Sex, drugs and Mahler.

Reflections on Martha Nussbaum's *Upheavals of Thought*. [draft March 5, 2004]

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Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'
Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move.

Alfred Lord Tennyson

1. What emotions are thought to be

Here are some things emotions have been said to be.

(i). Emotions are physiological disturbances.
(ii). Emotions are feelings.
(iii). Emotions are judgments.
(iv). Emotions are thoughts.
(v). Emotions are choices.
(vi). Emotions are appraisals.
(vii). Emotions are apprehensions of value.
(viii). Emotions are dispositional patterns of response.
(ix). Emotions are strong desires.
(x). Emotions are construals.
(xi). Emotions are regulatory mechanisms mediating between judgment and behaviour.
(xii). Emotions are styles of being.
(xiii). Emotions are mental modes.
(xiv). Emotions are information processing styles.
(xv). Emotions are patterns of action-readiness.
(xvi). Emotions are affect programs.
(xvii). Emotions are adaptive scripts selected to deal with standard life situations.
(xviii). Emotions are implementations of narratives.
(xix). Emotions are affiliative social functions.
(xx). Emotions are conscious episodes.
(xxii). Emotions are socially constructed attitudes.
(xxii). Emotions are causes of physiological changes.
(xxiiii). Emotions are effects of physiological changes.
(xxvi). Emotions cause upheavals of thought.
(xxv). Emotions are caused by upheavals of thought.
(xxvi). Emotions are upheavals of thought.
Though I've not attached names to these claims, I believe that (nearly) every one has been
defended as a central truth or even as the defining essence of emotions in the past two or three
decades. Despite the variety of these claims, they can be classed into three main genera: those
that see the core of emotions are conative, that is, akin to desire; those that see them as cognitive,
that is, akin to judgment or belief; and those that regard emotions as essentially bodily or
physiological events. Since all three views link emotion to behaviour, without necessarily
committing the crude error of being committed to behaviorism. So they can't be differentiated by
how good they are at explaining behaviour. But there is also a fourth type, the relation of which
to behaviour and to the other three genera is more problematic, and which has attracted rather
less attention. This is the view of emotion as a quality of experience. I'll attempt a partial
rehabilitation of this approach in these comments.

What is particularly impressive about Martha Nussbaum's rich and wide-ranging book is
that just about every one of the two dozen characterizations of emotion I've listed are subsumed
under the "modified neo-Stoic cognitivism" she advocates. (She doesn't use such a heavy-handed
label, but I'll refer here to her brand of cognitivism as 'MNSC.') The title of her book (to which
all unqualified page numbers in brackets will refer) suggests that the "master view" that sums up
her version of cognitivism is No. xxvi on my list. Or at least I think that is the master view,
though some of the advertisements for it in the book suggest that it is really No. xxv.
Furthermore, if we look at the epigraph from Proust, it rather looks as if it should be No. xxiv.
For what Proust actually says is that love produces "geological upheavals of thought", which
seems to me to place the causal factor outside the thought which it "heaves up". The syntax is
ambiguous if you isolate the phrase "upheaval of thought" (the French is "soulevements géologiques de la pensée"), since that could apparently be construed on the model of "snapping of fingers", in which the fingers are active, or on the model of "wetting of the bed", in which the bed is passive. Sometimes Nussbaum seems to imply that the thought is the cause of the
upheaval, at other times merely that it is the locus of upheaval. But what is clear is that the role
of cognition in these upheavals is more central than as mere effects.

Nussbaum concedes pretty much all there is to concede to those who stress the
physiological, or the motivational, or any of the other dynamic and bodily aspects of emotions
one might want to stress, and she finds ways of integrating these into MNSC. Among the
concessions that might at first sight seem to threaten MNSC is the amendment to classical
Stoicism that makes room for animal and infant emotions: the propositions which are the
intentional objects of a judgment can be "preverbal", so as to be attributable to small children and
animals. But providing these are allowed to be vague enough, and attributed according to a
reasonable principle of interpretative charity, it seems we must allow that other animals have
beliefs and that their emotions are contingent on those beliefs.

In the same spirit, Nussbaum manages to neutralise a number of standard objections, or
even dragoon them into performing as witnesses on her side. Thus for example she is able to
explain convincingly in terms of cognitive changes how grief changes its character and
diminishes in intensity with time. I'll return to this in a moment.

Besides the question of the change in intensity, the most commonly voiced objection to
cognitivism is that we can experience an emotion "against our better judgment", as it were.
Nussbaum whacks this one squarely back into the objector's court, adducing "the simple reason
that we may often hold contradictory beliefs, especially in cases involving long habituation."
(35) In other words, we have two beliefs in the matter, and one of them only is the one that
constitutes the emotion. One might quibble that if there are two evaluative beliefs, and evaluative beliefs are sufficient for emotions, there should be two contrary emotions as well as two contrary beliefs; but precisely what is to be explained is that some evaluations are hot and some are cold. Nussbaum needn't, however, be committed to the view that there must be an emotion for every evaluative belief. There are many additional features that may be required, but these additional features are themselves cognitive insofar as they touch on the essential nature of the emotion: "cognitive elements are an essential part of the emotion's identity, and of what differentiates one emotion from other emotions." (35).

In truth, I'm not sure the terminology matters very much. Jerry Neu has argued that "thoughts" rather than judgments are better suited to capture what is wanted here; Solomon, on the other hand, has defended "judgment" in preference to "thoughts". Vast ideological commitments tend to hover in the background of such terminological disputes, and I certainly have my own, human-as-beast preconception. But don't really care about the words. What I'd like to do here is to explore a different aspect of the cognitive core of emotions—to give it, as it were, a different twist. My starting point is to recall that there is one other central type of cognition beside propositional beliefs and knowledge, namely perception. Perception is also cognition, but it doesn't need to be propositional. Or so it seems to me and to some others, though the view that there is no non-propositional perception has also been fiercely defended.¹

So I'd like to put in a word for qualia in emotion. I know that sounds terribly old-fashioned, and confusing to boot, in the light of what will emerge as my own essentially reductively functionalist conception of qualia. But I still think the view that locates the cognitive core of emotion in the quality of perception rather than in belief is worth exploring, and it is possibly one—the only one, I'm tempted to add—to which Nussbaum has not entirely done justice.

I begin, obliquely, with a "softening up" analogy, which is perhaps more than an analogy, consider one familiar example of something of which it is not easy to decide whether it really counts as cognition or not, or at least whether it counts as information or not. I'm thinking of the well-known puzzle about whether the subjectivity of a point of view (in time or space) should count as cognition. You can conveniently put it in terms of god's omniscience: does god know that I am Ronnie? Of course. But god can't truly think this thought, which I can think and know: I am Ronnie. Nor, being eternal, can god ever think TGIF: thank goodness it's Friday. I am tempted both to say that I am Ronnie is something I know that no one else can know, and also to say that god, or for that matter anyone who knows me or anyone on Thursday, isn't really lacking any actual information by virtue of not being able truly to say either of these things. I have the same kind of puzzlement about some of what I will keep referring to, for want of a better expression, as the quality of experience.

2. My friend maryjane

Let me confess. I like drugs. I don't mean major hallucinogenics, LSD or hashish in large doses, which if we believe what we read promise major changes in our perceptions and in our beliefs. I refer to more modest drugs, such as caffeine and cannabis, the effects of which in small

¹Peacocke (Peacocke 2001) is on my side on this; Sedivy [ref?] and others maintain that there are no perceptions without conceptual and therefore propositional content.
doses are best described as changes in the quality of experience, without apparently modifying what we believe, what we know, or what we perceive. I suggest that these changes are emotional changes. It's not that all emotions are of that kind, but that subtle changes in the quality of experience are emotional, and teach us something about emotions that we tend to neglect in our theories because qualia are so very hard to say anything useful about. Though I've no personal experience of Prozac, some of (Kramer 1993)'s descriptions suggest that when it works right it also somehow changes the quality of a person's experience, its emotional tone, without changing what we think of as its cognitive content. I think there are interesting parallels to be drawn between these effects and Nussbaum's analyses of grief and of the emotional content of music.

Users of marihuana tend to find things funnier when under the influence of the drug. Is this a difference at the cognitive level? When I first tried marihuana, in the days when it was part of the Princeton graduate curriculum, I remember forming a theory to explain this effect, linking it to the impairment of short-term memory which is another widely recognized effect of cannabis. I thought perhaps the hilarity could be caused by the abbreviation of the focal specious present brought about by the memory impairment. On this theory, a story with a twist became much funnier because its twists and turns dropped out of the specious present and became relegated to the fringe of consciousness, where it tickled like a sort of mental feather. I remember applying this to a satirical take-off on a La Fontaine fable of the rooster and the fox which I happened to come across. In the original, the fox tells the rooster to come down from his tree so that they can embrace, to celebrate the new peace pact between all the animals. The rooster expresses his delight, and promises to come right down. He adds that he sees two greyhounds fast approaching, presumably to spread the same news, so they can all embrace and celebrate together. The fox proves to be in a great hurry and leaves. In the variant, the greyhounds arrive and embrace the fox. The rooster, amazed, concludes that the animals really have made a pact. He comes down from the tree and is eaten forthwith. And the moral is, that when the animals have made a pact it may not include you.

The reason this seemed especially funny at the time, I surmised, was that marihuana had narrowed my attention span. The scope of the specious present was cut short, and the denouement found itself just outside it now, on the fringe of my immediate memory span when I focused on the tale's basic situation. Or conversely, if I focused on the ending, the initial moves dropped out of the specious present, tickling at my brain from the fringe.

My promising career as an experimental psychologist was cut short at that point, for various reasons which included the unreasonable attitude of the US government towards cannabis and the fact that the Princeton doctoral program in philosophy made no provisions for lab work. In all candour, I don't now think my theory was all that likely to end up in the pages of Nature. But I do still think it would be interesting to find out more about how a drug can make something funny. Or, for that matter, how it can make sex sexier, or even love more intense, which cannabis also seems sometimes to do. Other drugs have other, sometimes ambivalent

2"Do we get further by recognizing qualia?... I don't feel much is contributed by this move." (61).
3On fringe consciousness" see (Mangan 2001), who refers to discussions of "penumbra" or "fringe" in (James 1983).
effects on emotion. Nico Frijda is fond of remarking that age has much the same effect on sex as alcohol: it increases the desire but impedes the performance. And though I've neither had nor heard first hand accounts (if that's not an inappropriate term) from those who have tried Viagra, I wouldn't be surprised if it were found to increase performance while diminishing hedonic quality.

None of these cases appear at first blush to owe their effects to changes in cognition. Yet that appearance may be misleading. In its modest way, my crude theory of the virtues of marihuana actually shows how the effect in question could be regarded as essentially cognitive. If indeed the framing of cognitions about a narrative and the positioning of different parts of it in focal or fringe consciousness accounted for the emotion of hilarity, it seems to me we could say that the drug itself had produced its effects by cognitive means. In this I think my cannabis-inspired elucubration (in itself a cognitive phenomenon, whatever its shortcomings as a theory) can claim to be a crude precursor to Nussbaum's compelling story about how the process of mourning affects grief by working on the cognitive content of the emotion.

3. Nussbaum on grief

Unlike my theory of why things are funny on dope, I think that Nussbaum's cognitive analysis of the changes in the quality of grief is very likely correct. The core of her analysis is that the kind of changes undergone in the process of mourning can be understood in terms of changes not in individual beliefs but in the whole cognitive economy in which beliefs about the person for whom one grieves function.

On the face of it, the "freshness" of grief would not seem to have anything to do with cognition. I have lost someone I love. As time passes, there is no more news. If my grief fades, or merely becomes easier to bear—if it changes its quality, in short, it doesn't seem to be because I come to know or believe what I didn't know or believe when the grief was fresh. Yet Nussbaum finds no fewer than four ways in which the diminishing "freshness" can be regarded as a cognitive process.

1) "First,... as mourning progresses the emotion is more likely to be a background emotion rather than a situational emotion, in the sense that fewer concrete situations will call it to mind". (80) Beliefs, as well as emotions, can be held either in the background or in the forefront. One might quibble here about whether the difference is in itself a cognitive difference, or whether it's merely a positional difference affecting the salience of items of cognition. But like the question of the location of certain thoughts in the forefront or in the fringe of consciousness, this can plausibly be regarded as a cognitive difference. So, yes, one might quibble, but I won't.

2) The novelty of a proposition explains why it has a particularly wrenching effect. This "comes in part from the fact that [the knowledge of the death] violently tears the whole fabric of hope, planning, and expectation that I have built up around her all my life. But... [later] I reorganize my other beliefs about the present and future to accord with it." (ibid).

Yet Nussbaum makes a curious concession: "That is not is not yet emotional change. I have defined emotions by their content, not by their relationship to other parts of our mental content." (81) This is the very quibble I rejected in the previous paragraph. But why put such a constraint on herself? Here I find Nussbaum rather too austere. What are beliefs, the paradigm cognitions, if we do not think of them in terms of their "relationship to other parts of our mental life"—and in particular to other beliefs? It's widely if not universally accepted that beliefs get
their content from their inferential powers. So it seems to me the concession is simply not needed here. On the contrary, a cognition's relation to other cognitions seems to me essential to its nature as a cognition.

3) The third change is a simple one. In time, the actual judgment about the person I have lost changes, Nussbaum points out, from present to past:

By now, in August 2000, it is no longer as true of me as it was in 1992 that “my mother is an important element in my flourishing”; I now am more inclined to accept the proposition “The person who died was a central part of my life.” (82)

This mere change of tense has extensive consequences, since "one becomes to that extent a different person." That presumably entails changes in dispositions, in habits, and in intentions, projects, and desires. Once again, it is after all not just a matter of any single change in belief, but of the way a whole network of mental states is affected by the passing of time. Nussbaum seems right to identify the cognitive aspects as central to these changes.

4) In the fourth set of considerations, Nussbaum draws attention to the "truth in the idea that emotions, in central human cases, need to be fortified by sensuous perception, lose their vivacity when perception is curtailed, and can be recalled by vivid perceptual reminders." (84). This is complicated by the fact that this need for perceptual reinforcement is strongly associated with the dependency of childhood. So in the end it is more because the need for comfort and support faces that the sensory memory fades, rather than that the memory simply fades out on its own, causing a diminution of the need for comfort and support. (85)

4. Proust's madeleine and Mahler's music

The "Vinteuil sonata", the madeleine dipped in tea, evoke emotional memory. And what is evoked is, to be sure, a great rush of thoughts: The pleasure of the madeleine, "isolated, with no notion of its cause, ... had suddenly made the vicissitudes of life unimportant, its disasters harmless, its brevity illusory. It worked, in the same way as love works, to fill me with some precious essence, or rather this essence was not in me, it was me..." (Proust 1966, vol. 1 p. 45) [my trans.] What I find most striking in this description is the primacy of perception in the triggering of emotion. Perception is, to repeat the obvious, a form of cognition. So Nussbaum is surely right to reject the assimilation of cognition to propositional attitudes, noting that it is an error to accept "the exclusive disjunction — “either linguistically formulable or noncognitive.”" (265). This is surely right, yet curiously Nussbaum doesn't do very much to explore the realm which most obviously attests to it, namely perception. She does mention the view that qualia or conscious feelings might have something to do with emotion ("it feels like something to have an emotion"), but dismisses this as "what psychologists call “arousal” and that Proust calls “upheaval”, which she's right to regard as inessential to complex emotions. (62) On the other hand, she does acknowledge that there is about the experience of emotion something "dense in a

4She concludes with what again appears to be a concession which I find rather puzzling, that "We may admit, then, that fading has a cognitive dimension that is to some degree independent of the thought content, without thinking that this dimension explains very much on its own." (85) I am not sure I grasp the import of this concession, so I leave it aside.
way that a propositional attitude view would not capture". "Denseness... a necessary feature of the experience of an emotion such as grief." (65)

Her objection to taking qualia seriously, that is, to the suggestion that qualia can be helpful in the analysis of emotion, rests on the fact that "there is just too much variation among persons and across time in the same person" (62). But I suggest that we should focus precisely on that variation. This will bring us closer to what I've been calling fringe consciousness. I don't want to claim that this is essential to emotion as such, but it does seem to me that fringe consciousness pertains to something that is essentially emotional in common experience. That's what seems to be modified by chemicals—coffee, cannabis, cocaine, these, in small doses, modify the quality of experience without doing anything that is "constant across subjects,...etc." Yet there is a difference, most often described as..., well, indescribable. That's what's peculiar.

What does seem to be describable about a specific emotional quale is the narrative in which the emotion's origin is rooted. Part of what I am experiencing, part of what is contained into the fringe, is the association with some particular story or stories. In fact, I want to say, the experience is indeed essentially one of perceptual "denseness"—using the word metaphorically for the fact that it feels dense, as opposed to abstract, in the way that a picture "is worth a thousand words". Perhaps it should also be taken in its literal mathematical sense, in which there are always more points in between any two points; so in a perceptual experience the sense is that there is always some fine discrimination that could be made. But this help much with the contrast between the perceptual and the propositional. For given a sentential description, one can always refine it in any of an indefinite number of ways. But that's precisely the point: once again, I want to say that the quale is ultimately just what it feels like for the complex cognition to work its way into fringe consciousness. Once focused on, the propositional contents are in focal consciousness, with all the limitations on crowding implied by George Miller's well-known "magic number seven" (Miller 1956). While in the fringe, on the other hand, there can be indefinitely many cognitions inchoately jostling each other, affecting only the overall quality of the experience. And "indefinitely many" counts both ways: it can be few as well as many. The experience can be dull as well as rich. So when we speak of some drug's dulling and another's heightening of awareness, we could be referring quite literally to how many thoughts are mustered by its fumes. (That is what I meant by characterizing my own concept of qualia as reductively functionalist.)

Similar observations can be made about the experience of listening to music. It's possible to listen to music, even attentively, without being moved, just as it's possible to look at someone you love deeply and feel nothing in particular. It's possible merely to notice, but feel nothing more, those very same features of the music which at another time leave you transported with deep emotion. But it's very difficult, again, to get a clear sense of what that difference consists in. It isn't enough to count as cognitive, I assume, if the difference amounted to being caused by the music to think a wealth of thoughts. This, I am ashamed to own, reliably happens to me when I watch an opera. Unfortunately, the thoughts quickly veer off into the irrelevantly philosophical. I can't possibly claim any but purely causal links between the music and the thoughts. But I am quite prepared to accept that an educated hearing of a Mahler symphony will speak to the emotional core of "the titanic struggle against life and destiny fought by a superman who is still a prisoner of the world." (620), or that in hearing Kathleen Ferrier singing Monteverdi's "Pur ti miro..." one can hear "an extraordinary musical depiction of lovemaking." (250) But the right model for the cognitions involved here is, it seems to me, one that conveys how perception can
be informed by the programme. It is, in an admittedly more grandiose way, a bit like our ability to see in fig. I a Mexican riding a bicycle seen from on top, providing it's suggested to us. Not anything can be suggested, yet when the suggestion works, more is going on than the pasting of a cognition on an arbitrary blank space.

But I'm jumping ahead hers. Let us look at Nussbaum's admirably lucid schema for classifying different positions about music.

Here's how it works. Three "warring positions" on the topic of the cognitive content of music are set out in terms of different responses to the following argument:

1) Music does not embody (or cause) linguistically formulable cognitive attitudes
2) linguistically formulable cognitive attitudes are necessary constituents of emotions.
3 [therefore] music cannot embody (or cause) emotions.

The available positions correspond to different responses to this argument:

A — accepts argument and conclusion (Stoics, Hanslick)
B — rejects the conclusion and gets rid of (2) (Schopenhauer, Langer, Levinson)
C — rejects the conclusion and rejects (1) (Deryck Cooke.) (255-6)

Nussbaum protests that she is an "amateur" in music, but I am a rank amateur, as I'm sure will already be obvious. I proceed here therefore to make a view rankly amateurish remarks, with even more trepidation than usual.

On A: Nussbaum gives us a very lucid quote from Hanslick, which begins with a defence of the explicitly cognitive view of emotions. Since music has no such content, Hanslick argues, it cannot contain emotion, though this is presumably compatible with the thought that it enhances some of the non-cognitive dimensions of emotion. So Hanslick says: "music can only express the various accompanying adjectives, and not the substantive, e.g. love itself". (Hanslick quoted 257). On this view, the immediate intentional object of music is nothing other than itself. It has "no need of content from outside itself". (quoted 258) In addition, however, this wouldn't preclude the possibility that music can also work, rather as cannabis does, as a regulator of emotion rather than as expression of full-fledged emotion. And indeed music is not infrequently thought to work rather like a drug. If that were the case, then it could still claim cognitive status based on the rather weaker understanding of that thesis, in that it reorganizes a network of cognitions, rather as I supposed that cannabis might work to modulate the attention span and thereby the relationship between the different cognitions involved in finding something funny.

Nussbaum's objections to Hanslick is that

"he has too hastily denied something without which it is difficult to explain why music has the importance it has for us. ... why it is a more or less universal view of composers and listeners that these ascriptions are not merely metaphorical..... Nor can he explain why certain so-called metaphorical ascriptions of emotion are apt and others are not... these... are not merely arbitrary." (259)

True, but nor are any ascriptions of synaesthetic properties just arbitrary. As anyone who has tried with a large class of students knows, synaesthetic equations of the sort noted by the Gestalt
psychologists are remarkably robust intersubjectively. In fig. 2, the respective *qualia* of ‘maluma’ and pattern I, and of ‘takete’ and pattern II, are somehow transmodally recognizable as similar. Surely this is a *cognitive* fact, but it is not a fact that is readily articulable in language. (Or if it is, the articulation is likely to be couched in question-begging metaphors such as: "Both ‘takete’ and the picture in fig. II are spiky.) So it could be that the properties of the music are as it were synaesthetically akin to certain emotional properties. If that were so, it seems to me it would not be a reason to think that music couldn't be *important*. On the contrary, the properties we are capable of apprehending *synaffectively*, if I may coin the term, are likely to be among the most pervasive, universal and important.

But will they be *in themselves* cognitive? By now we've seen that the term is capable of a range of interpretations, some broader than others. Nussbaum rightly says that in approaching the cognitive content of music, "What we need is an account that preserves the cognitive and symbolic complexity of musical experience while refusing to treat the music as a mere means to a cognition that is extra-musical in nature." (265). She rejects the idea of "musical lexicon" in which various musical items are keyed to concepts. But she claims that "when we express the content of an emotion in words, we are already, in many cases, performing a translation of thoughts that did not originally take an explicitly verbal form". (264) And she stresses in particular that "there are forms of cognitive/ intentional activity, embodying ideas of salience and urgency, that are not linguistic." (263)

I agree. But what's not clear to me is that this entails that we must deplore the lack of intentionality of music in Langer's view of music as vigorously as does Scruton, whom Nussbaum quotes approvingly: (p. 261)

Emotions are ...portrayed... as consisting of crescendos, diminuendos, surges, and releases, tensions and plateaux, and these peculiar 'formal' features are then isolated as the *things that matter* in our emotional life. As though loving someone mattered because of those inner rushes of blood to the heart (if that is how it feels) and not because the person himself matters a million times more. (Scruton 1997, 166, quoted on p. 262).

I'm afraid that Nussbaum's generous sympathy has moved her to endorse Scruton's characteristic lack of those very virtues. It's true that it can't be the rush of blood that matters more to the lover than the loved one, but it may be that *what it is to love* is if not the rush of blood to the heart then the rush of phenylethylamine to the brain. It could be that such chemical events, while not, to be sure, what emotions *are*, remain crucial as the necessary conditions that

5See fig. 2, from (Köhler 1947). For students I do the experiment in reverse, suggesting that it is obvious that (I) is *takete* and (II) is *maluma*. This elicits howls of indignant protests, professorial authority notwithstanding.
makes an evaluative judgment or other cognition *emotional*, and causally responsible for the fact that they matter.

On the next page, it is Nussbaum's criticism of Levinson that seems to me to suffer from a similar unfairness. She complains that Levinson is "being drawn toward cognitive language to explain how music can embody hope —only to take it away again with the left hand, so to speak, reminding the reader that it is not really the cognitive part of hope that we are considering, but only its ‘affective side’. (262). But if music were the *food* of love, its enabling drug, as it were, surely that would in no way detract from its importance, and would leave altogether intact the intentional nature of love. This seems to me more plausible, on the whole, than finding highly specific intentional references to specific aspects of the human condition in this or that phrase of Mahler's music.

5. Emotional sources of pathological cognition

There is an intriguing neurological disorder known as ‘illusion de sosie’ or *Capgras syndrome*, which I find immensely suggestive of some ways that emotion might play an important cognitive role—in an uncompromisingly literal sense of the term—while lying outside the focus of conscious intentionality and lacking in any explicit verbal content. In a case of this sort, a patient, Arthur, claims that his father is actually an impostor, who looks exactly like his father, but is actually someone else posing as his father.

Ramachandran suggest the following explanation. A direct link normally exists between the facial recognition mechanism and the areas controlling the appropriate emotional responses (particularly the amygdala). The sight of a close relative—a parent, in the case of Ramachandran's patient Arthur—normally triggers an affective response, which is itself subject to a "familiarity" evaluation. In Arthur's case, the direct link to the area in charge of generating the affective response is missing. As a result, the affective response to his father is not produced. This sets up a incongruity between the strictly cognitive familiarity check that applies to the face and the missing familiarity check applied to the expected affective response. The Capgras delusion is then no more than a perfectly reasonable inference: since I get a characteristic thrill when my father appears and I'm not getting it now, the person before me is not my father. On the other hand, he looks exactly like my father. Therefore she is an impostor, a stranger who looks just like my father. (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998, 158-173)

Note that the emotional premise of this inference is not experienced as either an emotion or as the premise of any argument: the entire mechanism lies below the threshold of consciousness. Note also that this "emotional premise" is of major importance in the person's life. That is why Ramachandran's hypothesis neatly accounts for the fact that the "impostor" syndrome only occurs with persons to whom the patient is particularly close: typically parents or spouses. It doesn't occur with the recognition of just anyone, because in most cases of recognition a more or less indifferent emotional reaction is normal, not aberrant. If something like this is correct, it would imply that recognition is subject to two independent checks. In those cases where the person recognized is both familiar and affectively significant, both markers are involved in the required "ID check". Failure of the two to agree leads to the verdict "impostor".

What is interesting about this case is that the role played by emotion is, on the one hand, clearly cognitive, since it is involved, if the foregoing description is correct, in the recognition of the subject's father. This recognition takes place below the level of consciousness and in parallel to the conscious processes of recognition. When dissociated from the emotional recognition,
however, this latter form of recognition enables the subject to recognize only the perfect resemblance. If nothing bears witness to the fact that this person's resemblance can be tied to the identity of *that particular person*, his father, then he will not know him as his father but interpret the experience as a perception of his father's double.

A similar story might plausibly be told concerning obsessive-compulsive disorder. OCD also appears to affect a fringe emotion, specifically the sense of "rightness." OCD may be seen as resulting from some sort of disconnection of the normal emotion of rightness in relation to recent memory of having taken necessary precautions. The relevant emotions here would be specifically *epistemic* emotions, which as Christopher Hookway (2001) has pointed out have been almost wholly neglected in the literature but constitute an extremely important aspect of our ability rationally to reason our way to new beliefs. If I didn't experience *doubt*, I wouldn't launch on an inquiry in the first place. If I didn't have the feeling of *rightness* about an inference, I wouldn't rely on it. If I didn't have the feeling of *conviction* about a conclusion, I wouldn't infer it. The patient suffering from OCD lacks some of those normal feelings. OCD has traditionally been taken to be a *neurotic* syndrome calling for psychoanalytic diagnosis and therapy. But the fact that some of these cases are apparently capable of clearing up under the influence of a targeted drug such as Prozac (Kramer 1993) suggests that this apparent complexity may in part be an illusion. Here again, though, we can see an apparently fringe-consciousness phenomenon at work, which is not apprehended as a conscious perception, yet affects cognition. It's also more obviously an emotional phenomenon at the manifest level, because it involves felt anxiety.

The intrinsically cognitive emotions to which Hookway draws attention are often neglected. They are a species of a broader class, which comprise our emotional reactions to the exercise of our powers. I've argued elsewhere that such emotional reactions to the exercise of our mental faculties is central to our appreciation of abstract art, and it seems to me plausible to extend this to the appreciation of music. When Scruton sneers at the "crescendos, diminuendos, etc.", he is ignoring the importance that some basic dynamic movements may have in cognition itself, and the power that the felt quality of their bare exercise may have to affect us.

In short, the power and intensity of our emotions on hearing music might be accounted for by the combination of at least these three sources of emotions: (1) emotions that are aroused entirely by the perception of form; (2) those, more or less relegated to the fringe of consciousness, which are aroused by associations and ancient narratives of our own affectional connections, but to which any intentional reference remains latent; and finally (3) the pleasure of simply exercising the many modules of our cognitive apparatus. All of these admit of degrees, and so can easily account for phenomenological intensity, all of them are related as much to perception as to any judgment, but all of them are intimately involved in cognition in a broad sense of the word. If I've dared to make this tiny addition to the panorama Nussbaum's book provides, it's only because I've felt that she'd taken care of *practically* everything.
References


