ECO336Y
Solutions to Sample Questions 5
Here are my solutions. Let me know if anything is unclear.
Total Points = 47
1) If
property rights are not defined over a resource such as a river, explain why
this may give rise to externality problems. (2 points)
Ownership of a resource helps ensure that the owner
takes account of the opportunity costs of using the resource in different
ways. If property rights are not
defined over a resource, then individuals may use the resource in ways that
have undesirable consequences for others, and there is no clear mechanism for
ensuring that the external costs and benefits felt by others are take into
account adequately.
2) If
markets fail, is government intervention always justified? Please set out your reasoning. [Two sentences.] (4 points)
If markets fail (because of externalities or market
power), this provides a reason for considering government intervention as a
means of correcting the failure.
However, government intervention is often costly and ineffective, and in
some cases, the costs outweigh the benefits of the government’s actions, so
that government intervention is not always justified.
3) [Again]
Please explain why an indifference curve drawn in leisure-income space (that
is, with leisure on the horizontal and income on the vertical axis) slopes
down. [Two sentences.] (4 points)
An indifference curve in the leisure-income space
shows all points that give an individual the same utility level. We usually
think of more work (and thus less leisure) as bad, and more income as good; so
if we start from a point on a given indifference curve where an individual has
a lot of leisure and then move to a new point where the individual has less
leisure, he/she must be compensated through higher income, so the slope will be
negative.
Question 4 (8 points)
Consider a firm that pollutes the environment
in the process of producing a good. Let
Q be the output of the good. The firm’s
and society’s marginal benefit schedule is given by
MB = 7 – Q.
Suppose the firm’s private marginal cost
schedule is given by
MPC = 3 + Q/2,
and the marginal social damage schedule is
given by
MSD = 4.5.
4a)
What level of output will the firm choose to produce if it ignores the
pollution problem? (2 points)
The firm will produce at the output level
where
MPC = MB, or
3 + Q/2 = 7 - Q.
Solving for Q, we get that
Q* = 8/3.
4b)
What is the socially optimal level of output? (3 points)
The socially optimal level is found where MSC
= MB. Here,
MSC = MPC + MSD.
Therefore,
MSC = 7.5 + Q/2,
which is an increasing function of Q. Note that the MSC curve is everywhere about
the MB curve. Thus the optimal
output level is zero.
4c)
Please give clear intuition for your answer to part b). (3 points)
In this case, the external damage associated
with producing the good is so high that once these damages are added into the
private cost, the full social costs outweigh the benefits at all levels of
output. So the socially optimal output
level is zero.
Question 5 (17 points)
Suppose a firm faces a horizontal demand
curve, with price P = $4. The firm’s
total cost curve is given by
C = Q2,
where Q is the firm’s output.
5a) Does
the firm have any market power? Please
explain. [One sentence.] (2 points)
As the firm is a price taker, it has no
market power.
5b) Write
down a general expression (in terms of Q) for this firm’s profit level. (3 points)
Profit = TR – TC = P Q – C(Q) = 4Q – Q2
5c) Solve
for the firm’s optimal output choice, showing your workings. [Hint: your answer should give Q* equal to
some number.] (6 points)
The firm’s optimal output Q* solves
d (Profit)/d Q = 0 where
d (Profit)/d Q = 4 – 2Q
Aside: What are we doing here? We are finding the output level at which
profits are maximized, which is equivalently the output level at which the
profit function has a slope of zero.
A second aside: strictly, we should also
check that the profit function is maximized, rather than minimized, at Q* =
2. We would do this by checking that
the second derivative of the profit function is negative, evaluated at Q* = 2,
which it is, being equal to –2 throughout.
5d) What
is the firm’s marginal cost at the optimal output level? (2 points)
MC = d C(Q)/ d Q = 2Q.
If Q* = 2, then MC = 4.
5e) In
the absence of externalities, does this firm produce at the socially optimal
output level? Please explain. [Two sentences.] (4 points)
Question 6
(worth 12 points)
A number of social scientists have studied
the impact of police expenditures on the level of crime to see whether higher
expenditures lower the crime rate significantly. Here, we repeat the standard type of analysis, collecting data on
a random sample of communities. Our
data set includes, for each community i, the crime rate (Ci), the level of police
expenditures (Ei), and the level of unemployment (Ui). Suppose that the unemployment rate takes on just two values: 0.1
in low-unemployment communities, and 0.2 in high-unemployment communities. We estimate the following model using
ordinary least squares:
Ci = a0 + a1 Ui + a2 Ei + epsiloni
where a0, a1, and a2 are our coefficient estimates,
and epsiloni is a random error term.
6a) Consider
the least squares line that corresponds to these estimates, drawn with crime
expenditures on the horizontal axis and the crime rate on the vertical
axis. Is the intercept of this line in
the low-unemployment community higher or lower than in the high-unemployment
community? And does this make
sense? Please explain. [Three sentences.] (6 points)
The intercept term is given by a0 + a1Ui,
assuming that the error can be ignored – on average it is zero. As long as a1>0,
as seems plausible, so an increase in unemployment (in moving from low- to
high-unemployment communities) leads to higher crime, as we would expect.
6b) Suppose
our actual estimates are: a0 = 5, a1 = 2, and a2 = -1. Predict the average
crime rate in high-unemployment areas if police expenditures = 2 per year. Please set out your working. (6 points)
Given these
estimates, the average crime rate is given by:
E(Ci|Ei
= 2) = 5 + 2 X 0.2 – 2 = 3.4,
where the
expression on the left reads “the expected value of the crime rate in community
i, given that police expenditures in that community are equal to 2.” Here, we assume that the expected value of
the error term equals zero, which is standard.