open to Chrétien's proposal,” Globe and Mail (Feb. 27, 2003); Paul Knox, “Russia favours Canadian compromise,” Globe and Mail (March 5, 2003), A11. Fox had also “styled himself in the role of broker, trying to bridge the differences between the United States and Britain on one side, and France, Germany, Russia and others on the other: ‘We have to convince the United States that we have alternatives to attain the objective of disarming Iraq…What we believe is that we still have time in formulas and proposals to do what we have to do without a war’” Brian Laghi, “Fox warns of economic cost of war,” Globe and Mail (Feb. 28, 2003).

70 Ambassador Cellucci stated that Canada's proposal for a new UN resolution, giving Mr. Hussein a March 28 deadline to comply, “is not particularly helpful” because it would allow Iraq to hold out longer: “We can't let this go on forever” (Colin Perkel, “U.S.-Canada relationship could suffer, Cellucci says,” Globe and Mail (March 1, 2003), A9.)
new “coalition.” The United States shot down Canada’s compromise resolution even though elements of it made their way into Prime Minister Tony Blair’s own last-minute effort to salvage peace. After much muddying and wavering, Chrétien’s decision not to participate in the U.S.-led military coalition for “Iraqi freedom” drew the withering scorn of the U.S. neoconservative establishment and jingoism in the media.

Ever since the announcement of the National Security Strategy six months earlier, Canada and Mexico had taken a number of steps to reconstruct their disordered policy hierarchies and bring them more closely in line with their domestic objectives and values. Assurances for Uncle Sam through more secure borders and immigration controls were still the *sine qua non* for good bilateral relations, but there were limits to how far either periphery would go solely in the interest of assuaging their demanding neighbor.

For the first time since the early 1980s, Ottawa did not revise its policy hierarchy in at least symbolic synchrony with the new doctrine in Washington whose view of the world it had generally shared. The Liberal budget on February 18, 2003 indicated that its spending priorities were more socio-economic than military. When Ottawa approved in February 2003 the Department of National Defence recommendation to deploy 1,200 Canadian troops as peace-builders to Afghanistan, it sought the help of NATO and a *European* partner—Canadians would not be in Kabul under American command. Then, as the White House became entrenched in its uncompromising position on Iraq, the Canadian government openly defied the militarized U.S. paradigm. Bush’s goal of disarmament and regime change drew an uncharacteristically sharp, public response from the Canadian prime minister who warned that U.S. unilateralism would undermine the United Nations. This was further indication of incongruity between the two countries’ paradigms.

But, Canada’s policy order was itself destabilized. Pro-war sentiment in the West and staunch opposition in Quebec made its foreign policy seem insecurely based. U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci’s rebuke unsettled the Canadian domestic political order, strengthening the Right in the House of Commons and business leaders who clamored for Canada’s military participation in or, at least, rhetorical support for the U.S. war. U.S. anger thus had a direct, if short-lived, effect on domestic Canadian public opinion and decision-making (seen in the related media alarmism, business doomsayers, conservative premiers’ attacks, and the federal leadership race)—a situation not witnessed since the

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71 For instance, the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the U.S.

72 Brian Laghi and Paul Koring, “Chrétien and Bush clash over regime change,” *Globe and Mail*, (Mar. 1, 2003); Brian Laghi, “Unilateral war could cripple UN, PM says,” *Globe and Mail* (Feb. 28, 2003). However, even Chrétien’s own foreign minister then exclaimed that Canada backed regime change.

73 This was a dramatic turnaround after calling the Canada-U.S. relationship “a role model for the world” only five months earlier: A. Persichilli, “Cellucci says Canada-U.S. relationship ‘a role model for the world,’” *The Hill Times* (Oct. 7, 2002), 1.

74 The disappointment was misplaced, considering Canada’s already significant contribution to the multilateral force in the Gulf region. As the U.S. Ambassador stated, “Ironically, the Canadians indirectly provide more support for us in Iraq than most of those 46 countries that are fully supporting us.” Canada’s military contribution put it right after Britain and Australia in the coalition. Richard Sanders, “Who says we’re not at war?” *Globe and Mail* (March 31, 2003), A15. It was mainly political symbolism and moral support that the White House was expecting from its ‘close friend and ally.’
episodes of Canadian-American discord during the Diefenbaker and Trudeau years. Because President Bush had made it clear that countries were either ‘with us or against us’ in his war on terror, many took Cellucci’s “disappointment” with Ottawa for a veiled menace of retaliation. The cancellation of President Bush’s first official trip to Canada scheduled for May 2003 seemed to be the first installment of a threat that was taken as serious by those who did not notice that the same stern message was delivered to a number of other unwilling capitals from Brasilia to Berlin.

According to policy analysts, the United States was far more annoyed with Mexico, whose diplomatic support in the Security Council it had taken for granted. But their deteriorating bilateral relations were evidence of the Mexican and American paradigms going from incongruent to conflictual.

As early as August 2002, President Fox had cancelled his visit to the U.S.—mainly for reasons of “sovereignty and...longstanding concerns about the treatment of Mexican nationals in the U.S., and particularly along the border.” In mid-September, with the U.S. war on Iraq imminent, Mexico City finally withdrew from the Rio Treaty which, Fox feared, could drag his government into a politically sensitive debate at home. This striking regression in U.S.-Mexico relations demonstrated that prior ideological harmony and warm personal ties were not enough to accommodate a drastic shift of the hegemon’s paradigm. Mexico’s American relations thus suffered a greater setback than Canada’s, whose policy sets had been more congruent until Washington broke the global consensus with its venture in Iraq.

Mexico’s disappointment with Washington’s failure to make good on the migration deal was fully reciprocated by U.S. disappointment with Mexico City’s behavior in the third theatre of war. Le colgaron muchos milagros—they hung many miracles on him—editorialized the Economist in August 2000, anticipating that Fox would fail to meet his country’s high expectations. Because of the scope and long-term character of the reforms promised by the new PAN government, some disappointments were inevitable. Most critically, they depended on reaching a deal with the United States. Lack of progress on the immigration deal precipitated Castañeda’s abrupt resignation as

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75 The approval of the prime minister’s handling of the situation on March 28, 2003, “declined a significant 10 points” since the previous week’s polling “A Country Divided on War in Iraq,” Ipsos-Reid at http://www.ipsos-reid.com/media/dsp_displaypr_cdn.cfm?id_to_view=1780.
76 Interview with Sidney Weintraub, April 9, 2003.
77 B.W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America at the U.S. State Department, cited in Mark Matthews, “Fox Snub called more gesture than rift,” The Sun (Baltimore, Aug 16, 2002), 1A.
78 Fox’s government had already come under left-nationalist criticism in Congress for its pro-Americanism, most recently with Castañedasiding with the U.S. position on human rights in Cuba: Andres Oppenheimer “A Loosening of U.S. ties with Mexico,” The San Diego Union – Tribune (Sept. 16, 2002), B6.
79 Vicente Fox’s statement revealed his country’s paradigm incongruence with the U.S.: “If we are going to dedicate all the effort, the budget, politics and everything just to security [and] terrorism, what we're suffering is on the economic side” (Laghi, “Fox warns of economic cost of war”).
80 Fox phoned Bush on March 24, 2003, but his call was returned four days later in a tone that sounded little like the amigo of two years ago: Andres Oppenheimer, “Bush Putting Mexican President on Hold,” Miami Herald (March 27, 2003).
foreign minister in January 2003. Unlike Jean Chrétien’s decision, which polarized Canadians until the U.S. disaster in Irak became evident, Vicente Fox reclaimed some of the ground lost domestically since his immigration agenda with Washington had failed. Opposing the U.S. at the UN was the popular decision for Fox. Whereas 48 per cent of Canadians supported the war, 90 per cent of Mexicans opposed it. By March 2003, Mexico’s incongruence with the U.S. policy order was complete, but it at least had absolute domestic support.

Conclusions

Almost two years after the incineration of the World Trade Center, understanding the impact on its neighbors of America’s most radical security reconfiguration since 1945 remained a work in progress. Nevertheless, our comparison was built on the expectation that a parallel analysis of Canada’s and Mexico’s responses to these convulsions in U.S. policies could deepen our understanding of three issues in the analysis of contemporary North America: the special characteristics of the United States’ neighbors, their capacity for autonomy, and the nature of governance in the continent.

The unique intermesticity of the North American periphery

Comparing two countries during one historical moment incurs the risk of ascribing uniqueness to phenomena that exist in other states or at other times. Canada and Mexico were not alone in having to respond to three consecutive shifts in the paradigm hierarchy of the global hyper-puissance following September 2001. Many of the two countries’ responses resembled those of European states, which also tightened their airport security, scoured their underground for terrorists, and cooperated with American counter-terrorism both directly and through Europol. Cooperation was extended when the United States militarized its homeland security paradigm with its intervention in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council debates on Iraq from October 2002 to March 2003 that alienated the two North American peripheries from the United States also created a schism in the Atlantic alliance and split the European Union down the middle.


84 The data came in answer to the question asked by the Ipsos-Reid polling firm, “In general do you support or oppose the United States and its allies military action against Iraq. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose this move?” (See “Canada and the Iraq War: Two Solitudes Emerge—Nationally, Equal Numbers Support (48%) and Oppose (48%) the U.S. Led Military Action Against Iraq” (April 6, 2003), Ipsos-Reid at http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1784.
Although as “the key recruitment, planning, and logistics base for the attacks,” Europe posed the greater security threat to the U.S.; it was Canada and, to a lesser extent, Mexico that felt compelled to reorder their domestic policy hierarchies in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Even by early 2003, the EU was only beginning to implement substantial changes. The Iraq crisis may have harmed French and German relations with Uncle Sam much more than it had Canada’s or Mexico’s, but the fear of U.S. retribution was felt more acutely by the global superpower’s two contiguous states.

That Canada and Mexico are the only two countries in the world engaged in an ‘intermestic’ relationship with the United States makes their domestic and foreign policy responses uniquely comparable in a horizontal or synchronic set of cases. However, for the conclusions flowing from any analysis of two countries’ reactions to a single event to be valid, comparability should also be established within vertical or diachronic sets of cases. A review of the history of Canada’s U.S. relationship would undeniably reveal instances both of conflict and cooperation, convergence and divergence, many of which would produce interesting historical parallels.

What makes Canada-U.S. teamwork in Afghanistan different from that of the Korean War—or their squabbles over Iraq different from their disagreements about Vietnam—was the presence of NAFTA as a common external economic constitution tying the two countries into an interdependent relationship that placed definite limits on the weaker player to define its policies but also definite constraints on the hegemon to punish deviant behavior.

NAFTA also served as the conduit to increase awareness in Ottawa and Mexico City of their shared North American interests, as well as their shared vulnerabilities. The Iraq crisis triggered a genuine attempt at cooperation by the two U.S. peripheries as their foreign policies converged, while an equally strong and shared opposition to Washington’s Indochina quagmire some thirty years earlier did not.

Convergence and autonomy

Implicit in tracking the metamorphoses of American policy sets was the question whether a homegrown, domestic paradigm order was still sustainable in the two countries living a deeply asymmetrical, interdependent existence next to the global hegemon. Given American supremacy, one might have expected that Canada’s and Mexico’s paradigms would converge to a common U.S. standard. Furthermore, Washington’s increased assertiveness in the aftermath of September 11 would have been thought to intensify this process, making incongruent paradigms in the peripheries untenable.

The hypothesis was persuasive. “Hegemony sits in tension with the principle of equality,” and the shift after September 11 ended the NAFTA-centered illusion that the

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86 The most recent suicide bombers in Tel Aviv were two British citizens. “Europe’s minorities: Forget asylum-seekers: it’s the people inside who count,” The Economist (May 8, 2003) and Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,” 80.
Unites States and its neighbors had equal input in the construction of the continent’s paradigm order. Fox’s vision had driven Mexico’s bilateral relations only in so far as it had coincided with Washington’s policy priorities. The post-September-11 progression of variants of the U.S. paradigm forced the peripheries into a reactive mode, in which immediate responses were required to forestall damaging, actions of a security-obsessed United States. In an insidious dynamic, allegedly poor security in the peripheries was making the U.S. feel more vulnerable, while strong U.S. homeland security measures were making its neighbors more vulnerable, compelling them to seek congruence with the U.S. paradigms.

The actual outcome was counterintuitive. Despite all these pressures to converge, the two peripheries retained their respective paradigms to varying degrees and at different junctures. Mexico—initially, at least—managed to preserve its own social/migration priorities throughout the period under examination. Even when it partially accepted the U.S. security paradigm in the fall of 2001, it did not develop a special institutional base for it. This could indicate that the southern periphery, though weaker and poorer, had more autonomy than the northern one, which followed in lockstep every shift in the U.S. paradigm variant until late 2002.

Prompted by evidence of economic setback in their relationship and impending U.S. retaliation, the new Mexican Foreign Minister announced early in 2003 a reordering of his government’s priorities. Counter-terrorism would displace the priority on social and migration policies that had for years been the anchor of Mexico’s U.S. policy. To sketch out the shape of the reordered Mexican policy hierarchy in mid-2003 would be speculative at best. It is too early to say whether kowtowing to Washington on counter-terrorism by displacing the social/migration paradigm is merely a rhetorical device designed to ensure the continued priority of migration on the bilateral agenda.

For Canada, the chief evidence of divergence from the U.S. paradigm was its short-lived diplomatic activism, which coincided with and responded to the highpoint of American unilateralism. This brief assertion of a separate Canadian way was followed soon after Washington declared the Iraq war won by actions signaling that Ottawa wanted to re-establish close relations with Uncle Sam. It moved towards endorsing NMD, and hurriedly announced a $100-million contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq, which, when thought too niggardly to impress the White House, was soon followed by another $200-million. Whether these fence-mending efforts were prompted by exaggerated fears of U.S. economic retaliation is immaterial. The point for our analysis is that Ottawa was under such political and corporate pressure that it hurriedly reordered its policy mix to re-establish congruence with the policy priorities of its continental leader.

It is equally germane to remember that the Canadian prime minister’s efforts at rapprochement were limited. He pushed ahead with his domestic program which included one item to which the Bush administration openly objected, the decriminalization of possessing small amounts of marijuana. He signaled the federal government would not interfere with an Ontario court’s ruling that sanctioned the marriage of same-sex partners, a development deeply offensive to social conservatives in Washington. And as if to make the point that he was in no way George Bush’s poodle,
he went out of his way before the G7/G8 Summit at Evian in June to criticize the United States government for its budgetary deficit.

Complex interdependence in North America seemed to oblige Washington to tolerate its neighbors’ independent policy sets, even when they resisted its own national-security priorities. It is beyond the scope of this text to test the hypothesis that the potential for Canada’s paradigm autonomy lay in its intermestic interdependence with Uncle Sam. Nevertheless it is worth recalling that, in 2001, U.S. exports to Ontario alone were worth twice as much as those to Japan. Canadians imported C$5,254 worth of U.S. products per capita. Thirty-seven states had Canada as their largest single trading partner. Seventeen per cent of U.S. crude oil imports came from Canada. A prolonged “border congestion would quickly cause recession in many key border states and make Mr. Bush a one-term wonder.”

Continental governance or government by states?
The United States’ reconstitution of its policy set around homeland security in the aftermath of September 11 also confirmed the continent’s failed institutionalization and continuing dual bilateralism. While the thirty points in the Canada-U.S. border plan were conveyed through Canadian diplomatic channels as a courtesy to the Mexican government, they were formally put forward as a template by Washington for the Mexico-U.S. border. They were neither discussed nor adopted though a trilateral process. President Fox’s November 2001 suggestion of a common “North American Security Policy” was ignored. Whether the hegemon preferred not to deal with both neighbors at the same table or whether the two peripheries preferred to treat separately with Uncle Sam, North American governance in the age of counter-terrorism still consisted of the two hub-and-spoke bilateral relations with little significant interaction along the Ottawa–Mexico City rim, except for their intense collaboration in the Security Council during the winter of 2003.

These events highlight the inadequacies in the conceptualization that understands governance regimes as either based on functionalism or on intergovernmentalism. In this dichotomy, the deepening of continental systems is treated as either functionalist (that is, automatic, uncontrolled integration takes place by means of spillovers from one integrated field to another) or intergovernmental (that is, integrative actions are taken deliberately by rational actors making decisions on behalf of democratically legitimated institutions). The trilateral relationship, which had developed when NAFTA was being negotiated, remained officially in place while the three domestic paradigms were congruent under economic liberalization. But without EU-style institutions, North American governance could not mature through institutional means. Conceived “as a simple, narrow, stand-alone agreement on foreign trade” empowered with rules but not

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89 Michael Den Tandt, “Trade as crucial to the U.S. as to Canada,” *Globe and Mail* (March 27, 2003), B2.
institutions, NAFTA had accelerated market integration in the short term without having the institutional substance to cope with emerging problems.

Until 2001, NAFTA-generated North American governance seemed to fulfill the criteria of the functionalist model as seen in its silent integration at the level of the transnational corporation when its production and marketing strategies were articulated at the continental level, a process that had had little evident impact on continental governance. But the state mobilization and the ensuing high level of government coordination provoked by the United States’ reconstruction of its paradigm refuted functionalist theory since intergovernmentalism took back the reins of continental politics from the putatively unleashed market.

When the World Trade Center attacks ended the shared, continent-wide conception of policy priorities, U.S.-centered bilateralism took over. The re-emergence of an assertive, militarized hegemon forced continental governance into retreat. North American economic integration—and the whole project of continental governance—remained a creature of its constituent states. Almost two years later, the peripheries’ preference for institutionalized multilateralism as their means for dealing with their powerful neighbor was an attempt to use global governance in lieu of continental governance.

It is too early to tell whether this short-lived episode of high-level cooperation between the peripheries will have significant implications for North American governance. Given Mexico’s preference for multilateral-bilateralism and Canada’s traditional counterweight strategy, this third dyad could become increasingly important as a complement to each periphery’s vital U.S. relationship and so provide NAFTA with an intergovernmental—if not institutionalized or supranational—base to diffuse American preponderance through a solidarity of the weak.

The advocacy of various permutations of an ambitious “NAFTA-plus” by business-financed think tanks such as the C.D. Howe Institute as well as by the aspirants for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada and the appointment of the former secretary of the economy, Luis Ernesto Derbez, as Mexico’s new foreign minister may herald a technocratic thrust in the peripheries supporting further institutional development to rectify NAFTA’s inadequacies.

If another leap forward is to follow the failed trilateralism and revived bilateralism resulting from Ground Zero – a kind of reculer pour mieux sauter – the three states of North America will need to achieve some consensus on their respective policy hierarchies. Paradigm congruence could occur if Washington realigned its policy set with Ottawa’s and Mexico City’s, a possibility that would have to await regime change in Washington. If the Bush Doctrine continues to provide the script there for a continuingly aggressive global unilateralism unacceptable both to Mexicans and Canadians, then the peripheries’ capacity to develop independent policy sets could perpetuate lasting paradigm conflict.

Whether such intergovernmental dissonance would block the development of continental governance will depend on how successfully the outstanding issues left over from the economic liberalization paradigm are dealt with in the troubled new conjuncture. Those sectors of the three economies that operate transnationally see their
destiny in continental policy convergence. If the price for further integration is satisfying Washington about its security, then big business will readily accept whatever security schemes are necessary.

Vicente Fox and his transnational business allies may have been eager to embrace an ambitious North American agenda, but the Mexican public has not lost its apprehensions about its northern colossus. It will tolerate neither support for aggressive American unilateralism nor such derogations of sovereignty as a U.S.-defined continental security scheme or deepening military integration.

A similar split between elite and public has complicated Prime Minister Paul Martin’s life. The integrationist Canadian business community which financed his leadership aspirations continues to press for every type of continental accommodation from custom’s and currency union to continental security perimeter and armed services’ integration. But the values and attitudes of the Canadian public have diverged from those of their American neighbors, so Martin has to contain his integrationist proclivities lest he jeopardize his party’s chances with an internationalist electorate, which had become markedly hostile to George W. Bush’s presidency.

Given the highly polarizing potential of negotiated mega-deals with Washington in a political conjuncture of considerable trinational alienation, economic pressure to maintain free flows of goods and people can be expected to generate integration incrementally as relatively small and technical issues are dealt with on an ad hoc basis.

With such dim prospects for continental convergence, the likelihood of a new dawning of paradigm stability in North America is even dimmer. The source of paradigm turbulence is the radicalism of the Republican Party’s Washington leadership and the institutional primacy of the Pentagon. The domestically polarizing effects of the Bush Republicans’ radical global agenda prevent the kind of paradigm entrenchment in the US that depends on a bipartisan consensus about its basic assumptions. The combination of paradigm instability at the centre and paradigm dissonance with its periphery suggests that the post-September 11th future of continental governance for North America is far from rosy.