The Inconsistent Neighbour:

Canadian Resistance and Support for the Bush Foreign-Policy Counter-Revolution

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While all countries have to react to American foreign policy, the United States' two continental neighbours experience this dilemma with a particularly acute intensity. Given their near-total dependence on selling their exports to American customers and given the enormous power asymmetry between the global superpower and its geographical periphery, Canada and Mexico encountered unusual difficulty during the opening years of the 21st century. They needed to reconcile managing important policy differences with Washington on global matters with maintaining good relations with their economic locomotive.

Before raising the diplomatic dimension of Canada's centre-periphery dynamic during the administration of George W. Bush, this chapter will examine to what extent the United States' 43rd president actually did precipitate a foreign-policy revolution.

The Bush Counter-Revolution

It was not obvious from his evasive presidential election campaign in 2000 that George W. Bush had much of a revolution in mind, whether politically or economically.

The Tough New International Economic Order
Continuity was certainly the subtext as far as the United States' global economic policy was concerned. Indeed, George H. W. Bush had presided over the opening years of the Uruguay Round (1986-94) which climaxed in the Clinton administration’s triumphal signing of the Marrakech agreement in 1994. The resulting World Trade Organization (WTO) signaled that American economic norms were being universalized in a muscular new hegemonic order to achieve the silent magic of the powerful new international legal order that President Theodore Roosevelt had begun ninety years earlier -- an "open door" for US enterprise in every foreign state's market.

It was muscular because, as Sylvia Ostry observed, it had the strongest dispute settlement mechanism of any international regime (Ostry 2001). It was hegemonic because it was supported by all other capitalist states, in particular the neoconservative Canadian governments of Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien. This order was imposed on weak states in the global South which were pressured to sign on with assurances that the liberated market would guarantee them perpetual growth.

While these norms had already been challenged through anti-globalization demonstrations in late 1999 in the streets of Seattle by non-governmental organizations from the North and behind closed doors at the same WTO ministerial meeting by many states from the South, Governor Bush remained as committed to global trade and
investment liberalization as had been the man he was campaigning to succeed in the White House. Fostering trade liberalization, which imposed US norms on its economic partners, remained part of the Bush, Jr. vision for the world, whether multilaterally with its global defense of monopoly intellectual property rights for big Pharma in the WTO’s Doha round of trade talks, hemispherically in its push to have a NAFTA model prevail over Brazil’s preference for a more state-driven approach to a Free Trade Area of the Americas, continentally with its Central America Free Trade Agreement, or bilaterally signing trade deals with Chile and Singapore (White House (2002), 18).

The Soft Political Global Order
While a global regulatory regime favouring the further expansion of US transnational capital suited the Republicans just fine, Governor Bush was clearly wanting to change the Democrats’ internationalism. In the light of the Clinton-mandated offensive to free Kosovo from Serbia, the Texan’s admonition that the United States should be humble in its foreign policy suggested a less interventionist, more withdrawn global stance. Once ensconced in the White House, he gave conflicting signals, appointing the moderate Colin Powell to the Department of State while giving the aggressive Donald Rumsfeld control of the Pentagon. His own positions on matters international were telegraphed by Condoleezza Rice whom he installed as National Security Advisor. Pupil and professor interacted constantly, whether in the White House gym or the Camp David woods. She talked about proceeding “from the firm ground of the national interest and not from the interest of an illusory international community” (Hirsh 2002: 32). He described his foreign policy as a “new realism” in which America’s efforts should steer clear of what he disparaged as “international social work.” Instead, it should return to cultivating great power relations and rebuilding the military (Ikenberry 2002: 46).

In sharp contradistinction to Clinton’s foreign policy, the Rice Doctrine’s implementation delivered a series of body blows to the international order that had been recommended by hard-liners who worked out their program in such think tanks as the American Enterprise Institute. In rapid succession, the Bush administration announced its opposition to the Kyoto Accord, the small arms convention, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the International Criminal Court.

This concerted counter-revolution, which moved American foreign policy towards a mix of behavioural unilateralism, ecological isolationism, and military triumphalism disconnected the Bush administration from the evolving multilateral order and placed it at odds with Canada’s traditional penchant for multilateralism. In the short term, neither Canada nor the rest of the international community could do much beyond wringing their hands in collective dismay.

The Anti-terrorist Security Order
The global security context following the end of the Cold War in 1990 -- which had been evolving confusedly for a decade in the more anarchic regions of the Balkans and Africa where concerns for human security had created new dilemmas of intervention in failed or failing states for the international community -- was turned on its head in the course of two hours on the morning of September 11, 2001. The cataclysmic terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington proved to be a political opportunity that allowed the fledgling Republican administration to save itself from the political doldrums in which it had been wallowing since its inauguration earlier that year. Exploiting the nation's trauma, it shifted its governing policy paradigm both internally and externally.

Domestically, the United States switched from a small-government neoliberalism to a big-government security paradigm with its Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 — or USA PATRIOT Act (THOMAS). Its homeland-security response to the spectre of global terrorist networks flew in the face of the world order based on trade and investment liberalization that it had constructed after World War II. This paradigm shift from economic border opening to military border closing was out of sync with the policy agendas of Uncle Sam’s two territorial client-neighbours whose economic fortunes depended more than ever on maintaining an open frontier with the United States.

With the catastrophe dramatically proving how the same means that had generated America’s growing wealth and prosperity – open economies and global communications systems – could be used to bring down the world’s hegemon (Flynn in Lachapelle 2001: 18), the president’s handlers reinvented George W. Bush as a wartime president. Acting as the world’s only remaining superpower and eschewing its traditional leadership role as the collaborative architect of a rules-based multilateral international system, the United States abruptly took on an unapologetically imperial role as unilateral enforcer of its new global-domination script (Nye 2002).

The Bush administration elevated the foreign war on terrorism to the top of its policy agenda in two stages to which Canada responded in two markedly differing ways. First, Bush’s linking of his “war on terror” to the Taliban in Afghanistan caused Canada to revert to Cold-War patterns in coordinating its military policies with the Americans to whom it offered practical support. When Washington engaged in a pre-emptive regime change in Iraq dubiously rationalized by the Bush Doctrine and misleadingly supported by questionable intelligence, the limits to Jean Chrétien’s commitment to bilateral friendship became apparent.

Canada's Ambivalent Response

Whereas September 11’s attacks were understood abroad as sabotage requiring transnational cooperation amongst intelligence agencies, the US administration quickly constructed them as acts of war requiring not just defence through improved counter-intelligence but offence through military retribution and interdiction. Secretary Rumsfeld managed to restore the defence budget to Cold-War levels1 in order both to pursue its war against Islamic jihadists and to fund his ballistic missile defence program (BMD) which was a repackaged version of the Reagan regime’s ill-fated and satirically dubbed Star Wars project to shoot down missiles and so achieve US military control of space.

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1 At US$390 billion in 2001, US defence spending exceeded the combined budgets of the next fourteen largest spenders. See Hirsh (2002). By 2004, this figure ballooned to US$455 billion, surpassing the combined total of the next thirty-two most powerful nations and accounting for 47 per cent of the world total. See Starck (2005).
In his speech to Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush made it clear that he would not let any international institution stand in the way of his use of force when American security interests were perceived to be threatened. He also demanded full support from every other country by issuing a blunt ultimatum to world leaders, “Either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists” (Hillmer et al. 2003: 3). Within a month, he tested the fidelity of his allies by turning the “war on terrorism” into actual war in the Himalayas.

Afghanistan and the Powell Doctrine
Buttressed by the worldwide outpouring of sympathy for Americans that followed the collapse of the World Trade Center's twin towers, Secretary of State Colin Powell assembled a supportive international coalition by promising a clear mission to topple the fundamentalist Taliban government in Afghanistan which he credibly identified as harbouring Bin Laden's terrorist operation, Al-Qaeda.

Concurring with the international consensus that attacking the pariah Taliban and its associates in Al-Qaeda was justified, Ottawa signed on to the Powell Doctrine. Somewhat belatedly -- in February 2002 -- Prime Minister Chrétien committed 750 Canadian soldiers from the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry Regiment to be deployed around Kandahar as part of a US Army task force and under US command. This decision to go to war soon became embroiled in political controversy. Some Canadians were alarmed by the implications of their soldiers fighting for rather than with the Americans. More were shocked to learn that these troops were handing over captured Taliban fighters to their US military commanders who insisted that the Geneva Convention forbidding the use of torture in the treatment of prisoners of war did not apply to these enemy combatants. The dismay generated by this violation of Canada’s treaty obligations was compounded by the loss of four Canadian soldiers killed by American fighter pilots in a “friendly fire” incident, for which President Bush issued an offensively belated apology (CBC).

When Canada’s support for the American war in Afghanistan was rewarded with increased duties imposed on British Columbia’s lumber and the Prairie provinces’ wheat shipments, Canadians learned that acting as an unconditional ally -- even at the cost of breaking international law, violating its principles, and losing its soldiers -- did not yield benefits in other areas of Canada-US relations, as had been anticipated in public by International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew.

Iraq and the Bush Doctrine
A year after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration released its National Security Strategy (NSS), which proceeded from the proposition that the “United States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and influence in the world,” economically, politically, and militarily (White House 2002: 1). Speaking the language of Wilsonian internationalism, much of the NSS's rhetoric gave the impression that continuity rather than change prevailed in the National Security Council. Other parts of the document demonstrated that the unilateralist, Straussean (Atlas 2003), neo-conservative, anti-détente policy network from the old Reagan administration including
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy-Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Vice-President Dick Cheney, and the arch-hawk Richard Perle had won the struggle to redefine American foreign policy. The moderately multilateralist Powell approach, with its preference for deterrence and containment, had been shredded. In a blunt statement of faith in the value of hard power, the NSS legitimized America’s right to strike preemptively in anticipation of any perceived threat to its interests.

But when the Bush administration constructed Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as an immediate threat to US security, it became apparent that Canada would have difficulty keeping in step with the global leader. The notion of forced disarmament through pre-emptive regime change that the Bush Doctrine promulgated was at odds with Canadian non-interventionist views on non-proliferation. Furthermore, Canadians did not feel threatened by Iraq. As the debate proceeded over whether the international community should attack Saddam Hussein, it became evident that there were limits to how far Jean Chrétien could be pushed by Washington. Owing to a lack of convincing evidence, the Bush administration had trouble developing rationales for war based either on Iraq’s possession of WMD or on its links with al-Qaeda and was no more persuasive when shifting the argument to the human rights purpose of liberating the Iraqi people. When it announced it would enforce regime change despite Iraq’s voluntary disarmament under the United Nations' scrutiny and regardless of the Security Council’s position, the rift widened with Canada, whose foreign policy was still firmly rooted in respect for international organizations and the primacy of international law (Lyon 1989).

As the Pentagon moved its military machine to Iraq’s borders, Jean Chrétien repeatedly stressed that war with Iraq was “not justified” (McCarthy and Koring 2003). His new minister of foreign affairs, Bill Graham, warned that regime change threatened to destroy “the world order as we presently know it,” adding “we do not believe we have a right to invade” (Trickey and Naumetz 2002). Defying Washington’s desire for unquestioning support, Canada reverted to its traditional role of helpful fixer. Canadian diplomats made concerted efforts to bridge a bitter transatlantic divide with a compromise resolution at the UN that would have bought time by postponing the US attack.

Ottawa’s position converged with that of its other NAFTA partner, whose seat on the Security Council placed it uncomfortably in the limelight, and the two peripheries coordinated their efforts to find a diplomatic alternative to war. During an official visit to Mexico in late February 2003, Prime Minister Chrétien discussed with President Fox his proposal for a more precisely detailed and extended ultimatum. Chrétien then followed up with a telephone call to President Ricardo Lagos in Santiago, since Chile was serving on the Security Council. Fox had also styled himself in the role of broker, trying to bridge the differences between the Anglo-American perspective and the others: “We have to convince the United States that we have alternatives to attain the objective of disarming Iraq … What we believe is that we still have time in formulas and proposals to do what we have to do without a war.” Mexican Foreign Minister Derbez raised the Canadian proposal with Powell the next week in a meeting in Washington, but the Bush administration interpreted its northern neighbour’s goodwill in trying to bridge the

2 Quite unlike the crisis in Kosovo, Iraq was not, at the time, engaged in brutal civil war.
transatlantic divide as unhelpful meddling. US Ambassador Cellucci said Canada's proposal for a new U.N. resolution, which would give the Iraqi dictator a March 28 deadline, was “not particularly helpful” because it would allow Iraq to hold out longer: “We can’t let this go on for ever”.

When Canadian attempts to avert war with Iraq failed, Jean Chrétien was forced to decide whether to join Bush’s campaign. After much muddying of the waters -- even Chrétien’s own foreign minister exclaimed that Canada backed regime change -- the Canadian prime minister made an uncharacteristically sharp and public response, warning that the United States' unilateral adventure in regime change would undermine the United Nations.

Chrétien’s decision not to participate in a US-led invasion of Iraq infuriated critics at home and in the US. Despite being consistent with Canada’s role in building the post-war international order and its long-standing penchant for multilateralism, Chrétien’s view that Saddam Hussain must be disarmed – but only with UN approval -- was far from coherent and certainly not universally popular. Business leaders who feared US retaliation in the form of border blockages, clamoured for Canada’s military participation in the conflict, or at the very least, rhetorical support for the US war since it was the political symbolism of moral support that the White House was expecting from its “close friend and ally.”. Pro-war leaders in Canada’s western provinces feared US reprisals for not supporting the country's most important ally, while staunch opposition to the war in Québec and an upcoming provincial election in that province pulled the Liberals’ foreign policy in the opposite direction (Parkin 2003: 7).

US Ambassador Paul Cellucci’s rebuke that Washington was “disappointed” with Canada unsettled the Canadian domestic political order, strengthening right-wing critics in the House of Commons and emboldening the premiers of Ontario and Alberta to voice their support for Washington’s war with Iraq. Following Cellucci’s rebuke, approval of the prime minister’s handling of the situation “declined a significant 10 points,” since the previous week’s polling.

Canada’s policy priorities had been generally congruent with Washington’s until its unilateral venture in Iraq broke the global consensus favouring multilaterally negotiated approaches for resolving serious threats to international stability. This leaders-level disagreement sent shock waves through the Canadian political system. Jean Chrétien’s decision was initially contested, since 48 percent of Canadians supported Bush’s war. Going into the third week of the war, Canadians were split evenly between those who supported (48 percent) and those who opposed (48 percent) the US led military action. However, an Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail poll revealed that “a division is clearly developing between the two solitudes:” a slight majority (54 percent) of Canadians outside Quebec expressed approval of the war, compared to a minority (29 percent) in Quebec. This division between Quebec and the rest of Canada also emerged on the question of whether to help the US coalition after the military action had begun: 51 percent of Canadians supported such a move (58 percent in English Canada and 28 percent in Quebec). The prime minister’s approval rating on the handling of the Iraq situation remained steady at 55 percent -- with a major difference between Quebec (75
percent) and the rest of Canada (48 percent). In fact, 50 percent of Canadians outside of Quebec then disapproved of his handling of the crisis (compared to the 50 percent of English Canada that had expressed approval one week earlier). Beyond the poll data, Chrétien’s decision resonated strongly with the left-of-centre public in Canada, many of which thought this was “Jean Chrétien’s finest hour”.

Ultimately, Chrétien’s decision proved popular, particularly when the United States’ rapid military victory on the battlefield turned into a prolonged disaster for it afterwards. But Canadians’ smugness about their government’s boycott of the American war was ill founded. Ironically, the Canadians indirectly provided more military support for the United States in Iraq than all but Britain and Australia among the forty-six countries that were fully supporting it, providing twenty-five war planners, naval protection in the Persian Gulf and air space allowing two to three US flights per day to refuel in Newfoundland. Canadian naval units had been dispatched to the Persian Gulf where they constituted an interoperating component of the American fleet patrolling Iraq’s coastal waters. When the Department of National Defence decided in February 2003 to deploy 1,200 peace-building troops to Kabul, it was easing the Pentagon’s military burden in Afghanistan thus letting it concentrate on its challenges in Iraq. Ambiguity, not to say hypocrisy, also characterized the Canadian response to the United States’ continental application of its renewed war doctrine.

iii) North America and the Rumsfeld Doctrine

The US war on terrorism may have increased the distance between the political leadership of United States and Canada, but it accelerated cooperation between Canadian and American military personnel. At NORAD’s (North American Aerospace Defence Command) continental headquarters in Colorado Springs, the Canadian second-in-command had been in charge of North America’s airspace on September 11th. This close intermeshing of the two armed services led to the establishment of a joint North American Planning Group to prepare contingency plans for maritime or land threats and for military assistance to civilian authorities in emergencies. The opaque nature of negotiating Canada-US military integration and cooperation meant that discussions took place with little public deliberation about the content and consequences of the Pentagon’s new Northern Command. Similar opacity enveloped issues involving the technological feasibility and military rationale for Ballistic Missile Defense.

Offsetting the Canadian government’s hesitation about accepting its armed forces’ integration within Northcom and the weaponization of space that BMD would entail was the enthusiasm of Canada’s military industry. Already integrated under such institutional arrangements as the Defence Production Sharing Arrangements, it stood to benefit from BMD as it had from building components of the Pentagon’s weapons systems throughout the Cold War.

The internal feuding that divided Canada over Iraq was followed by a break from three norms that had characterized Ottawa’s political relationship with Washington. The first deviation was seen when provincial premiers, who were concerned that Chrétien was damaging Canada-US relations and that his policy on Iraq would spill over into
commercial areas of crucial importance to them, took matters into their own hands (Foot 2003). Led by Ralph Klein and Gordon Campbell from Alberta and British Columbia, the premiers toyed with the idea of establishing parallel summit relationships of their own with the US government. Campbell and Klein actually did travel to Washington in June of 2003 to discuss with Vice-President Dick Cheney US tariffs on B.C. lumber and the ban on importing Canadian beef following the discovery of “mad cow” disease in a Canadian bovine. Despite having been hit with trade sanctions following Canada’s military contribution in Afghanistan and despite J.L. Granatstein (2003) insisting “There will be no favours for Canada from the White House,” the two premiers, the right-wing Alliance Party, and Canadian big business clung to the belief that unconditional Canadian support for the Bush administration’s military operations would spill over as goodwill that would help resolve bilateral trade conflicts.

The second departure from earlier patterns was the abandonment of ‘quiet diplomacy,’ the practice of keeping Canada-US disputes over each other’s policy out of the public eye. During the debate over Iraq, Jean Chrétien allowed minor incidents in Ottawa to become major irritants in Washington. After belatedly asking his communication director, Françoise Ducros, to resign for referring to President Bush as a “moron,” Chrétien failed to discipline MP Carolyn Parrish’s comment, “damn Americans… I hate the bastards.” He let his minister of natural resources Herb Dhaliwal’s questioning of Bush’s leadership as a statesman go unrebuked while upbraiding Ralph Klein for publicly backing the US war in Iraq (Brean and Alberts 2003). These brouhahas made the front pages throughout Canada and the United States and they registered in the White House.

Even Chrétien appeared to be practising public diplomacy when he questioned the US government’s analysis of terrorism by linking the attacks to “root causes” of poverty and the “arrogance” of the West (Blatchford 2003). As if to emphasize he was in no way George Bush’s poodle, Chrétien went out of his way, before attending his final G7/G8 Summit at Evian in France, to criticize the United States government for its budgetary deficit (McCarthy and Laghi 2003). On the American side, US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, and Condolleeza Rice, hinted strongly that there would be serious consequences for Canada’s refusal to support the US in Iraq (Brean and Alberts 2003; Appleby 2003).

In threatening reprisals, the Bush administration itself explicitly broke a third unwritten law in Canada-US relations, the practice of non-linkage. Because of Bush’s with-us-or-against-us position, many in Canada took Cellucci’s “disappointment” with Canada as a thinly veiled threat to impose costs on Canadian exporters. Had they compared notes with their colleagues in such other capitals as Mexico City, where the US ambassador made oblique threats, doomsters on the Canadian right might not have warned so portentously that “there will be no favours for Canada from Washington or anywhere its reach extends” (Granatstein 2003) and that there would be a “serious economic fallout,” the only visible riposte was the cancellation of President Bush’s first official visit to Canada scheduled in May 2003. As the bilateral meeting’s agenda was about securing US guarantees for Canadian energy supplies, some Canadians saw the snub as more caritas than curse (McQuaig 2003).
Other punishment was said to include the difficulty that the prime minister experienced in getting phone time with Bush to resolve the US embargo on Canadian beef exports, although Ottawa’s ambassador to Washington later stated in public that he had encountered no difficulty in pressing the Canadian government’s case (Kergin 2005). J.L. Granatstein (2003) argued that, having upset the Bush administration over Iraq, Canada could no longer count on the White House to temper the excesses of Congress. Unremarked, the supraconstitutional norms enshrined in both NAFTA and WTO trade rules (Clarkson 2002) — two pillars of Chrétien’s economic legacy (Clarkson and Lachapelle 2004) — provided Canada with some protection against finger twisting by an unhappy hegemon wanting to crimp Canada’s diplomatic autonomy through trade retaliation.

Despite doomsday forecasts from the Canadian right that Canada would be punished for its opposition to the war with Iraq, no tangible punishment was ever experienced. Indeed, only a few weeks after his rebuke, the US ambassador to Canada confirmed that Canada-US relations were essentially “back to normal” (Cattaneo, 2003), while his Canadian counterpart, Michael Kergin, publicly stated his view that the handling of Canada-US disputes concerning mad cow disease and softwood lumber were unrelated to Canada’s refusal to sign on to the war in Iraq and missile defence (Kergin, 2005). These views suggest that the temperature of Ottawa-Washington’s diplomatic relations was not an accurate gauge of the actual Canada-US relationship. For his part, Chrétien toyed with the idea of using energy exports as leverage in the dispute over softwood lumber. Ultimately, he refrained from making any threat to link energy to lumber, presumably because, in the words of a former Canadian Ambassador to Washington, the United States “could easily outlink Canada” (Gotlieb 2003: 25).

In the context of conflictual relations between the two capitals, the Canadian prime minister’s efforts at rapprochement were negligible. The gulf between Canadian and American policy paradigms was given fiscal support in the 2003 federal budget, which confirmed that Chrétien’s spending priorities leaned more towards socio-economic than military objectives (Government of Canada 2003). He pushed ahead with plans to decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana despite repeated warnings of reprisals at the border. He also signaled the federal government would not try to overturn an Ontario court’s ruling that sanctioned the marriage of same-sex couples, a development that was deeply offensive to such social conservatives in Washington as the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the president himself.

Militarily, Chrétien deflected immediate US pressure for troops to help secure and rebuild Iraq following hostilities there. In its February 2003 decision to redeploy 1,200 troops as peace builders in Afghanistan, Ottawa sought a European partner to make sure that Canadian soldiers in the International Security Assistance Force would not be in Kabul under US command. On the medium-term issues involving integration in continental and space defence, the government tried to remain non-committal toward the American proposals and actions. Ottawa resisted the idea of folding NORAD into Northern Command, which would integrate all Canadian forces under a single structure.
with the US army, navy, marines, and air force. This defence mega-structure would be responsible for the territory stretching from the North Pole to Guatemala and parts of the Caribbean including Cuba. In the longer term, Ottawa continued to show discomfort with the idea of responding by military means to a terrorism which it understood as an essentially non-military threat.

Canada also resisted giving its full support for BMD, on the grounds of its principled opposition to the weaponization of space. But while Ottawa officially opposed any measure that would render the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty obsolete and raise the spectre of a renewed arms race, the joint forces of economic integration and Canadian-American cooperation in the defence of the continent ultimately led Ottawa to move toward endorsing both proposals. While he shelved the decision on missile defence on May 8, 2003 (Leblanc and McCarthy 2003), within a matter of weeks, Chrétien gave the signal to go ahead with talks to discuss Canada’s “potential” participation (Sallot 2003).

Former Chrétien Finance Minister Paul Martin took over the reins of government in December 2003 as if the Leader of the Opposition, having long criticized the Chrétien government’s excessively anti-American stance, had finally won power. He appointed as his defence minister David Pratt, a Liberal who was overtly committed to Canadian support for BMD. He regrouped the Canadian armed forces in a “Canada Command” that mirrored the Pentagon’s Northern Command and restructured the government’s security bureaucracy to mirror the US Department of Homeland Defense. He reorganized his cabinet structure to give priority to his personal management of Canadian-American relations, he strengthened the political capacity of Canada’s US embassy, and visited the White House in order to express a new cordiality for the US president, who was receptive to this overture, relieved that Chrétien had departed.

Two years later, it was as if Martin had taken his contradiction-filled CanAm cues from his predecessor. Despite his a major expansion of the Canadian defence budget and despite his continuing support for such US international economic objectives as the Free Trade Area of the Americas, he managed to offend the White House. Although he had committed two thousand Canadian troops to waging active war in Afghanistan's southern region around Kandahar where the Taliban's forces were gaining strength, he had rebuffed President Bush’s insistent request that Canada support the BMD program. He passed legislation to permit same-sex marriage and supported decriminalizing the possession of marijuana – two measures deeply offensive to the Republican right. More provocatively, he had gone out of his way during the 2004 election campaign to criticize US social programs and even more provocatively criticized the US government's environmental policy in the 2005 election.

With the United States government refusing to comply with the NAFTA-based arbitral decisions on the two countries’ long-standing dispute over US softwood lumber imports from Canada, Martin even became more confrontational than Chrétien, suggesting that Canada might divert its oil production to China.

**Conclusion**
Two years into his second term, George Bush’s “transformational diplomacy” had come under considerable pressure. Its rhetoric still a contradictory mix of missionary Wilsonianism and aggressive manicheism, the US government remained committed to securing global military dominance. Nevertheless, George Bush was trying to withdraw from an Iraq venture now widely seen even in the United States to have been a disaster in statesmanship. His emissary, John Bolton, had managed to hamstring United Nations reform, but the US president had to acknowledge at the 2005 G7/G8 Summit at Gleneagles the reality of global warming, its human causation, and the need for multilateral action to contain it. Even the American war on terror was widely acknowledged to have aggravated rather than mitigated the threat of non-state actors to the United States. In short, the Bush administration’s ideologically driven foreign policy had failed successfully to deploy its massive hard power while managing to undermine its precious soft power.

In this moment of need, the White House received an unexpected bonus. After five years of the Liberal Party’s ambivalence, the government of Canada shifted to unambiguous support for Washington's agenda. Following his thin minority victory in the federal election of January 23, 2006, the new Conservative prime minister, Stephen Harper, moved quickly to establish his pro-American credentials. He flew to Kandahar where he endorsed the Canadian military engagement against the Taliban with Bush-like war-fighting words rather than failed-state, peace-building rhetoric. He advertised himself as the United States' ally with "Boots on the Ground" posters in the Washington metro that presented Canada as a military ally. He cut off Canada's financial support for the recently elected, Hamas government of Palestine to show his solidarity with Israel, the United States' main ally against Muslim nationalism in the Middle East. He has expressed his scorn for the Kyoto protocol on global warming. And he demonstrated his full support for the fledgling Security and the Prosperity Partnership of North America by participating enthusiastically in a trinational summit with Vicente Fox and George Bush in Cancún.

In short, as Mexico prepared to follow Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela in their political shift away from a US-led neocorporate world order [Check after July second!], Harper's Canada has lined up to buttress the Bush counter-revolution. The immediate payoff was a resolution of Canada's softwood lumber dispute with Washington based on Canada abandoning its previous insistence that the United States comply with NAFTA-mandated arbitration procedures. In the longer term, the benefits of coziness among the continent's conservatives will have to be weighed against the costs of reinforcing the rogue Empire.

With the collapse of the Liberal Party's support in Québec and the weakness in its leadership, it is possible that, by the time of the 2008 presidential elections, Stephen Harper will have been returned to office with his hoped-for majority. If the Republicans are unable to recover from the twin disasters of Iraq and Katrina, we may see a new disjunction between Washington and Ottawa, with conservative Canada once more resisting an American foreign policy revolution -- this time a return to the liberal internationalist tradition.
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