Problem Sets:
| Session: | Date: | Lecture description: | Problem set: | Due Date |
| 1 | Jan 11 | Introduction of Game Theory (Ch. 1) | Set
1 (From Textbook) |
Jan 18 |
| 2 | Jan 18 | Nash Equilibrium: Theory (Ch. 2) | Set
2 (From Textbook except Qs. 6) |
Jan 25 |
| 3 | Jan 25 | Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations (Ch. 3) | Set
3 (From Textbook except Qs. 6) 1] 42.1 (Finding NEs using BR fn.) = 40.1 in online chapter 2] 42.2 (A joint project) = 40.2 in online chapter 3] 44.1 (Contributing to a public good) = 43.1 in online chapter 4] 59.1 (Cournot w/ quadratic cost fn) = 57.2 in online chapter 5] 59.2 (Cournot w/ fixed cost) = 57.3 in online chapter 6] 67.2 (Bertrand w/discrete prices) = 65.2 in online chapter |
Feb 1 |
| 4 | Feb 1 | Mixed Strategy Equilibrium (Ch. 4) | No PS. | |
| 5 | Feb 8 | Extensive Games: Theory (Ch. 5) | Set
4 (From Textbook) 1] 114.2 (Games w/ Mixed strategy equilibria) 2] 114.3 (A coordination game) 3] 118.1 (Silverman's game) 4] 121.2 (Eliminating dominated actions when finding equilibria) 5] 128.1 (Choosing a seller) 6] 132.3 (Contributing to a public good) |
Feb 15 |
| 6 | Feb 15 | Extensive Games: Illustrations (Ch. 6) | Set
5 (From Textbook) - See comments |
Feb 22* |
| * | Feb 22 | Reading Week | ||
| 7 | Mar 1 | Midterm | ||
| 8 | Mar 8 | Extensive Games: Illustrations (Ch. 6 & 7) | Set
6 (From Textbook) 1] 183.3(Dictator game & impunity game) 2] 185.1 (Bargaining over 2 indivisible objects) 3] 189.1 (Stackelberg's duopoly game with quadratic costs) 4] 191.1 (Stackelberg's duopoly game with fixed costs) 5] 192.1 (Sequential variant of Bertrand's duopoly game) |
Mar 15 |
| 9 | Mar 15 | Bayesian Games I (Ch. 9) | Set
7 (From Textbook) 1] 210.3 (Two-period PD) 2] 211.1 (Timing claims on an investment) 3] 214.1 (Bertrand's duopoly game with entry) 4] 227.2 (Firm-union bargaining) 5] 230.1 (Nash equilibria when players may make mistakes) |
Mar 22 |
| 10 | Mar 22 | Bayesian Games II (Ch. 9) | Set
8 (From Textbook) |
Mar 29 |
| 11 | Mar 29 | Extensive Games with Imperfect Information I (Ch. 10) | Set
9 (From Textbook) 1] 284.1 (Infection) 2] 287.1 (Cournot's duopoly game w/ imperfect info) 3] 288.1 (Cournot's duopoly game w/ imperfect info) 4] 291.1 (Reporting crime w/ an unknown no. of witnesses) |
Apr 5 |
| 12 | Apr 5 | Extensive Games with Imperfect Information II (Ch. 10) | Set
10 (From Textbook) 1] 316.1 (Variant of card game) 2] 318.2 (Strategies in variants of card game & entry game) 3] 319.3 (Nash equilibria of card game) 4] 320.1 (Nash equilibria of variant of card game) 5] 331.1 (Selten's horse) 6] 331.2 (2 similar games w/ different equilibria) |
I hope to receive your email saying u've done PS 10 before the final. |
Set 2.6] A beautiful mind with a wrong answer
In the movie A
Beautiful Mind, there was a shot in which John Nash and 3 of his fellow
classmates saw 4 brunettes and a blonde in a bar. John suggested that they should
all approach the brunettes. Suppose that for these 4 gentlemen, each of them
prefer getting the attention of the blonde, than getting the attention of any
brunette (they "value" the attention of any brunette of the 4 equally),
than getting no attention at all. 1 guy will get the attention of the girl he's
approaching if he's the only one approaching her. More than 1 guy approaching
any girl will result in rejection. Getting attention of any girl after having
a rejection is not feasible (coz' no one wants to be "Plan B").
(a) Explain why John's proposal is wrong.
(b) Give me at least one explanation that John may intentionally make it wrong.
(c) Find the Nash equilibrium/equilibria of the game.
Set 1.4] 17.1 (Games equivalent to the prisoner's dilemma in the textbook)
Determine whether each of the games in Figure 17.1 differs from the Prisoner's Dilemma only in the names of the players' actions, or whether it differs also in one or both the players' preferences.
X |
Y |
|
X |
3,3 |
1,5 |
Y |
5,1 |
0,0 |
X |
Y |
|
X |
2,1 |
0,5 |
Y |
3,-2 |
1,-1 |
Figure 17.1 The strategic games for Exercise 17.1.