Lecture 25: Freedom and Determinism,
Pt. II - Incompatibilism
Taylor, "Freedom and Determinism"
·
holds that:
any acceptable philosophical
solution to the freedom/determinism debate must be able to address two basic
facts:
1.
that we deliberate
2.
that some of our actions are up to us
·
rejects Compatibilism (i.e., Soft Determinism) by
invoking the distant causation argument
·
rejects Simple Indeterminism as incoherent
1.
Argument
against Soft Determinism
What is the distant causation argument?
à if
determinism is true, then it must be the case that even one's will can be
traced along a causal chain to an event/point which is outside of one's
control.
Recall that Hume rejected this argument because:
a)
it did not have any practical import, e.g.,
it didn't change the fact that someone is harmed by the fact that s/he
has been robbed
b)
it is difficult issue, but not one with which
philosophy should trouble itself à
philosophy should be concerned with "the
examination of common life"
But Taylor counters that:
"it
is not nonsense to ask whether the causes of my actions -- my own inner
choices, decisions, and desires -- are themselves caused"
For the fact remains that:
"if
determinism is true … all those inner states which cause my body to behave in
whatever ways it behaves must arise from circumstances that existed before I
was born…"
e.g., mad physiologist; compulsive behaviour
2.
Argument against Simple Indeterminism
à simple
indeterminism holds that free actions are not caused; or if they are caused by
inner states, then these inner states are themselves not caused.
But Taylor replies, if simple determinism is true, we do
not have free agents, but instead "erratic
and jerking phantom[s], without any rhyme or reason."
Uncaused actions are random actions not free actions.
Two
basic facts:
a)
that my behaviour is sometimes the outcome of
deliberation
b)
that my behaviour is very often up to me
Neither Determinism nor Simple Indeterminism can
reconcile with these two facts.
One deliberates:
1.
with reference to future actions
2.
only when I do not already know what I will do
3.
in order to decide what to do.
à
Determinism precludes deliberation.
If determinism is true, then there are always antecedent
conditions sufficient for everything that I do, and thus my actions can be inferred rather than decided.
à
Determinism precludes any actions being up to me.
If determinism is true, it would not be in my power to
choose what I should do. For according to determinism, “whatever happens at any time is the only thing that can then happen, given
all that precedes it”.
à Simple
indeterminism also precludes deliberation.
If free action is uncaused, hence random, action, then
they cannot be my own actions, i.e., if they are not caused by anything, they
are not caused by me.
Logically, we get into a real bind when it comes to
reconciling the two basic facts to the theoretical commitments of Determinism
or Simple indeterminism.
What’s to be done?
Taylor's
alternative: A Theory of Agency
Humans are “self-determining
beings; that is beings which are sometimes the causes of their own behaviour”.
Taylor recognizes two difficulties with this theory:
a)
it rests on a contentious metaphysical view of the person
b)
it relies on “an extraordinary conception of causation”
But Taylor is willing to accept these difficulties. Even
if it is not flawless, it is superior to the alternatives.
In effect, we’re left with a trade-off:
Do we reject the two basic
facts as mere illusions?
Or, do we accept the theory of
agency despite its metaphysical difficulties?
Next day: Read Campbell, “Has the Self ‘Free Will’?”
Soft Determinism holds three claims:
1)
that determinism is true
2)
that voluntary action is free to the extent that it is
not constrained or impeded
3)
that the causes of voluntary behaviour are certain states,
events, conditions within the agent him/herself
Simple indeterminism argues:
1)
that we do have free will
2)
that free will is not compatible with determinism
3)
that determinism is therefore false.