Q1: Interest Parity and Efficient Markets
Q2: Forward Rate Tests of Market Efficiency
Q3: The Forward Rate and Forward Discount Hypotheses
(Advanced)
Q4: This is Not What I Learned in My Options
and Futures Course!
Interest parity and efficient markets require that forward
exchange rates equal the expected future spot rates on the dates
at which the forward contracts mature. True or False: Explain
your answer.
False! Neither require it.
We define the interest parity condition as
(1) --- id - if = FD + PRP
where id = the domestic nominal interest rate, if = the foreign
nominal interest rate, FD = the forward discount and PRP = the
country specific or political risk premium.
The forward discount is defined as
(2) --- FD = (F - S)/S
where S is the spot rate (domestic currency price of foreign
currency) and F is the forward rate (domestic currency forward
price of foreign currency).
Finally, the efficient markets condition is defined as
(3) --- FD = Es + FXRP
where Es is the expected rate of change of S and FXRP is the
foreign exchange risk premium.
Foreign exchange markets, and markets in general, are efficient
if market participants use all the information available to them
in making transactions decisions.
The efficient markets condition will always hold, as will the
interest parity condition, if investors are
rational (i.e., use all information available to them in making
investment decisions). Thus (1) and (3) define the conditions
under which the relevant markets will be efficient.
For the forward exchange rate to equal the future spot rate
expected on the day that contracts mature (or, what is the same
thing, for the forward discount to equal the expected rate of
change in the exchange rate) the foreign exchange risk premium
FXRP must be zero (and, of course, the foreign exchange market
must be efficient so that (3) holds).
The interest parity condition, as we have defined it, says nothing
about the relationship between the forward and expected future spot
exchange rates.
Our statements of the efficient markets and interest parity
conditions in (3) and (1) above are true by definition.
Sometimes in the literature you will see the efficient markets
condition referred to as, simply,
FD = Es.
This is incorrect because markets can be efficient when this
equality does not hold if there is a risk premium. Moreover,
even if this equality holds, markets could be inefficient
if there is were a non-zero risk premium (because equation (3)
would be violated).
Quite apart from the definition of interest rate parity in
equation (1) above, there are two common types of interest rate
parity appearing frequently in the literature:
It turns out that covered interest rate parity seems to occur
to a reasonable approximation (i.e., political risk premia seem
to be small) while uncovered interest rate parity is almost always
rejected by a correct interpretation of the data except where
there are big differences in the rates of inflation in the two
countries in question.QUESTION #1
These interest parity statements are hypotheses about the
political or country specific risk premium PRP and foreign
exchange market risk premium FXRP. Unlike (3), they are capable
of being refuted by the data.
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A test of whether the forward rate equals the expected future spot rate is really a joint test of three hypotheses; the efficient markets hypothesis, the hypothesis that the risk premium is zero (or, depending on the test, constant) and and an hypothesis about how expectations of the future spot rate are formed. If the test fails, there is no way of knowing whether it failed because the efficient markets hypothesis is not true, because a risk premium exists (or varies through time), or because the wrong theory of how expectations about future spot rates are formed is being used. It is thus impossible to test whether markets are efficient, because there is no independent way of determining whether or not a risk premium exists, or whether agents form unbiased expectations.
To put things more formally, we can write the forward rate as
(1) F = EFS + RP
where F is the forward rate (in, say, Pounds per Canadian Dollar), EFS is the expected future spot rate (Pounds per Canadian Dollar) and RP is the risk premium (measured in Pounds). This equation will hold if the market is efficient. If it is inefficient the equality will not hold. Instead, we would have
(2) F = EFS + RP + ERR
where ERR is the error in the forward prediction due to the failure of market efficiency.
Even if markets are efficient the expected future spot rate can differ from the actual as a result of bias in the agents' formation of their expectations or as a result of random error. We will then have
(3) EFS = MAFS + BIAS
where MAFS is the mean of the actual future spot rate and BIAS is the bias in the prediction of the actual future spot rate resulting from the way agents form their expectations.
Then, substituting (2) into (3) we obtain
(4) F = MAFS + BIAS + RP + ERR.
To establish that markets are efficient we must establish that ERR = 0.
Suppose we do a statistical analysis and find that on average
F - MAFS > 0
---i.e., that the forward rate differs from the mean expected future spot rate and hence does not predict it well. There could be three possible reasons why this forward-prediction test can fail.
The failure of our test does not necessarily imply that the market is inefficient.
Alternatively, suppose we do a statistical analysis and find that on average
F - MAFS = 0
---i.e., that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. From equation (4), this only means that
BIAS + ERR + RP = 0.
There are a number of possible reasons why this could be true, among them:
We can never show empirically that the market is efficient by examining the ability of the forward rate to predict the future spot rate because the test will necessarily be a joint test of three hypotheses:
(1) Markets are efficient (ERR = 0).
(2) Agents form unbiased expectations (BIAS = 0).
(3) There is no risk premium (RP = 0).
The efficient markets hypothesis is simply a working hypothesis that enables us to conduct a rational analysis of the problem. It is a necessary condition for any useful analysis to be possible. Exactly the same can be said for utility maximization! If people do not exhibit coherent behavior, analysis of the consequences of that behavior is impossible.
The first point that has to be brought into the discussion is that observed real exchange rate series are, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from random walks. Some mean reversion is evident when the series are viewed over long periods but from the point of view of forecasting, unless agents have information about the innovation or error term, their best forecast of next period's real exchange rate will typically be the observed real exchange rate this period. Next period's nominal exchange rate will, of course, differ from the real exchange rate by an adjustment for ongoing inflation.
If the real exchange rate is a random walk, it can be viewed as having been generated by a time-series process of the form
(1) --- rex(t) = rex(t-1) + v(t)
where rex(t) is the logarithm of the real exchange rate and v(t) is a random innovation process (error term) with mean zero and constant variance.
The nominal exchange rate, of course, will be a random walk if the real exchange rate is a random walk. But it will nevertheless move up and down in relation to the real exchange rate in accordance with increases and decreases in agents' expectations of the difference between the domestic and foreign inflation rates.
To illustrate the consequence of the real exchange rate being a random walk, let us imagine a world where the domestic and foreign inflation rates exhibit zero trends. Then let us generate a simulated series representing the logarithm of the deviation of the nominal exchange rate around some constant value (which we choose to be zero) using (1) above with the innovation (renamed e(t) because the exchange rate is now the nominal rate) specified as having a normal distribution with variance equal to 1.0. In this case, equation (1) becomes
(2) --- s(t) = s(t-1) + e(t)
Then let us suppose that agents know that the real and nominal exchange rates are random walks but have no information about the innovation process e(t). Their best prediction of next period's real exchange rate is the current period's value so, under the assumption that all agents are risk neutral (so the risk premium will be equal to 0), the forward rate f(t) (in logarithms) will equal s(t) and the forward discount will then be zero. Let us suppose that agents make guesses about the actual inflation rate so that the the forward real exchange rate is chosen with an error u(t) having a variance that is small relative to the variance of e(t). Then the forward rate in period (t), which will be the forward forecast of the spot exchange rate in period (t+1), will equal
(3) --- f(t) = s(t) + u(t)
and the forward discount will be
(4) --- fd(t) = f(t) - s(t) = u(t)
The resulting simulated data is shown in the three panels of CHART 1. The top panel shows the movements of the spot rates and previous period's forward rates (i.e., forward rate forecasts). Notice how the forward rate tracks the spot rate very closely. The correlation between them is evident from the scatter diagram in the middle panel. Despite the fact that the forward rate tracks the spot rate quite closely, there is essentially no relation between the forward discount and the period-to-period change in the spot rate in the bottom panel.
When we fit the equation of the forward rate hypothesis
(5) --- s(t+1) = a0 + b0 f(t) + e0(t)
to the simulated data plotted in the chart, we obtain an estimated value of b0 equal to .988 with a standard error of .007. The t-statistic for the test of the null-hypothesis that b0 = 1 is .286 so we cannot reject that hypothesis.
On the other hand, when we fit the equation of the forward discount hypothesis
(6) --- s(t+1) - s(t) = a1 + b1 [f(t) - s(t)] + e1(t)
to the simulated data we get a point estimate for b1 equal to -.042 with standard error .119, yielding a t-statistic for the null hypothesis that b1 = 0 equal to -.356. We cannot reject that null hypothesis.
So if the real exchange rate is a random walk, the inflation rate is known to have zero trend, the risk premium is zero (or a constant), and agents have no information about the innovations in the real exchange rate process, we would expect b0 to be not far from unity because forward rates will track the spot rate with a one period lag plus an error. Since there is serial correlation in the spot exchange rate series (i.e., each period's value is correlated with the previous period's value) we can expect the forward exchange rate to be highly correlated with next period's spot rate. In addition, because the error in setting the forward discount is random and uncorrelated with the innovations to the spot rate, we would expect to observe estimated values for b1 equal to zero.
Before looking at parts (2), (3) and (4) of the question, let us complicate our simulation of the path of the exchange rate a bit by assuming that e(t) is composed of two parts. One part, comprising half of the variance of e(t), can be seen by agents if they interpret the evidence correctly while the remaining part is "pure news". We then assume that agents incorporate the part of e(t) that has the potential to be correctly interpreted into their forward prediction f(t), making errors u(t) in the process that have a variance about equal to the variance of the potentially predictable part of e(t). If we run our simulation exercise many times under these assumptions, we will obtain values for b0 quite close to unity but typically below it by a statistically significant amount. And we will obtain values for b1 quite close to 0.5 (which is the ratio of the variance of the potentially predictable part of the innovation to the variance of agents' forward prediction). The R-squared for the forward discount regression will typically be about half that for the forward rate regression.
Now let's go a step further and assume that the variance of agents' errors in predicting the potentially predictable part of the innovation to the spot rate have a variance that is tiny in relation to the variance of the potentially predictable part. If we run the simulation many times under these conditions, we will typically obtain values for both b0 and b1 that are not statistically significantly different from unity. The R-squared values for the forward discount regressions will, again, typically be about half as large as those for the forward rate regressions.
We can demonstrate in this fashion that the expected value of b1 will be the ratio of the variance of the predictable part of the innovation to the spot rate to the variance of agents' forward rate forecast. When agents have no information, or use the information they have badly, b1 will tend toward zero. When they have some information and use it well, b1 will tend toward unity. b0 will typically not differ much from unity in any case, though it will tend to be statistically significantly different from unity when agents' do a bad job of using available information. Note here, that poor use of existing information does not imply that markets are inefficient---it simply implies that agents are human and make errors.
You can satisfy yourself that the above arguments are true by making
your own simulations and examining the resulting deviations of b0 from
unity and b1 from its theoretically expected values by downloading the
following program files and running them in RATS or SHAZAM:
fssim.prg --- for RATS 4.xx
fssim.bch --- for RATS 3.xx
fssim.shz --- for SHAZAM
The comments in the program files will show you how the program works.
Edit the two relevant parameters, G and Z, to correspond to the desired
simulation, and then execute the file using the statistical program.
If you have an account on CHASS you can simply copy the file fssim.shz to
your account, edit it appropriately, and then execute the command
shazam < fssim.shz > fssim.out
You can see the results for the simulation by examining the file fssim.out.
Part (1) also asks what the real-world evidence is regarding the values of b0 and b1. Typically, the values obtained for b0 have not been far from unity while those obtained for b1 have tended to be negative and significant, though the R-squared values in these forward discount regressions are typically very small. See "Real Exchange Rates,Efficient Markets and Uncovered Interest Parity: A Review," University of Toronto, January 8, 2002. (postscript -- rexrev.ps -- 541k) PDF (rexrev.pdf -- 411k)
Turning now to part (2) of the question, we would expect inflation differences to be more predictable than real exchange rate shocks, so that real exchange rate predictions (i.e., forward rates) would be likely to successfully incorporate major, persistent differences in domestic relative to foreign inflation. Both b0 and b1 would be positive and closer to unity.
Transactions costs (part (3)) become relevant in two ways. First, they make it less profitable for agents to make forward contracts that exploit deviations of the forward rate from the risk-adjusted expected future spot rate. This means that variations in hedging pressure may lead to deviations of the forward rate from the expected future spot rate of the sort that we have been incorporating in the error term u(t). Secondly, if "noise traders" drive the forward rate away from where "arbitragers" expect it to be it will less profitable for the latter to drive forward rates back into line with their expectations as to future spot rates. Here we are thinking of arbitragers as speculators who profit from the stupidity of noise traders. As the evidence at the end of the above noted paper "Real Exchange Rates,Efficient Markets and Uncovered Interest Parity: A Review," shows, it would seem that transactions costs of reasonable magnitude will make it unprofitable to take advantage of the observed significant negative estimated values of b1 using a naive trading rule.
Finally, turning to part (4), we can see that if the real exchange rate is a random walk it will neither be constant or mean revert to some constant value. In fact, of course, real exchange rates do exhibit some mean reverting behavior that suggests that the real exchange rate may fluctuate around some trend value that may be horizontal. It is a mistake, however, to view this trend value as an equilibrium in the sense that deviations from trend set in motion economic forces that cause the real exchange rate to move back towards the trend value. The mean reverting character of real exchange rates may simply reflect the fact that random forces driving them up are usually eventually offset by random forces driving them down. These forces are random in the sense of being exogenous and unpredictable.
No! It is true that, ignoring risk (an important assumption), the log of the forward price will equal the log of the spot price plus the interest rate differential---an expression virtually identical to the one you note above. Letting id(t) and if(t) be domestic and foreign interest rates and f(t) and s(t) be the logarithms of the forward and spot exchange rates respectively, we have the interest parity condition
(1) id(t) - if(t) = f(t) - s(t) + risk premium
which when we assume that the risk premium is zero reverts to
(2) f(t) = s(t) + id(t) - if(t).
This expression is otherwise known as covered interest parity.
Once we take into account the length of the forward contract and adjust the interest rates to apply to that length of time, this is exactly what you are learning in your options and futures course. And, as long as we ignore the country specific risk, violation of this condition will present an arbitrage opportunity---an investor can switch funds from one country to the other, covering himself with an appropriate forward contract, and make a sure profit as long as the two countries' securities are perfect substitutes (i.e., there is no country-risk differential).
But market efficiency (again assuming no risk) implies that
(3) f(t) - s(t) = E{s(t+1)} - s(t).
If we substitute (2) into (3) to eliminate f(t) - s(t) we obtain the uncovered interest parity condition
(4) id(t) - if(t) = E{s(t+1) - s(t)
which says that the interest rate differential depends on the expected future spot rate.
So the forward exchange rate depends on the expected future spot rate because the interest rate differential depends on it. Or alternatively, the interest rate differential depends on the expected future spot rate because the forward exchange rate depends upon it (equation (3)). Which ever way we look at it the model being used in my course is the same as the one in your Options and Futures course.
Actually, if you go into a bank and want to buy forward exchange, the bank will apply the interest rate differential to the current spot price to obtain an appropriate forward price to charge you. They do this because they assume that covered interest parity holds to a reasonable approximation (i.e., there is no country-risk premium) in which case the observed interest rate differential will reflect the markets expectations as to the movement of the spot rate over the life of the forward contract after appropriate adjustment for foreign exchange risk.
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